Peace, Security & Defence Forum 2027

Europe’s central question is no longer whether it should assume greater responsibility for its security, but how it can build the capacity to defend itself and make independent decisions while preserving cooperation with the United States where interests align. Where priorities diverge or access to critical US capabilities is uncertain, what must Europe be able to deliver on its own? A European Defence Union should be judged by results, not by the creation of another institution. Can Europe assess threats, take decisions, mobilise forces, sustain Ukraine and respond to aggression as one operational space? What governance and partnerships would make this possible?

This requires common threat assessments, shared planning, interoperable forces, military mobility and assured access to critical enablers. It also requires political readiness to deter, impose costs and manage escalation – not simply to absorb attacks. Planning must address both major conventional aggression and persistent cyber, sabotage, disinformation and other hybrid operations, while protecting democratic decision-making and essential civilian services.

Ukraine and Europe’s eastern flank must be central to this effort. Their experience offers practical lessons in adaptation, preparedness and endurance. The Forum should ask which lessons European governments and armed forces have already translated into practice, which remain unaddressed and what has prevented implementation. Ukraine should be treated as a security provider and co-designer of European defence, not merely a recipient of assistance. The Forum should examine how to integrate Ukraine into European planning, procurement, innovation and industrial production now, without waiting for the completion of the country’s EU accession.

• What self-defence capabilities and independent decision-making capabilities should a European Defence Union be able to deliver by 2030, and who should be accountable?
• How can Europe reconcile different threat perceptions and take timely decisions, including when unanimity proves unattainable?
• Which critical enablers must be under assured European operational control by 2030, given uncertainty over access to US capabilities, and what credible interim arrangements are needed?
• Which Ukrainian operational lessons have European states actually implemented, which remain neglected, and what prevents wider adoption and partnership with Ukraine?

Europe’s defence industry must prepare for sustained high-intensity operations. Ukraine has demonstrated the importance of affordable systems produced at scale and the capacity to replenish equipment and ammunition under pressure. Other recent conflicts have underlined the continuing importance of complex capabilities, layered air and missile defence, substantial stockpiles and the ability to replenish them during sustained operations. This session will focus on production, procurement, supply chains and the financing required to sustain them.

Europe’s major defence companies have the engineering depth, systems-integration expertise and supply-chain reach needed to deliver these capabilities. Yet fragmented national requirements, short-term orders and limited visibility over future demand continue to constrain investment in production capacity, skilled workers and lower-tier suppliers. Longer-term contracts, aggregated demand and clearer procurement pipelines are essential to industrial readiness. The discussion should also consider how defence investment can support European jobs, skills and growth, and where economic trade-offs arise.

Industrial readiness also depends on dependable supply chains, financing and procurement decisions that give companies confidence to invest. Europe must identify dependencies on non-European software, cloud services, satellite systems and components that could restrict operational choices. A practical dependency audit should distinguish manageable commercial exposure from vulnerabilities that could prevent mission success. The session will test whether EU and NATO industrial initiatives are changing national purchasing decisions and encouraging joint procurement, or simply adding overlapping mechanisms.

• Which long-term demand signals, financing tools and contractual commitments would enable companies and suppliers to expand and sustain production capacity?
• How can national procurement systems aggregate demand and place timely orders, and what have EU and NATO industrial initiatives changed in practice?
• How should industrial investment balance capability requirements, secure supply chains and production resilience with jobs, skills and wider European economic growth?
• Which critical supply-chain and technology dependencies could disrupt sustained operations, and who should address them first by 2030?

Europe continues to invest heavily in legacy platforms and established acquisition models, even as warfare becomes more digital, iterative and dependent on rapidly evolving dual-use technologies. This creates a growing mismatch between the speed of technological change and the pace of military adoption. From AI and robotics to space-enabled capabilities, autonomous systems and other emerging technologies, many militaries and procurement systems still struggle to move useful prototypes into testing, doctrine, training and operational deployment.

Europe has no shortage of promising defence start-ups and SMEs. The difficulty is shortening the journey from prototype to deployed capability. Limited access to military users and realistic testing environments, lengthy certification and regulatory procedures, uncertain follow-on contracts and limited tolerance for failure can prevent promising solutions from reaching the field. Ukraine’s operational feedback loops provide a concrete test of what Europe has learned and what remains unimplemented.

A stronger innovation pipeline needs faster access to military users and test environments, proportionate certification and regulatory requirements, rapid experimentation and clear routes from successful trials to procurement and operational use. This demands greater willingness to accept managed risk, as well as cooperation between armed forces, established manufacturers, start-ups and investors. EU and NATO innovation initiatives should be assessed by whether they shorten national testing, approval and acquisition cycles rather than multiply parallel programmes. The test is not the number of projects funded, but the time taken for relevant capabilities to reach forces and improve operational effectiveness.

• What would shorten the route from prototype through testing and certification to deployment, and which procurement rules or practices must change?
• How can armed forces adopt AI, space-enabled technologies, robotics, autonomous systems and other emerging capabilities rapidly while managing operational and regulatory risk?
• Which lessons from Ukraine’s experimentation and frontline feedback have European forces adopted, and which remain blocked by doctrine, testing or acquisition systems?
• How can EU and NATO innovation initiatives help national authorities procure and deploy successful technologies faster instead of creating overlapping processes?