How will Merkel's foreign policy change after the September elections?

Karl-Heinz Kamp is President of the Federal Academy for Security Policy in Berlin

In the September federal elections in Germany, Chancellor Angela Merkel won a fourth term in office, but probably not the way she wanted. Her conservative party polled at historic lows and she will have to rely on an untested and difficult coalition with the Green Party and the revived Liberals.

Merkel will also face a harsher and angrier opposition featuring the right wing nationalist Alternative for Germany (Alternative für Deutschland, AfD), which became the third largest group in the national parliament. What does this new constellation mean for Germany’s future security policy course? Will the country, which has meanwhile taken the lead in the EU and NATO, reduce its international engagement?

It is unlikely. Angela Merkel as one of the most experienced and respected political leaders on the international scene will remain firmly committed to a strong Europe and a firm transatlantic security partnership. Moreover, Germany’s political class – except the extreme left and right – has been characterised by a broad political consensus on the basics of security policy for decades, such as internationalism, alliances, commitments, consensus and solidarity. This consensus can hardly be destroyed by populist movements, which usually fail when their presence in governments or parliaments forces them to transform their simple slogans into realistic policy concepts.

Still, the new government will be confronted with a vast number of foreign and security problems that will require stamina, patience and smart politics. Five areas will be particularly difficult.

The fourth point, Franco-German cooperation, is closely intertwined with European defence. The victory of President Macron is an opportunity to overcome stagnation in France and free energies for Franco-German cooperation benefitting EU security in general. However, despite common good will, both countries still differ fundamentally with respect to threat assessment and level of ambition. Germany will have to bridge the gap between France’s request for strong intervention capabilities for Africa and the NATO defence needs in the East.

Fifth, in order to make headway in all three areas, NATO, CSDP and cooperation with France, Germany has to make up its mind on two core issues: one is nuclear deterrence and the other is its policy on arms exports. NATO is improving its nuclear posture in reaction to the threat Russia poses in Eastern Europe. In the German public, however, the anti-nuclear tenor gains force, particularly since the United Nations voted for the condemnation of nuclear weapons in general. Moreover, one of the new coalition-partners, the Green Party, has its roots in the pacifist movement of the 1970s and is therefore strictly anti-nuclear.

Regarding arms exports, Germany traditionally adopts a much more restrictive course than most of its European allies and France in particular. However, European or Franco-German defence cooperation will not work if commonly produced weapons cannot be exported because of a German blockade. This is once again an issue that will be tough to solve with the Greens in government.

Hence, Germany’s general course will not change but there will be more potential for friction both at home and between Germany and its partners.

This article reflects the author’s personal opinion