NATO’s fragile future under the spotlight: a preview of the upcoming Ankara Summit

As NATO prepares for a pivotal summit in Ankara, questions over deterrence, burden-sharing and the Alliance’s long-term strategic posture are once again at the centre of transatlantic debate. Friends of Europe’s policy debate “NATO’s fragile future in the spotlight: a preview of the Ankara Summit” examined how decisions at the upcoming Ankara Summit should update NATO’s deterrence and defence posture, integrate lessons from Ukraine’s wartime innovation and advance a more robust European pillar while preserving US strategic engagement.

Friends of Europe was honoured to host Rose Gottemoeller, former NATO Deputy Secretary General and US Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security, and Trustee of Friends of Europe; Myroslava Gongadze, Senior Fellow for Peace, Security and Defence at Friends of Europe and Non-resident Senior Fellow at Atlantic Council; and Jamie Shea, Senior Fellow for Peace, Security and Defence at Friends of Europe and former NATO Deputy Assistant Secretary General, alongside more than 90 distinguished online participants.

Rose Gottemoeller underlined that bipartisan support for NATO and Ukraine remains firm in the US Congress despite ongoing domestic turbulence. She highlighted growing respect on Capitol Hill for Ukraine’s rapid innovation cycle and suggested the Ankara Summit could deliver a reaffirmation of Article 5 that would be acceptable to President Trump, with Congress strongly backing collective defence.

Drawing an explicit parallel with NATO’s experience during the 2003 Iraq war, she recalled that the conflict was a “very dangerous” and highly divisive moment for the Alliance, yet one from which NATO ultimately recovered and continued to advance. In her view, this demonstrates that even severe crises can significantly strain, but do not necessarily fracture, the transatlantic relationship.

Myroslava Gongadze argued that Ankara comes at a point where it is no longer sufficient to restate NATO’s stability; the key issue is whether the Alliance can prepare for a potential direct test by Russia, particularly in frontline states. She noted that the growing defence and drone focus of the recent Ukraine Recovery Conference illustrates how security and industrial capacity now underpin both Ukraine’s recovery and broader European security.

She set out three priorities for Ankara:

1. Recognise deterrence as industrial, with clear commitments on how quickly allies will build, modernise and scale production in relation to Russia.
2. Strengthen Europe as a security actor within NATO, prioritising procurement efficiency and defence industrial capacity – focusing on how spending can make procurement and industry more effective in the long run.
3. Shape NATO’s future around Ukrainian lessons – from drones and electronic warfare to civilian resilience and rapid innovation – shifting the question from whether Ukraine is ready for NATO to whether NATO is ready to integrate Ukraine’s operational experience.

Jamie Shea argued that Europe must further reduce its military dependence on the US, noting that defence of NATO’s eastern flank is already far more dependent on European capabilities than during the Cold War. For Ankara, he called for clarity on US troop and equipment posture, continued US nuclear guarantees, and sustained US political‑military engagement in NATO.

He also suggested the summit could be used to re‑tighten pressure on Russia, including through sanctions, now that the Iran war’s impact on oil markets has receded. Echoing Gongadze’s remarks, he further stressed that NATO must move towards a more “industrial” model of deterrence, with faster procurement and scalable production of key capabilities such as drones and air defence systems.

However, he warned that a widening North–South gap in European defence spending and support for Ukraine could undermine any meaningful European pillar emerging from the summit.

The discussion converged on the view that post‑Cold War NATO is over. The Ankara Summit must signal a transition towards an alliance in which Europeans assume a larger share of conventional defence, NATO’s industrial planning supports high‑volume production of capabilities proven in Ukraine, and Ukrainian operational lessons are embedded in NATO doctrine, training and capability development – all while maintaining US nuclear guarantees and close transatlantic political coordination.

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PHOTO CREDIT: Shutterstock| Alexandros Michailidis