Iceland’s “No” vote: communication lessons the EU still refuses to learn

Iceland’s referendum is not an isolated setback for the pro-European cause. It is yet another wake-up call for the European Union, its institutions and its political leaders to improve the way they communicate.

At a time when enlargement has returned to the top of the European political agenda, Iceland’s referendum also matters for the wider European debate. If Europe is entering another phase of enlargement and political integration, EU institutions and political leaders must ask themselves whether they have learned how to bring citizens on board, both in candidate countries and within the EU itself.

The inability of the pro-European camp in Iceland to secure majority support echoes communication weaknesses seen in previous European referendums, including  Denmark’s rejection of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, the defeat of the European Constitution in France and the Netherlands in 2005, Ireland’s rejection of the Lisbon Treaty in 2008 and Brexit in 2016.

A familiar pattern of communication failure

All these referendums asked citizens to decide either their country’s relationship with the EU or the future direction of European integration. Despite their different political contexts, these campaigns revealed recurring weaknesses in pro-European political communication. Pro-European leaders offered abstract arguments and struggled to formulate a message that did not sound elitist. They communicated too late and focused too much on institutional procedures that few people understood, instead of addressing citizens’ real preoccupations and speaking to their hearts. Their Eurosceptic opponents were more vocal, spoke in plain language and used short, emotionally powerful messages about sovereignty, identity, national control and issues people genuinely cared about.

Pro-European national leaders have also ‘contributed’ to the problem by allowing the EU to become a scapegoat, a tactic usually associated with Eurosceptic parties and movements. They have too often failed to acknowledge the EU’s role in successful initiatives and achievements, while allowing Brussels to be associated primarily with unpopular decisions. The EU’s reputation cannot be rebuilt overnight, and years of negative narratives cannot suddenly be reversed during a short pre-referendum campaign. Yet the pro-European camp often waits until a referendum to explain the positive difference the EU makes, while their opponents have spent years criticising it. By the time the campaign begins, the “Yes” camp must defend an abstract political project from scratch, while the “No” camp only needs to draw on narratives that have already taken root, such as mobilising existing fears and promising to take back control from Brussels.

Putting complex questions on European integration to a referendum is a bold but risky political choice, particularly when sufficient public knowledge and debate have not been built beforehand. Citizens cannot be expected to master the technical details of European integration during a short campaign, nor should they have to. Political leaders must instead explain how the choice relates to citizens’ concerns, everyday lives and their country’s future. That requires sustained communication well before a referendum is called, rather than a last-minute effort to make the case for Europe.

Whether referendums are the right way to decide such complex matters, when they are not constitutionally required, is itself debatable and deserves a separate discussion. However, once political leaders choose to put these matters directly to citizens, they have a responsibility to ensure that voters have the knowledge needed to make an informed decision.

France and the Netherlands: when voters answered a different question

The defeat of the European Constitution in France and the Netherlands in 2005 provides an example of how a referendum on European integration can become a vote on wider national concerns when the pro-European case is not communicated effectively. The debate became dominated by immigration, sovereignty, identity, economic insecurity and enlargement, with many voters using the referendum to express dissatisfaction with their national governments rather than to judge the Constitution itself.

In France, the referendum became closely tangled with domestic political dissatisfaction, making it difficult to separate the vote on the Constitution from opinions about the government. Many citizens treated it as a “sanction vote”. In the Netherlands, concerns about national influence and identity came to overshadow the provisions of the Constitution itself. The pro-European political elite failed to translate the complex institutional text into a persuasive case that resonated with Dutch citizens.

The results demonstrated that providing information was not enough. Without persuasive political leadership and a message connected with citizens’ concerns, a referendum can become a vehicle for wider fears and preoccupations to shape the outcome.

Ireland and Brexit: why simple messages defeat complex and abstract arguments

In Ireland, the “No” campaign connected the Lisbon Treaty with threats to taxation, workers’ rights, neutrality, public services and national identity. When the vote was held again in 2009, a better organised and more convincing “Yes” campaign helped secure a different result. The Treaty had not become simpler, but the political communication had changed.

Brexit again demonstrated the power of a short and emotionally charged message. “Take back control” captured concerns about sovereignty, borders and national identity in three memorable words. The “Remain” campaign focused on the economic risks of leaving, including lower growth, job losses, reduced investment and damage to trade. However, it struggled to explain in an equally memorable and positive way the benefits of the UK remaining in the EU.

Iceland: another communication test the EU failed

The recent referendum in Iceland was another test of whether the EU and pro-European national leaders had learned from past experience and improved how they explain what the EU does, why it matters and how it benefits citizens. The outcome showed that they had not. Citizens of Iceland rejected reopening accession negotiations because the pro-European campaign failed to convince them why taking even the first step towards EU membership was in their country’s interest.

Iceland’s experience should also serve as a warning for the EU’s future enlargement. Accession is too often communicated bureaucratically, through negotiating chapters, technicalities and EU jargon, from an institutional ivory tower that speaks little, if at all, to most citizens. None of this answers the most important political question: why should people want their country to join the EU? Unless political leaders connect membership with citizens’ concerns, everyday lives and their country’s future, technical progress will not necessarily translate into public support. As Bono put it back in 2018, “Europe is a thought that needs to become a feeling.”

The “No” campaign told an emotional story: Iceland must protect its fishing waters, natural resources and independence. Its message was connected with the country’s history and identity.

The “Yes” campaign framed its message around “Yes to see”, reflecting its argument that a “Yes” vote would reopen accession negotiations and allow Icelanders to see what terms could be secured. While this captured the procedural purpose of the referendum, it did not serve as a persuasive political narrative capable of connecting with citizens. They were asked to support a complex and abstract negotiation process without clearly understanding what it would involve, while their opponents offered the simpler promise of retaining national control.

Information is not communication

Citizens of Iceland needed to know that opening negotiations would not amount to joining the EU and that they would have the opportunity to vote again on any final agreement. However, the pro-European case could not stop at explaining the procedure. It also had to show what Iceland could gain and better address concerns about fishing, natural resources and sovereignty. Through the European Economic Area, Iceland already implements many EU rules without having representatives in the European Parliament, a vote in the Council or a Commissioner. The “Yes” campaign missed the opportunity to use this contrast to present sovereignty as the capacity to have a seat at the table, shape the European rules that Iceland already implements and defend the country’s national interests from within the decision-making process.

The recurring lesson from more than three decades of EU-related referendums is that the EU needs more timely and effective pro-European communication from national and European political leaders and EU institutions. Information about the EU alone is not enough. Political leaders must listen actively, address citizens’ preoccupations and explain persuasively what the EU does, why it matters and what is at stake.

This will become even more important as the EU considers its next phase of enlargement and integration. Governments in candidate countries must prepare their citizens for the responsibilities and opportunities of EU membership. At the same time, European institutions and political leaders in the current member states must also explain to their citizens why enlargement is in their countries’ interest and how it can make Europe more secure, influential and resilient.

Enlargement cannot be communicated simply as an institutional process or a succession of negotiating chapters. It needs a political narrative that connects with people’s lives and addresses their concerns about security, prosperity, identity, sovereignty and Europe’s future. The EU cannot assume that public support will follow automatically once the technical conditions have been met.

The question now is: if Europe is entering another phase of enlargement and political integration, has it learned how to bring citizens on board, or will it once again hit the snooze button and sleepwalk towards its next crisis of public support?

The views expressed in this #CriticalThinking article reflect those of the author(s) and not of Friends of Europe.