A new European Security Order (made in Russia)? Nein, Danke.

#CriticalThinking

Peace, Security & Defence

Picture of Jamie Shea
Jamie Shea

Senior Fellow for Peace, Security and Defence at Friends of Europe, and former Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Emerging Security Challenges at the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

How do you kill a negotiation? By negotiating or at least pretending to negotiate. Ahead of planned winter bombardments of Ukraine’s cities, Russia has no interest in meaningful negotiations with Ukraine. Negotiations involve give and take, and Moscow is not willing to compromise or settle for what it has achieved thus far. Indeed, Putin has never desired dialogue. He still believes he can win his war against Ukraine despite Russia’s enormous losses (over 1mn soldiers killed or wounded since February 2022) and he has never deviated from Russia’s maximalist demands for Ukraine to cede all the territory of the Donbas to Moscow, elect a Russia-friendly government, renounce its right to join NATO, and limit the future size and firepower of its armed forces.

A winter of brutality

The greater the human and economic costs of the war to the Kremlin, the more these maximalist demands turn into the minimal requirements for Putin to demonstrate to the Russian people that the whole debacle has been worthwhile. Yet to win against Ukraine, Putin has to break the spirit of the Ukrainian people, convince them that further resistance is futile and that it is better to opt for ‘peace’ now while they still have buildings to live in, shops to buy food from and electricity that comes on for at least a few hours a day than to see their country and all its infrastructure totally destroyed.

With temperatures now falling below zero in Kyiv, winter is the best time for the Kremlin to make daily life for the Ukrainian people even more miserable and hazardous, and to test their breaking point. Yet making winter a weapon of war against Ukraine and has made the Kremlin even more reckless in breaking every norm of the international law governing armed conflict. Power grids, electricity generators, schools, buses, railway stations, service stations, supermarkets, water pumping stations and pipes, queues outside shops, hospitals and apartment buildings.  No civilian entity is now off the Kremlin’s target list for its round-the-clock ballistic missile and drone strikes. Civilian casualties are increasing rapidly and the days and nights of Ukrainians are being disrupted like never before.

A Russian army that has been unable to advance in eastern Ukraine for years (and has been rolled back 800 square kilometres by Ukraine so far in 2026) now sees winter as its best ally and chance of victory. Russian commanders wish to transfer the centre of gravity of the war from the front line to the home front, towards the soft and vulnerable civilian targets using long-range missiles rather than soldiers. The Russian army is more effective as a terrorist organisation than as a combat force. So don’t expect Putin to be serious about peace negotiations before the snow thaws in spring.

Dialogue as a smokescreen  

Despite their brutal winter tactics, the theatre of negotiations is a key part of the Kremlin’s strategy. By sending two Russian Deputy Foreign Ministers and a delegation to Abu Dhabi last week to meet the two US envoys, Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner, as well as a Ukrainian delegation, Putin was following a tried and tested tactic. If you can’t strengthen your own side, then try to weaken your adversary. Negotiations are a good way to do this. Participants in these may be classified as those who will take ‘peace at any price’ and those who insist on a just and principled peace.

Putin has little to lose and much to gain by engaging in performative ‘peace’ negotiations

The meetings allow the aggressor to impose their own victim narrative of the war in which they have been forced to take up arms because of supposed past injustices they have been subjected to.

To appear reasonable at the negotiating table, the aggressor can request that punitive measures against him, such as economic sanctions or diplomatic restrictions, be delayed or lifted altogether, while dangling the carrot of future lucrative business deals in front of other parties. Russia can cast the dispute caused by its aggression seem like an unnecessary irritant standing in the way of business as usual. Putin can promise that this is one last concession, claiming that a prolonged period of peace lasting decades will come once the annexation has been satisfied.

Hitler was adept at manipulating France and Britain with this tactic back in the 1930s as he sought to dismember Czechoslovakia and Poland. Witkoff and Kushner are both businessmen (first and foremost), and they have proved particularly susceptible to this line of argumentation from the Kremlin. Not by accident, the head of Russia’s sovereign wealth fund and chief scout for foreign direct investment opportunities, Kirill Dimitriev, has been their host and constant companion on all their visits to Moscow and been part of the Kremlin’s negotiating team.

By pointing to a better tomorrow, the Russian negotiating strategy has been able to induce the Trump administration to put most pressure on Kyiv as the weaker party that is refusing to recognise the fait accompli of territorial conquest and the inevitability of its ultimate defeat and therefore prolonging the suffering of its people by stubbornly staying in the fight. “You have no cards”, as Trump famously put it to Zelensky at their stormy meeting in the Oval Office in February 2025. In this way the ally of Kyiv becomes the ally of Moscow by exerting the greatest pressure on Ukraine to make concessions to obtain any peace agreement possible.

In sum, Putin has little to lose and much to gain by engaging in performative ‘peace’ negotiations. He can probe for differences and divisions among his opponents, driving wedges between them. By talking, the Russian leader can also break out of his diplomatic isolation, gain a media platform from which to broadcast globally Putin’s propaganda points against NATO and the West, and try to establish his credentials as a partner for the US and Europe on other issues such as energy supplies or the Iranian nuclear programme. All this seeks to minimise the significance of his aggression against his neighbour by muddying the waters and adding as many other, diversionary issues to the agenda as possible. Moreover, the intransigence of Kyiv in refusing to sacrifice territory that Russia has not yet conquered gives Putin an excuse to keep fighting, while Russia’s continuation of the war convinces Washington that it must pressure Kyiv, and take away support to Ukraine (for instance denying it access to Elon Musk’s Starshield satellite navigation system) if the war is to end.

Russia’s U-turn on the ESO

The Kremlin has long justified its invasion of Ukraine as a defensive reaction against NATO encroachment on its borders, particularly through enlargement to Ukraine. It has pointed the finger too at the “fascist” nature of the regime in Kyiv and played up imaginary threats to the security and wellbeing of ethnic Russians and Russian speakers living in eastern Ukraine. Moscow complains that there can be no peace unless the “root causes of the conflict” are addressed, as if the root cause was not its own invasion.

The ESO has become for Moscow what the Treaty of Versailles was for German nationalists in the days of the Weimar Republic

The Kremlin has found a new way continuing negotiations while pushing a resolution of the core issues into the long grass. They aim to make a peace agreement in Ukraine conditional upon a revision of the European Security Order (ESO). What Moscow is referring to here is the set of arrangements put in place after the Cold War to undergird a more cooperative security order in Europe giving all countries, and not just the major powers, a seat at the table and a voice in the debate. These included arms control treaties for both nuclear and conventional weapons, military transparency and confidence-building measures, permanent consultation forums like the NATO-Russia Council, established in 2002, or the Council and Security Forum of the OSCE in Vienna. Summit meetings between President Putin and the NATO and EU leaderships became commonplace and Russia joined some traditional Western clubs as well, such as the G7 (becoming the G8) or the Council of Europe. At the OSCE Istanbul summit in 1999 Russia accepted formally that every European country has the right to join an alliance and that military forces cannot be stationed outside national borders without the express will of the countries concerned. In the NATO-Russia Founding Act of 1997 the two sides declared that they no longer regarded each other as adversaries and pledged to cooperate on a range of challenges, from peacekeeping to nuclear safety and the fight against terrorism.  Moscow joined NATO’s peace support missions in Bosnia and Kosovo and welcomed a NATO information office in Moscow. As the Red Army pulled out of eastern Europe and NATO contingents packed their bags in the former West Germany, the age of military confrontation seemed definitively over.

When Russia shared the same vision as its European partners of a different type of security based on engagement and cooperation, the new security order offered the Kremlin multiple forms of integration and ways to plug in to the many cooperative activities that were available. The new order was not imposed on Russia against its will, Russian diplomats helped actively to construct it. But today the Kremlin insists it is a strategic disadvantage. Peace in Europe and cooperation with NATO gave Russia breathing space during which it could tackle its very real security threats such as domestic terrorism and separatism coming from Chechnya and the wider Caucasus.

The ESO has become for Moscow what the Treaty of Versailles  was for German nationalists in the days of the Weimar Republic: a convenient scapegoat to justify a sense of national humiliation at the hands of treacherous foreigners who took advantage of a temporarily weakened Russia and refused to recognise its great power status and natural security interests on the world stage.

In the eyes of Moscow, that ESO, designed for a cooperative Russia, now has to be dismantled if it is to rebuild its sphere of influence in eastern Europe and turn the countries of the region into a neutralised buffer zone against the West. Like a doctor advocating major surgery as the only way to cure an illness, Putin is trying to convince the US and Europe that only a revision of the entire post-1989 settlement will stop the violence in Ukraine. Or to quote General Dwight Eisenhower: “if you can’t solve a problem, make it bigger.”

This demand is not new. It first surfaced in 2008 as the Medvedev Plan when the then Russian president wanted to establish a directory of great powers (including first and foremost Russia) to oversee the activities of the OSCE and NATO. At the last meeting of the NATO-Russia Council in 2022, on the eve of Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine, Russian diplomats presented the Kremlin’s basic demands to the allies: the withdrawal of NATO forces from the territories of the countries that joined the alliance after 1997;  no NATO exercises close to border areas; a halt to further NATO enlargement; no alliance forces to be stationed in Ukraine, particularly to train the Ukrainian army or help to implement a peace agreement; and limits on the future size and equipment of the Ukrainian military. To these, the Kremlin has now added more demands: that the UK cease to extend its national nuclear deterrent to its NATO allies; that Finland, which reversed its previous policy of non-alignment and joined NATO after Russia invaded Ukraine, leave the alliance; and that countries in eastern Europe conclude with Moscow bilateral non-aggression pacts. These pacts would clearly give Moscow a “droit de regard” over their defence plans and undermine NATO’s collective defence guarantee. In return Moscow has hinted that it could withdraw its forces from Moldova (Transnistria) and Belarus although the latter would presumably remain embedded in the Russian military command structure.

Can Europe explore joining these talks?

As Europeans ponder the Russian proposals, they must be clear among themselves (and with Moscow) about what is negotiable and what is non-negotiable. Russia is a big neighbour of Europe which will remain problematic even if not always a direct military threat. So clearly Europe has a permanent interest in stable, transparent and predictable security relations with Russia. Russia has to be part of the European security architecture even if on the periphery and not centrally integrated into the European project. That means trying to get back into the more cooperative relationship we had with Russia in the 1990s when there were arms control agreements (INF, CFE, Open Skies, Vienna Document, etc) as well as political agreements such as the 1990 OSCE Charter and the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act. There was also after 2002 the NATO-Russia Council. But it will probably take many years, even with a more cooperative regime in the Kremlin, to negotiate new arms control treaties and in light of recent experience there will be doubts on the European side that Moscow will stick to these agreements, making rigorous verification and regular review conferences essential if the agreements are to have any lasting value. So, something more modest, but which still suits the interests of both sides, will have to be found.

It is a familiar Kremlin tactic: make outrageous demands and put everything on the table in the knowledge that you will not get everything but that your adversaries will be sufficiently rattled to at least make some concessions

Some of the Russian proposals, put on the table of the NATO-Russia Council back in 2022, may be worth exploring, such as more early warning and transparency regarding military exercises, reciprocal observation of exercises, agreements to prevent and handle dangerous incidents at sea and in the air, and a crisis hot line between Brussels and the Kremlin. Moscow has mentioned these ideas to Kushner and Witkoff and they have (predictably again) taken them onboard. The NATO allies can presumably compete the list with ideas of their own, such as a halt to non-declared military deployments or to the use of civilian assets for covert military activities, designed to limit Russian shadow fleet operations.  But most of these ideas are not new.  They were pursued in the OSCE in Vienna for decades and were the subject of many meetings of the NATO-Russia Council before it collapsed after Putin invaded Ukraine. In some cases, such as the use of transponders by military aircraft to aid identification a good deal of preliminary technical work had been done. So, it would be possible to come back to these confidence-building measures but only after a Ukraine ceasefire and a withdrawal of Russian forces from Ukraine into a less threatening posture. Today is certainly not the moment. But there is a world of difference between these procedural and de-escalatory measures and re-opening the fundamental principles of the post-Cold War European order.  Such as the right to join an alliance, the commitment to the peaceful settlement of disputes, the right of states to voluntarily welcome foreign troops and bases onto their territories, the pledge that Russia and NATO no longer regard each other as enemies, avoiding unequal zones of security within NATO, the legitimacy of the transatlantic security relationship, to name only a few.

Russia is trying to muddy the waters by mixing up the procedural and the fundamental issues to confuse European public opinion. It is a familiar Kremlin tactic: make outrageous demands and put everything on the table in the knowledge that you will not get everything but that your adversaries will be sufficiently rattled to at least make some concessions. Half a cake is still better than none.

Moreover, Moscow is also trying to convey the idea that there is some Yalta-style Grand Bargain to be had which, in exchange for the sacrifice of Ukraine and giving Russia a sphere of influence in eastern Europe, will ensure Europe peace and tranquillity for decades into the future. This could mean no more big spending on the military and lots more money for welfare and pensions. Propositions that, as elections approach in Spain, France and Germany are highly attractive to the far-left and far-right populists and no doubt to their counterparts across Europe, even if the imperial nature of the Putin regime and Russia’s current trajectory make this ‘get-out-of-jail card’ for hard-pressed European voters largely an illusion. But the populists are already calling for a halt to more aid for Ukraine and a return to cheap fossil fuel imports from Russia. In concluding a deal to buy 300,000 tonnes of Russian diesel (a deal that will not lower diesel prices at the pump for the American consumer but will significantly increase Putin’s war chest for his campaign against Ukraine) Trump has already led the way.

Europe’s task

So how must Europe respond to Russia’s calls to abandon the ESO and return to the 19th century model of spheres of influence, and constantly shifting balance of power diplomacy…a European past in which the big powers define their security interests as they see fit and small states appear and disappear as the tide of history moves along?

1. EU involvement in the peace negotiations

The first step is to get fully involved in the Ukraine peace talks moving forward. Given that the fate of Ukraine is much more existential for the security of Europe than for that of the United States, it has long been absurd that the US is negotiating the fate of Europe with European diplomats as observers in the antechamber and not at the table as direct participants.  One of the positive outcomes of the talks in Abu Dhabi is that Witkoff and Kushner appear to have persuaded the Kremlin that Europe should be a participant from now on.  It long opposed this, arguing that due to its support for Kyiv, Europe was a co-belligerent and could not therefore act as an impartial mediator (as if the billions of dollars and military assistance that both the Biden and Trump administrations have given Ukraine could be so easily disregarded).

But Europeans have long been hesitant about pushing for a seat, not sure who would best represent their views (a hardliner or a more conciliatory individual) and whether they might offend Trump and weaken further his support for NATO if they defended a distinct European position.  But Trump’s willingness to negotiate on the ESO and to ease Russia’s financial difficulties have rung alarm bells and pushed the Europeans into action.

At the recent meeting of the European Political Community in Dublin, they agreed on a negotiating team consisting of the 5 big European powers (UK, France, Germany, Poland and Italy) along with representatives of the EU institutions (presumably the High Representative, Kaja Kallas who has warned her fellow Europeans not to “fall into the trap” set by the Kremlin in re-opening the ESO).  Because once one fundamental principle is given up, the others begin to be questioned and lose their legitimacy quickly thereafter.

But Europe is not known for its unity and perseverance and so formulating and defending a collective position in the face of the Kremlin’s derision and attempts to divide Europe will be a big diplomatic challenge. There will be outliers, like the Slovak Prime Minister Fico, tempted to break ranks, undermine EU solidarity and cut bilateral deals with Russia. Smaller EU member states may make trouble if they feel marginalised by the E5 big powers representing them in the peace talks.  It will take inspired political leadership from Ukraine’s friends in Europe to keep the continent together while also trying to persuade Washington to take a firmer and more principled position vis-à-vis Moscow at this difficult time. Hopefully a Congress in the hands of the Democrats and with many friends of Ukraine and NATO in its ranks can help to deliver this.

When it comes to negotiating positions, Europe should follow three objectives. First not to impose on Ukraine anything that Kyiv is not willing to accept itself. This is particularly the case when it comes to territorial concessions.  Second, to press for a ceasefire before a final peace settlement is agreed and as a precondition for meaningful negotiations to proceed.  European negotiators need to push back against the Russian position that nothing can be agreed before all of Russia’s demands have been addressed and satisfied. This is a recipe for paralysis and nothing more than a capitulation by Ukraine with the West exchanging real security for a fragile peace.  Third, Europe should press for partial deals that can help to relieve immediate suffering, such as a halt to strikes against energy infrastructure, a re-opening of the Black Sea to commercial shipping and a halt to attacks on port infrastructure, and humanitarian pauses allowing for the safe evacuation of civilians, as happened last October for the inhabitants of Oleshky near Kherson.

2. Never abandon Ukraine: Plan accordingly

Second Europe must make clear to the Kremlin that it will not abandon Ukraine under any circumstances and will be Kyiv’s partner ‘for as long as it takes’.  Putin is looking at the upcoming elections in Europe and counting on the exhaustion of the European taxpayer as much as that of the Ukrainian families huddled in underground bomb shelters.  He is always alert to signs of ‘Ukraine fatigue’ among European governments and is aware that the Northern European countries pay the lion’s share of the financial support and weapons purchases for Ukraine.  He sees ad hoc and last-minute financial packages being cobbled together for Kyiv in which not all EU member states participate.

So, what Europe needs to do is to come up in 2027 with an agreed financial plan for Ukraine including the transition from war to reconstruction and the long-term financing of a Ukrainian army of 800,000 active soldiers and reservists.  This plan should have an initial 10-year time frame and the funding streams need to be spelled out to demonstrate to Russia that all of Europe is committed to this long-term effort.  Linking the funding to the next EU 7-year Financial Framework and moving ahead on an EU commitment to jointly cover any legal liability for the confiscation of frozen Russian bank assets (to be used as collateral for low interest loans to Ukraine) can have the desired effect. Putin is hoping that the election of the far right or far left to power in key European countries like France will weaken support for Ukraine and force Zelensky to cave in to Moscow’s demands.

The task of Europe overall is to make sure that Putin’s gambit does not succeed.  In this context the efforts by Chancellor Merz to ringfence financial support for Ukraine in future EU budgets so that it is not vulnerable to individual vetoes by EU member states deserve the backing of the EU Council now, and not waiting for the French elections next year. Yet more immediately Ukraine has a €70bn funding shortfall in 2027 which the EU and its international partners need to fill.  This is on top of the €45bn from the current EU support loan to Kyiv totalling €90bn which most EU members agreed to last year.  As a free and secure Ukraine is the lynchpin of the future ESO, demonstrating to Moscow that Europe will have Ukraine’s back for as long as it takes is the best way to counter the Kremlin’s plans to use a defeated and subjugated Ukraine to prise this order open.

3. Help Ukraine this winter 

Third is to help Ukraine to survive the upcoming winter.  This will mean fuel supplies, emergency generators and humanitarian support to the civilian population. Europe must find more air defence missiles for Ukraine urgently and step up the joint production of the new anti-missile and counter-drone technologies that have been developed by Ukrainian start-up companies. The allies need to prevail upon Washington to stop the damaging on-again/off-again access to the Starlink (and military version Starshield) satellite navigation network that is impeding Kyiv’s ability to track and shoot down incoming Russian missiles and drones.  Another winter with no significant breakthrough is bound to increase opposition to the war in Russia and to put pressure on Putin to seek a way out.

4. Inform the public of Russia’s ESO U-turn

Fourth is a public communications campaign to push back against the Kremlin’s indictment of the ESO. For too long European politicians and thought leaders, including in the media, have allowed Russian diplomats and think tankers to get away with false stories of Russian victimhood and imaginary Western conspiracies against the country’s security.

Repeat a lie often enough and people will start to believe it is a principle of political communication invented by Joseph Goebbels. But it is a staple of authoritarian regimes in general. They like to rewrite history, which is always a complex affair at the best of times, into black and white mythology where good is on one side of the ledger and bad on the other. Nationalism is often based on a sense of exploitation, unfairness and a desire to settle scores. It re-interprets past events, inflating the significance of some and playing down or denying the importance of others. All to lay the groundwork for revisionist foreign policies. But as the US Senator, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, was fond of pointing out: “everyone is entitled to their own opinion, but everyone is not entitled to their own facts”.

The fact of the matter is that Russia signed up to all of the core post-Cold War treaties and documents establishing the ESO and committed to upholding them. Moreover, Russia was one of the principal beneficiaries of that order being more integrated than ever before and with its citizens enjoying more freedom and prosperity as well as more genuine democracy. The source of Russia’s democratic decline and economic reversals is not the ESO but Putin’s decision after 2007 to turn his back on it. This is something that Russian diplomats often pretend to disregard but Russians themselves need to be reminded of.


The views expressed in this #CriticalThinking article reflect those of the author(s) and not of Friends of Europe.

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