Europe at war: Friends of Europe’s warning shot

The authors of this warning shot are Gábor Iklódy, Myroslava Gongadze, Jamie Shea and Thomas Van Vynckt. Gábor Iklódy is Senior Fellow for Peace, Security and Defence at Friends of Europe, former EU Ambassador, and former Assistant Secretary General for Emerging Security challenges at NATO; Myroslava Gongadze is Senior Fellow for Peace, Security and Defence at Friends of Europe, Non-resident Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council, Supervisory Board Member at the Ukrainian Institute and Editorial Advisory Board Member at Ukrainska Pravda; Jamie Shea is Senior Fellow for Peace, Security and Defence at Friends of Europe and former Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Emerging Security challenges at NATO; Thomas Van Vynckt is Head of Peace, Security and Defence at Friends of Europe.

Russian threats and targeted actions against Europe are not isolated incidents. They form a centrally planned and managed campaign designed to destabilise European societies, test Europe’s resilience and resolve, and weaken the transatlantic bond. Russia is using a wide toolkit: sabotage of critical infrastructure, subversion, cyberattacks, disinformation and propaganda, GPS jamming of civilian aircrafts, damaging undersea cables, drone incursions over EU territory, and operations targeting critical and commercial infrastructure as well as our democratic institutions have all been observed in recent days, months, and years.

Hybrid warfare campaigns work best in polarised societies and what we are witnessing through these measures is exacerbating polarisation, eroding trust, and dividing communities. Therefore, countering disinformation, protecting media independence, and building public trust must be strategic security priorities.

None of this is new. These tactics have been part of Russia’s “active measures” for a century. The novelty lies in the scale, frequency, growing boldness, and openness of these operations. The purpose is clear: deter Europe from supporting Ukraine by weakening public support, prepare the ground for future escalation and, crucially, sow doubt about NATO’s Article 5 pledge – the very foundation of the transatlantic security apparatus.

Russia does not hide its intent: it openly claims it is at war with NATO and Europe. This narrative is a central theme in its domestic propaganda to justify the full-scale invasion of Ukraine by portraying it as resistance to Western expansionism. With Washington searching for a quick end to the war, prioritising speed, money and backroom deals over lasting peace, Moscow sees Europe as the main obstacle because it continues to support Ukraine to resist and push back Russian advances. Also, because Europe refuses to accept the Kremlin’s terms.

Taken individually, each hybrid incident committed or sponsored by Russia has been calibrated to remain below thresholds that would trigger stronger NATO and European responses, let alone trigger Article 5. Taken together, they reach the level of a sustained, below-threshold, hybrid war against Europe and NATO. Failing to acknowledge this reality makes truly effective and robust countermeasures to deter further escalation very difficult and risks opening the way for much worse scenarios. Weak reactions to Russia’s aggressions against Ukraine in 2014 and Georgia in 2008 have led us to where we are today and serve as stark reminders.

Yet, Europe remains stuck in bureaucratic inertia and political risk aversion. Internal divisions, slow decision-making, and a deeply legalistic peacetime mindset are preventing the EU and most of its member states from acknowledging the reality of a hybrid war and responding effectively to change the Kremlin’s calculations. Whether this is about handling sanctions, shadow-fleet vessels, the protection of critical infrastructure, or the use of frozen Russian assets, Europe continues to apply a peacetime logic to an environment that is no longer peaceful and an adversary that does not feel bound by agreed international law.

The result is that Russia has been all but deterred. On the contrary, it has increased the intensity, frequency and scale of its operations. Recognising this reality is essential to move forward. Europe must acknowledge it is engaged in a hybrid war with Russia. Only then can we use the full force and range of instruments at our disposal – and adapt them to an environment deliberately shaped to stay below thresholds that may trigger stronger responses.

Failing to name the problem has already cost Europe time and security. Continuing to hesitate will invite further escalation at a moment when Russia is actively probing for weakness. A swift shift from a peacetime posture to a genuine defensive mindset is not escalatory – it is the minimum required to protect Europe, its values, way of life and all citizens.

Also: Europe is not ready for war. Decades of underspending, reliance on external security guarantors, chronic fragmentation in our industries, failure to set collaboration as the norm for industry and research, and dependence on foreign supplies have left Europe without the capabilities, stockpiles and resilience required to deter a capable and determined aggressor like Russia.

Europe’s decision-making and structures require urgent updating. The European defence industry cannot deliver at the scale or speed that a real crisis would require. Geopolitical shifts and changes in the strategic environment mean that the tenacity and resilience of traditional partnerships long assumed unbreakable are increasingly questioned.

NATO’s goal of lifting European defence spending to 5% of GDP within a decade and the EU’s new initiatives and instruments such as ReArm Europe and SAFE represent the beginning of a long and painful correction. But money alone will not fix Europe’s defence problem. If Europe continues to spend in ways it has in the past, higher budgets will simply generate more of the same inefficiency. Spending better is as important as spending more.

Ukraine’s defence needs and lessons from its wartime innovation should form the bedrock of future European defence investment strategies and be wholly integrated into European planning.

Europe still behaves as if 27 separate defence markets can produce a coherent whole. We have known for a long time that it cannot. The continent operates dozens of tank types, fighter models, artillery systems and command structures – most incompatible with one another and as a result, a lot more expensive to maintain. Governments protect national champions even when they underperform, slowing consolidation and weakening competitiveness. Joint procurement and standardisation remain the exception rather than the rule.

Europe imports roughly three-quarters of its major weapon systems and relies heavily on external suppliers for its critical materials. When trade is being weaponised, this is unwise. Absolute self-sufficiency is neither realistic nor desired, but selective autonomy is overdue.

The protection of critical infrastructure and supply chains, and civil preparedness remain uneven across the continent. We need a whole-of-Europe approach. Modern conflict illustrates the necessity of dual-use technologies and shows that defence and resilience in a hybrid context are increasingly inseparable; Europe must manage them as two sides of the same coin. Europe needs a whole-of-society approach to crisis response and must adopt a total defence concept across its membership. Furthermore, hybrid war targets people as much as infrastructure and Europe must explain to its citizens why deterrence matters, what is at stake, and how defence spending protects their daily lives. We can and must draw lessons from the Nordic countries and Ukraine’s wartime societal resilience.

Scaling production, improving innovation and reducing delivery times will require mergers, shared programmes, common standards and a willingness to allow some national champions to disappear. Industrial policy must follow security needs, not the other way around.

Money alone can’t fix these problems. Purpose, focus, and industrial consolidation must guide the spend. Otherwise, Europe won’t be safer. Money can buy equipment; it cannot buy time, readiness or deterrence. Those depend on choices Europe has only just begun to confront.

The views expressed in this #FranklySpeaking op-ed reflect those of the author(s) and not of Friends of Europe.