Clearing the skies: European security architecture in the age of unmanned warfare

Friends of Europe’s high-level breakfast roundtable “Clearing the Skies: European security architecture in the age of unmanned warfare” examined how Europe should redesign its security architecture in an era of unmanned warfare, drone incursions and hybrid threats. The discussion focused on frontline experiences along Europe’s eastern border and the strategic implications of the war in Ukraine.

Friends of Europe was delighted to host Kyllike Sillaste-Elling, Permanent Representative of Estonia to the EU, Nerijus Aleksiejūnas, Permanent Representative of Lithuania to the EU, and Krisztian Meszaros, State Secretary for Multilateral Issues in the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, as introductory speakers. They were joined by senior officials from across the European defence and security ecosystem, including the European Commission’s Directorate-General for Defence Industry and Space (DG DEFIS), the Council of the European Union, NATO’s D2IA, the European Defence Agency and several Permanent Representations to the EU.

The discussion opened with a broad consensus that European security architecture is undergoing a fundamental transformation, marked by an increase in drone incursions into European airspace, substantial new commitments to defence spending, and a growing public perception that national security is under threat. Yet many of the political, bureaucratic and industrial reflexes that govern security policy still operate on a peacetime logic, while the continent lives in what was described as a “new normal” of chronic insecurity and hybrid pressure.

Participants noted broad convergence on the nature of the threat, with Russia widely recognised as the primary threat to European security. Despite this agreement, some raised concerns about the absence of a shared sense of urgency and the lack of an innovation model capable of keeping pace with the rapidly evolving, drone-centred character of the war in Ukraine. This was despite accelerated defence capability development across Europe in recent years and important industrial potential.

Ukraine’s experience of conducting the war was used to illustrate this gap. On the frontlines, small units can identify flaws in unmanned systems, send short video clips directly to manufacturers, and see design modifications incorporated and returned to the battlefield within days. This type of rapid feedback loop at the tactical level stands in stark contrast to European defence innovation and procurement processes, which remain constrained by lengthy procedures, competition rules, fragmented national approaches, and a low tolerance for risk. While drones were repeatedly identified as a genuine game changer, policy and industrial frameworks have yet to adjust commensurately. It was also stressed that, alongside drawing lessons from Ukraine’s adaptation, Europe must systematically analyse how Russia is learning and reconstituting its forces during the conflict, to anticipate future Russian concepts of operations rather than preparing only for the current phase of the war.

Europe’s primary problem is not a lack of technology or capable firms: many companies in the drone and counter-drone space are already highly competitive. Instead, the bottlenecks are found in fragile value chains, where key suppliers struggle to scale; in regulatory systems that inhibit fast iteration; and in the absence of predictable, long-term demand signals from governments. Rather than relying on one-off national purchases, participants called for a more structured European approach that provides stable demand while preserving flexibility to adapt to new technologies emerging from the battlefield.

A second strand of the discussion focused on direct experience with recent drone alerts and hybrid incidents in Europe. In a recent case experienced by Lithuania, tens of thousands of residents were instructed to move to shelters, revealing significant weaknesses in preparedness, communication and crisis management. At the same time, examples of drone incursions crossing borders showed that national air alert and airspace management systems do not yet interoperate effectively, leading to fragmented situational awareness and response. Taken together, these factors were seen as a warning of how unprepared many parts of Europe remain for sustained, high-intensity drone or hybrid attacks.

Critical gaps remain in European preparedness: technologically, key gaps persist in detection, tracking, air alert interoperability and counter-drone capabilities, while societally, civil protection systems, shelter infrastructure, public guidance and psychological preparedness remain underdeveloped. The most exposed regions – countries on Europe’s eastern flank – are effectively serving as testing grounds for methods that could later be used more broadly. At the same time, there is a growing reliance on Ukrainian experience and expertise in counter-drone practice, hybrid resilience and civil protection, which is already being shared well beyond Ukraine’s borders.

Thirdly, the strategic future of Ukraine itself emerged as a central security issue. Contributors argued that supporting and integrating Ukraine is now a core European interest, not only a matter of solidarity or values. If Ukraine were to be absorbed into an adversarial orbit, or to slide into instability and state failure, the consequences for European security would be severe, ranging from increased military pressure on EU borders to uncontrolled spread of combat experience and advanced drone know how. By contrast, bringing Ukraine closer politically, economically and industrially was described as a strategically beneficial and sustainable approach for Europe.

Finally, European efforts on capability development, industrial policy and resilience were seen as complementary to NATO and the wider transatlantic security architecture. With the NATO Ankara Summit only days away, three specific priorities for the summit were presented:

• First, a major political push on drone and counter-drone capabilities, combining double-digit billion investments with a strong emphasis on upskilling operators in line with lessons from Ukraine;
• second, a new “scale-up package” designed to match innovation with demand, including a clear, declassified signal on aggregate capability needs in five priority areas so that innovators and industry know what to build for;
• and third, a drive to mobilise more private capital and connect defence innovators with existing commercial production lines, reducing the need for new factories and enabling faster surge production when required.

Together, these measures are intended to help close the gap between defence innovation and the ability to generate deployable capabilities at Alliance level.

Ideas to take forward

• Build a “fast lane” for defence innovation
  Create EU frameworks that can translate frontline operational feedback on drones and counter-drones into funded development and deployment within months, not years, overcoming the current pattern of year-long decision-making and disbursement cycles that leave European instruments out of sync with battlefield realities.
• Use predictable, long-term demand to drive capability development
  Use joint European procurement and long-term contracts to give industry clear, stable signals on priority capabilities, while embedding flexibility to upgrade systems as technology evolves.
• Build consistent, interoperable capabilities across the full spectrum of threats
  Capability development must be coherent and complementary, covering all threat vectors and ensuring interoperability rather than creating a patchwork of national systems.
• Strengthen cross-border drone and airspace coordination
  Develop shared standards and joint operational protocols so that unmanned incursions crossing borders are detected, tracked and managed through an integrated European response rather than fragmented national systems.
• Build a European preparedness and civilian security framework
  Develop a pan-European civilian security framework covering civil defence planning, continuity of government, public-private coordination, resilience of democratic institutions and whole-of-society preparedness. This framework should also define how Europe operates under continuous pressure, including thresholds for moving beyond normal peacetime procedures when countries are affected differently.
• Invest in societal resilience, not only hardware
  Pair investments in air defences and counter-drone technology with public guidance on shelters, regular civil protection exercises and basic education on how to respond to alerts.
• Make Ukraine a structured partner in capability development
  Systematically channel Ukrainian battlefield lessons into European planning through joint R&D programmes, co production schemes and regular operational dialogues.
• Introduce security and resilience clauses in enlargement tools
  Embed explicit security, defence‑industrial and resilience clauses into enlargement and neighbourhood agreements. These should link EU support and market access to partners’ steps to integrate their defence and raw‑materials sectors into European value chains, protect strategic assets from competing powers, and strengthen democratic and societal resilience (including free media, investigative journalism, civil protection and critical‑infrastructure cooperation). Over time, this can be formalised as a ‘security chapter’ with clear benchmarks in accession packages.
• Use partnerships to reinforce Europe’s industrial and societal base
  Treat candidate and neighbouring countries as part of Europe’s extended defence industrial and raw materials ecosystem, using EU instruments to build joint capacity rather than keeping them at arm’s length. In parallel, use partnerships to bolster democratic and societal resilience by supporting free media, investigative journalism and civic protection cooperation, so that EU–partner collaboration strengthens both capabilities and societies.
• Develop ‘anti-dependence’ mechanisms in critical areas
  The EU should identify the technologies most critical to European sovereignty, security effectiveness and resilience, and establish mechanisms to prevent strategic dependencies in these areas through instruments, including premiums and more coherent governance. Particular attention should go to AI, autonomous systems, cyber, quantum, space, advanced communications and critical digital infrastructure, with the aim of ensuring that Europe retains sufficient control over the technologies on which its security depends.

Related content:

• Event | Clearing the skies: elevating European capabilities in drone and counter-drone systems
• Event | Clearing the skies: scaling Europe’s drone and counter-drone innovation
• Insight | Here come the drones: how can Europe “keep calm and carry on”?

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PHOTO CREDIT: Shutterstock| Es sarawuth