Will the Trump revolution run into the sand in 2026?

US President Donald Trump and his senior cabinet colleagues in the Administration lost no time at the end of 2025 in ticking off the list of their “historic achievements” in the first year of Trump’s return to the White House. These ranged from stopping illegal migration at the southern border and deporting thousands of migrants, overturning Biden-era policies committed to reducing CO2 emissions and combatting climate change, passing a sweeping “Big beautiful bill” of tax and benefit cuts in Congress, pulling in “trillions of dollars” in tariffs from US trading partners on all five continents, curbing inflation, ending “woke culture” in government and business, forcing allies to pay vastly more for their own defence, ending eight conflicts across the globe, to reasserting US dominance in its own backyard, the Western Hemisphere. Whatever we may think of the longer-term consequences of these measures, or the wisdom underlying them, we cannot contest the energetic activism of the Administration in issuing 225 Executive Orders in just 10 months and in achieving almost absolute control over the news agenda, both inside the US and internationally. In Trump’s mind he has more than delivered on his campaign promise to “put America first”, although what that means in practice depends on Trump’s day-by-day interpretation of the concept.

In 2025, it has swung from isolationism and unilateral bullying of allies to hyper-military interventionism as far afield as Nigeria, Venezuela, Iran, Yemen and Syria, as well as more traditional diplomacy and multilateral negotiations involving Europe, the Gulf Arab countries, Egypt and Türkiye in trying to achieve ceasefires and peace agreements in Gaza, Sudan and Ukraine. Like experiencing all four seasons in one typical day of Scottish weather, the Trump doctrine tends to embrace every element of policy all the time, making it difficult for observers to determine an overall strategy or vision for global order beyond dealing with events and crises tactically as they emerge from one day to the next. If there is one consistent theme that has emerged from the first year of the Trump Administration it is the absolute assertion of untrammelled presidential (and that means personal) power, and constant activism to demonstrate that power at home and abroad, breaking in the process the normal checks and balances system on which US politics has traditionally been based. It recalls the famous dictum of Louis XIV of France: “L’Etat, c’est moi”.

The pace and extent of the changes that the Trump administration has brought to both US politics and the rules based international order more broadly have justified the sense among many that we are witnessing a revolution. This word conveys several meanings at the same time. There is the sense of lasting upheaval in which the only certainty is that the world of yesterday is gone forever, even if we may not know for years what future order the revolution will produce. There is the sense of an unstoppable dynamic or a chain reaction in which the destruction of one institution or norm inevitably leads to the collapse of several others with no end in sight. There is also the sense of a power vacuum as the Pax Americana, on which the world’s democracies and the liberal order largely depended, fades away increasing security dilemmas and economic risks for the many while producing new opportunities for the few, cynical or ruthless enough to take advantage of the vacuum.

The one characteristic of revolutions, at least in their early stages, is that they define themselves by what they are against, rather than what they are for. As Edmund Burke famously observed: “rage and frenzy can tear down in half an hour what prudence, foresight and deliberation cannot build up in a hundred years“. The dynamic revolutions unleash is more destructive than creative as the old order must be demolished before the new one can be put in its place. The problem is that stage one is much easier to accomplish than stage two, as Burke pointed out, particularly when the revolutionaries themselves are more united in their loathing of the “Ancien R égime” than in their vision of what they want to replace it with. Thus, as we saw in France after 1789 or Russia after 1917 or again after 1990 with the collapse of the Soviet Union, factionalism soon prevails and the revolutionaries spend as much time fighting each other as their reactionary opponents.

Finally, revolutions either peter out quickly or carry on for decades before an equilibrium is established. It all depends on how firm and organised the reaction is. Thus it took just a few months for the European monarchies and empires to snuff out the liberal, nationalist revolutions of 1848, but it took seven different European coalitions and 24 years of almost uninterrupted warfare in Europe and beyond (and an estimated 6.5mn military and civilian deaths) before the forces of revolutionary and Napoleonic France were finally defeated and a new Concert of Europe of the conservative powers established to keep the peace. It was based on the principle of monarchist legitimacy and “No More Napoleons”.

Admittedly what Trump has unleashed over the past year is not a revolution that goes this far. The US has sought to impose its power on others more through economic leverage and limited military strikes to intimidate and coerce than by all out military campaigns to secure regime changes or the annexation of territory. This said, the recent toppling of Nicolas Maduro in Venezuela followed by statements that the US will run the country, and threats against Greenland and the Panama Canal suggest that the US may evolve into an expansionist revolutionary power in time as well.

But the impact of the revolution is nonetheless visible on civil liberties, media freedoms and legal protections in the US and on international trade and security relationships, particularly affecting the European and Asian allies of Washington. The damage to international organisations and cooperative efforts to deal with climate change or humanitarian relief, health and development, democracy building and war crimes accountability has also been significant. Ironically where the US has long standing adversaries, they have been untouched or even emerged stronger, with the notable exceptions of Iran and Venezuela in the wake of US military action against them.

Overall, the impact is more regressive than progressive, moving us back to a 19th-century world of dominant and feared but unloved nation states, asserting their primacy in their own regional spheres of influence. They strive to shape economic and security relationships to serve their own interests first and foremost while keeping rivals at bay. Yet trying to impose a 19th-century world on the highly complex societies of the 21st century, with their educated, wealthy citizens empowered by technology and their integrated economies and global supply chains, is no easy feat. So, the question for 2026 is will the Trump revolution continue unabated or run into the sand as the counter forces, initially stunned and on the back foot as Trump moved swiftly to enact his campaign promises, regroup and fight back? If so, how could this happen and which indicators do we need to look for?

On the US domestic front, the midterm elections in November could mark a turning point. The House of Representatives usually flips from one party to the other in these elections as the public registers its dissatisfaction with the sitting President. The Senate, where Republicans have a slender majority, could change too but probably not by enough to give Democrats overall control of Congress. Trump’s low approval ratings and the worries of the US electorate about jobs and the cost of living and housing, coupled to the concerns of small business owners about the impact of tariffs, suggest that this traditional pattern of midterm voting will continue in November. Democrats have been buoyed by recent successes in the New York mayoral election and two races for state governor in Virginia and New Jersey. They also won a House seat in a special election in Arizona, the mayoral election in Miami, a state election in Iowa and two seats on the Public Service Commission in Georgia. Even where Republicans held on, as in the Governor’s race in Tennessee, it was with significantly reduced majorities vis-à -vis the November 2024 elections (in this case down from a 30% to a 9% margin).

Overall, in 2025 Democrats flipped 21% of Republican held legislative seats across the US. They adopted a clever strategy of tailoring their candidates to the local political context and the mood of the electorate. Hence the ‘radical’ populist, Zohran Mamdani, prevailed in New York with its well-publicised housing, transport and social problems whereas in more prosperous and conservative Virginia, the moderate centrist, Abigail Spanberger, carried the day.

The fact that Democrats have done well in traditionally Republican areas like Arizona and Georgia give them heart but the midterms are still ten months away and the US economy (always the core preoccupation of the American voter) may well improve in that time. GDP growth was 4.2% in the third quarter, a full percentage point higher than what analysts had predicted, and the Federal Reserve has started to cut interest rates as inflation cools. Also, the Democrats have far from recovered from their bruising defeat in the November 2024 election. They lack a recognised national leader, became split in Congress during the government shutdown last autumn and are divided over the way ahead: whether to oppose Trump’s policies and actions head on or to embrace some of them to win back Hispanic, black and working class voters who have drifted to the right. This would mean endorsing Trump-era tax cuts, tough action on crime and narcotics, and stringent controls on migration.

Democrats are still not sure of their brand. Some want to pursue cultural issues like race and gender identity, whereas others want to reconnect to the American worker without a college degree by refocusing on economic issues like deregulation, protectionism and manufacturing jobs. But if Democrats can regain the House, and can perhaps win one or two seats in the Senate, they can:

• block Trump’s legislative agenda,
• deny the Administration funding,
• launch investigations into abuses of power, such as the deployment of National Guard units to Democratic controlled cities against the will of the state governments,
• reverse the multiple illegal firings of civil servants and heads of government agencies, subpoena officials and documents,
• restore funding to agencies like US AID, Voice of America and the US Institute for Peace, and
• hold the Administration to account for its military operations abroad, often with the flimsiest of legal bases.

Even if a Democratic controlled House could not (or would not seek to) reverse all of Trump II’s 225 Executive Orders, it could at least stop him going further, for instance in trying to manipulate the Constitution to run for a third Presidential term or to contest and seek to overturn election results.

If the Republicans suffer a major setback in November, splits in the MAGA movement may well deepen. Already there has been unease within the base over Trump’s equivocations in the Jeffrey Epstein case, the strong-arm tactics against migrants used by ICE, the handling of the economy or the President’s increasing use of US military force abroad, which jars on the base’s isolationist instincts. Thus far few Republicans have had the courage to challenge the President whose grip on the Grand Old Party (GOP) is close to absolute. Exceptions have been former Vice President Mike Pence and former House members, Lynne Cheney and Nikki Haley, but they were already long-standing dissidents whose political careers were in the past rather than the future. Some Republicans in Congress have turned against the administration when it comes to upholding Denmark’s sovereignty in Greenland and opposing a US military takeover of the island. They have also supported moves in Congress to demand Congressional approval before further US military action in Venezuela even if, in this latter case, mega pressure from the Republican leadership ultimately brought them back into line.

But as Trump is seen more as a lame duck President and the next presidential election approaches in 2028, some may try their luck and decide to run as the true heirs of the MAGA cult. It is virtually impossible that a more traditional, internationalist Republican in the Mitt Romney mould could gain traction. In 2026, perhaps Marjorie Taylor Green, a Representative from Georgia who broke with Trump over the Epstein affair, will lay down a challenge. Jockeying within the White House may also begin, particularly between Vice President JD Vance and Secretary of State, Marco Rubio. Fond of family dynasties and in a US that has known the Adams, Roosevelt, Bush and Clinton political castes, Trump may well try to swing the nomination towards one of his sons or to son-in-law, Jared Kushner. At the same time, he will want to reign supreme for as long as possible and will probably be happy for the pretenders to fight it out while he keeps everyone guessing. He will probably also try to cut a deal to ensure that he remains the éminence grise, or puppet master behind the throne even after he is forced to leave the White House. There could also be some firings of high-profile officials such as Rubio, Justice Secretary Pam Bondi or Treasury Secretary Scott Bessant if they fall out with Trump on key policy decisions. This could lead to intensified in fighting at the top of the MAGA movement and slow its capacity for long term strategy and planning, as limited as these have been thus far. Expect surprises is a hallmark of Trumpian politics.

The Constitutional question has also come into play here. Thus far, Trump has demonstrated his willingness to ignore court decisions that he does not like, question the impartiality and integrity of the judiciary, muzzle and intimidate the press by launching billion dollar lawsuits for damages, take advantage of a weak and compliant Congress (except for a few instances of principled opposition as in the release of the Epstein files) and stuff the Supreme Court with conservative justices who will do his bidding. The Supreme Court has largely complied, giving the President immunity from any form of prosecution and backing his decision to close whole government agencies (normally controlled and funded by Congress). Yet a case took place last Wednesday, which could give the Supreme Court the opportunity to show its mettle and reassert its authority.

The case concerns the legality of the Trump tariffs adopted under national security and emergency economic measures laws and without the consent of Congress, which would normally be required. If the Supreme Court declares the tariffs unconstitutional, the US Treasury would need to pay back billions of dollars to the businesses that have had to absorb them thus far. In reality, this is unlikely to happen as the Administration will no doubt direct its swarms of lawyers to come up with an alternative legal basis to which they can be attached.

Nonetheless, a Supreme Court ruling against the Administration coupled with a more independent and assertive Congress, states reasserting their rights over policing, disaster relief and migrant protection, and media organisations like the New York Times, the Wall Street Journal, AP and the BBC, or universities like Harvard, prepared to push back against government efforts to intimidate them would start to rebuild the shaky system of checks and balances underpinning US democracy. Again, none of this is inevitable; the US political system has shown resilience in resisting the abuse of presidential power in the past, most notably during the Watergate scandal that ended Richard Nixon’s presidency in 1974. The Supreme Court was also instrumental in blocking many measures put forward by President Franklin Roosevelt in the mid-1930s as part of his New Deal to alleviate the impact of the Great Depression. These measures may have been intended honourably to help the poor and unemployed but in the view of the Supreme Court they represented federal over-reach vis-à-vis the prerogatives of the states. So the Court pushed back. We can only hope that the US political system still contains these pockets of resilience.

One such signal came just before Christmas, on 23 December, when the Court stopped Trump from deploying 300 National Guard troops to Chicago to help federal officials manage (non-violent) protests against his immigration policy. In its majority verdict, the Court argued that the law allows only for the use of troops within the US in exceptional situations of insurrection threatening the very existence of the US itself and where the state law and order forces are not capable of dealing with the local unrest. This situation clearly did not apply to Chicago. Birthright citizenship is another issue where the Supreme Court can make a stand in upholding the Constitution.

On the international front, 2026 may see pushback as well or at least America’s partners reducing their dependence on the US both militarily and economically. This would limit the Administration’s ability to make them accept one-sided deals, economic coercion or interference in their domestic affairs. There is only so much poking that other countries will accept before they start to look for alternatives. Europeans for instance spend $3.6tn dollars every year on US goods and services. Indeed, they may well be hooked onto US social media platforms and tech services, just as they like American sports shoes and subscriptions to Netflix to fill the dark winter nights. Hundreds of thousands of Europeans go to the US every year for business trips and vacations. But European consumers, like their governments, have a choice when it comes to how and where they spend their money.

If there is a perception that the US is engaging in petty and mean bullying, as when last month it banned the former EU commissioner, Thierry Breton, and a number of NGO representatives from visiting the US because of their involvement in digital regulation, or when officials at the International Criminal Court in The Hague were had their Microsoft email accounts shut down, forcing them to switch their IT systems from Microsoft Office to a European alternative, then nervousness about using US tech services is bound to spread throughout the EU.

The same will happen if there is a perception that the US is interfering in European national elections, particularly in support of far-right populist parties as the recently published US National Security Strategy encourages the Administration to do. Europeans having largely weaned themselves off of Russian gas and oil (with the EU recently deciding to do so totally by the end of 2027) will not want to accept a new dependence (and therefore political leverage) on US LNG exports. Europe is currently the largest customer for US LNG. If Washington demands that its European allies vastly increase their defence budgets to 5% of GDP while refusing to categorise Russia as a threat and being ever more ambivalent about its commitment to their security, it cannot be surprised by recent measures by the EU to ensure that the bulk of this extra money (at least 60%) is spent on weapons and hardware made in Europe.

In the realm of trade, Europe benefits enormously from its trade with the US, as shown by its reluctance recently to impose counter tariffs on US exports to the continent. It also relies on the US dollar for many of its financial transactions just like European consumers depend on Visa and Mastercard. But the Trump Revolution has made a point of weaponising these economic and trade dependencies and using them to extract concessions on buying additional US products or increasing investments in the US or tying continued US military support to buying more US weapons or paying more for US troops and bases deployed overseas. The use of the dollar and access to the US market can be weaponised too to get European countries to follow Washington in imposing sanctions on its rivals and adversaries or in imposing fines on European banks and companies for not following US foreign policy priorities. It is presently a popular sport within the MAGA movement to denigrate Europe and play up its weakness while disregarding its strengths and usefulness to the US as an ally. Abstract pseudo intellectual insults such as “civilisational erasure” flow easily from the pens of MAGA scribes. They are not always wrong in their diagnosis of Europe’s ailments, for instance too much red tape and bureaucracy, the weak innovation culture and Europe’s declining competitiveness. But these are often exaggerated and a whole series of complaints are added that bear little relationship to reality, such as absence of free speech or uncontrolled migration or the tensions resulting from multiethnic societies.

The Trump Revolution’s foreign policy is based largely on bashing Europe as the EU project stands for rules, respect of commitments, solidarity and collective decision making following open consultations. Moreover, Europe embodies multilateral agreements and the benefits of bilateral trade and security cooperation. The transatlantic relationship that has emerged from decades of standing together from one crisis to the next has become a structured and orderly relationship reflecting give and take and burden sharing. It aims to spread its norms and values globally by peacefully engaging other democracies as partners in its frameworks of cooperation – again for mutual benefit. This in turn reinforces the authority of international organisations such as the UN with its various agencies and mechanisms or the WTO. Consequently, attacking Europe is the MAGA way of discrediting the rules-based order more generally, thereby opening the path to a different international system based on great powers asserting their interests in their spheres of influence and doing transactional deals with each other without fixed rules or the pretence of lasting cooperation. The victims of these deals will be the smaller countries unable to stand up for their rights and interests. Thus, the US in this dystopian vision will team up with Russia, China, India, Türkiye and possibly Japan as circumstances change to forge sweetheart investment deals and share out key economic resources and technology. Splitting the raw materials and precious metals of Ukraine between Russia and the US in the wake of a peace agreement is one place to start; giving China advanced Nvidia chips to develop AI models in exchange for Chinese rare earths is another.

But this Hobbesian world will not secure US predominance and it will not make the US more prosperous and secure over time. China and Russia will not see the US as a partner but always as an adversary whose power and influence they will try to undermine. Despite Trump’s repeated efforts, Putin has been deaf when it comes to any form of compromise on Ukraine and President Xi has ignored US appeals to stop supplying Moscow with military equipment and technology. In space exploration, AI generative models, naval power, nuclear weapons, green manufacturing and smart electricity grids, China is clearly seeking to outperform the US and become the dominant player in any new balance of power system of the global economy.

Both Putin and Xi have seen that it is easier for them to put pressure on a wavering US President navigating from day-to-day than for Trump to exert pressure on them. China has stepped up its military intimidation of Taiwan with big exercises ever closer to Taiwan’s borders and despite US aid to Taipei. Seeing Trump carry out regime change in Venezuela can only encourage Xi and Putin to seek similar goals in Taiwan and Ukraine. This will worry the China and Russia hawks who are still numerous in the Administration and in Congress. So, although we will see a Trump-Xi summit in the spring and no doubt Trump-Putin summits as well, 2026 may well be the year that multilateralism and traditional alliances make a comeback. In passing the Defense Authorisation Act, US Congress has recommitted the US to NATO and directed the President to maintain the current number of US troops stationed in Europe to the floor of 72,000. The Act also provides for $800mn in support for Ukraine, admittedly a shadow of what was allocated for weapons and financial aid under the Biden Administration, but the measure at least shows where the sentiment in Congress lies.

Meanwhile Europe, although not as united and economically dynamic as we would wish it to be, continues to fly the flag of multilateralism. Europe is learning to adapt, bend its rules to get decisions taken, and be more flexible and creative to defend its military and economic security. The Coalition of the Willing of over 30 nations continues to meet regularly to assist Ukraine while the EU provided a €90bn support package for Kyiv, worked with the rest of the world to advance climate goals at the COP conference in Brazil, concluded a MERCOSUR trade agreement and secured security partnerships with Indo-Pacific democracies. The EU is continuing (albeit slowly) its enlargement to 10 candidate countries and the UK is drawing closer to the union to which it once belonged. Bulgaria recently became the latest country to adopt the euro. Small steps maybe, but they all add up. European strategic autonomy moves progressively forward and more and more EU member states – some with enthusiasm, others more reluctantly – now accept that it is the only way forward.

Of course, EU disunity from time to time and the too-many Council meetings needed to decide things relative to the global headwinds bearing down on the union continue to worry European diplomats and analysts. But this activity shows American businessmen, diplomats and politicians that it is impossible to overlook Europe and that there is an alternative to Trump’s unilateralism. As Tesla gives way to China’s BYD for electric vehicles on the European market, US defence contractors experience tougher competition from European companies enjoying major new investments, and Europeans become disenchanted with the data voracity and the dictatorial algorithms of tech platforms like X, Google and Meta, US corporations risk losing the benefits of an internal market of 550 million people. At the same time, as US strategists experience the colder, less stable world of America alone, they may remember all the security benefits that alliance with Europe brought them in the past. Multiple military bases from which they could project air and maritime power into Asia, the Middle East and Africa; early warning radars for their missile defence system; joint patrolling of the Atlantic and High North that protected the US eastern seaboard; and a big, permanent and secure market for US weapons sales. As Joni Mitchell used to sing in Big Yellow Taxi: “Don’t it always go that you don’t know what you have lost til it’s gone”. But it has not all gone yet and there is still time for serious people in Washington to tell the White House to rein in the MAGA ultras and stop bashing Europe. Will 2026 be that year?

Finally, we come to conflicts and how to stop them. Trump likes to claim that he ended eight wars in his first eleven months back in office. Of course, this self-grading depends on how you define ‘ending’ a conflict and how sustainable the peace resulting from a shaky ceasefire needs to be. It also depends on how you define a ‘conflict’. For instance, Trump often puts on his list the dispute between Egypt and Ethiopia over the Great Renaissance Dam on the Nile although this has not so far degenerated into open hostilities. Yet despite these caveats, Trump does deserve credit for his engagement in conflict resolution efforts and for the successes that he has achieved with his direct and personal diplomacy, even if so far they have not added up to the ‘cigar’ of the Nobel Peace Prize. He has managed to bring leaders to the table (for instance Putin in Ukraine) who previously refused to engage with each other. In particular, he has finally imposed a ceasefire on Israel and Hamas in Gaza coupled with a plan to establish an international administration in the strip, send in an Arab-led stabilisation force, set up a local police and start the reconstruction of Gaza – 70% of which has been destroyed in two years of Israeli bombardments. Yet we have also seen Trump’s proclivity to proclaim personal success for quick agreements, often interpreted differently by the belligerents, not followed up by any viable diplomatic process and military confidence-building measures, which soon unravel. This has been the case with US mediation in the DRC-Rwanda conflict and the border clashes between Thailand and Cambodia, which have flared up time and again.

In the Middle East, 400 Palestinians have died in Israeli strikes since the Gaza peace plan was agreed, Israel has continued to strike Hezbollah targets in Lebanon and retained its forces in Syria. Moreover, Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu is clearly a man for the status quo – preferring to keep Washington’s attention on Iran while keeping Israeli troops in half of Gaza and focusing on the remnants of Hamas and Hezbollah, rather than try to bring the Palestinian entities, Lebanon or Syria forward. Hamas clearly does not want to disarm until Israel withdraws its troops from Gaza and shows a real willingness to move on to Phase 2 of the Gaza peace plan, which the US now wants to move on to, at least in terms of setting up a transitional administration in the strip. Meanwhile, the humanitarian situation in Gaza has improved a little but is still dire as the recent torrential rains have demonstrated. We know that Trump likes showy occasions as when he gathered Arab and European leaders in Sharm el Sheikh last 13 October to proclaim “Peace in the Middle East” and the “greatest achievement in the region for 3000 years”. But he now sees that securing real and lasting settlements requires painstaking diplomatic work, the capacity and willingness to put pressure on all sides equally and locking in detailed, actionable commitments. Will Trump have the stamina and the political skills to stay the course in 2026? The same question can be asked of the terrible conflict in Sudan, Saudi and UAE interference in Yemen or moving to a new nuclear deal with Iran.

For we Europeans the war in Ukraine will remain the major preoccupation. 2025 ended with a US peace plan for Ukraine being “90%” ready after many meetings between President Zelensky, Trump himself, US negotiators and European leaders and officials. Yet the remaining 10% concerning Ukrainian territorial concessions to Russia is unsurprisingly the hardest part. President Putin has so far shown no flexibility, camping on his maximalist demands. So, in 2026 will Trump double down on his peace plan and show real willingness to put pressure on Putin to accept compromise and halt his aerial bombardment of Ukraine and military operations? Will the President turn the economic screws on the ailing Russian economy through more measures against Moscow’s oil and gas and commodity exports as well as locking Russia out of global trade and financial transactions? Will he give Ukraine the NATO style Article 5 security guarantee for a minimum of 15 years, backed by US forces in Europe, as he has promised or try to water it down? Will Trump walk away from the whole negotiation, as he has threatened if Putin doesn’t budge, and return to blaming Kyiv and the Europeans? By going beyond shock tactics and threats and engaging with the Europeans to bring Zelensky and Putin to the table with a serious, detailed peace plan, in other words using US power for traditional multilateral diplomacy based on incentives and penalties, the US President could achieve a meaningful ceasefire and de-escalation. The Nobel Peace Prize would then be his as a reward rather than a right.

The danger in 2026 is that Trump will move from getting involved in world affairs to make peace, to getting involved to make war. Added to his interventions in all the other places, he has now suggested striking the Iranian regime if it uses violence against the students and other protesters demonstrating daily on the streets of Tehran and other cities. If he becomes a lame duck President after November, Trump may take an increased interest in foreign affairs. He certainly has not been an isolationist President as he suggested he would be during his campaign. But US Presidents are rarely rewarded at home for their foreign policy engagements. Spasmodic eruptions of US military power ‘tous azimuts’ unrelated to any perception of US interests or benefits to US security (especially if the US gets bogged down and starts to take casualties) could quickly alienate Trump from his base and raise more opposition (as well as scrutiny) within Republican ranks. The aspirants for the succession would correspondingly come under pressure to distance themselves from Trump and campaign on a more traditional conservative platform rather than present themselves as the heirs to his legacy.

So, in conclusion: watch this space. 2026 may indeed be another year when the Trump revolutionary bandwagon marches resolutely on, turning both the US itself and the world beyond into very different places. More of the same and another depressing diatribe by JD Vance at the Munich Security Conference in February could sound the death knell of the Atlantic Alliance and any hope for a stable, cooperative US-EU relationship. It would make any repair job in future years much harder and frankly less likely. But although Vance speaks for the Administration, he does not necessarily speak for the US. As the longer-term consequences of the new US orientation become clearer, we may well see other influential US voices speak out in Munich showing that, as in physics, a reaction sooner or later provokes a counter-reaction. And as the year progresses the headwinds that can derail the Trump Revolution are potentially there and building up. Nothing is inevitable in the affairs of nations and peoples, for good or for bad, but as we begin 2026 there is still an outside chance that the US, Europe and the world beyond will be in a better place by next January. Revolutions may seem unstoppable at first as they notch up successes and cower their opponents. Yet as with all counterrevolutions, it takes only one big setback for the resistance to be emboldened, to organise and to develop a momentum of its own. And why not, as who wants to live in someone else’s sphere of influence?

The views expressed in this #CriticalThinking article reflect those of the author(s) and not of Friends of Europe.