Trump Agonistes: or how to end a war once you have started one

In his epic book on statecraft, Niccolo Machiavelli warns his Prince that “it is easier to start a war than to end one”. Three weeks into his bombardment of Iran, this is a lesson that US President Donald Trump is learning fast. As Trump himself has put it, “I will know the outcome when I feel it in my bones.”

Certainly, everything that Trump says about the success of the US military campaign suggests that he should have declared victory and a ceasefire days ago. He says that the US (with help from its Israeli ally) has destroyed over 7,000 military targets in Iran and practically “obliterated” the Iranian regime. He claims that there are no longer any Iranian leaders alive that he can negotiate with (as the new Supreme Leader has not so far appeared in public and was wounded in an air strike), the Iranian navy has been sunk (with US submarines attacking it as far away as Sri Lanka), the air force (already in a sorry state) decimated and the country’s nuclear programme set back by many years. Although in the latter case this objective was largely achieved in the US/Israeli bombing of Iran’s three key nuclear sites (Fordow, Natanz and Isfahan) and killing of a number of Iranian nuclear scientists last June, and it is not clear what extra dents in the nuclear programme have been made and whether they will make any significant difference.

Yet despite claiming that the US military campaign is “way ahead of schedule, we are no wiser about the ultimate US objectives and why Trump is continuing the war. The objectives reeled off by his spokesperson, Karoline Levitt, are ones that were demonstrably accomplished in the first week of the campaign. So why are they still “objectives” and, according to the law of diminishing returns, what is the purpose of expending ever more precious munitions (which it will take years for US defence contractors to replace) and spending $1bn every day for ever smaller margins of impact?

In the past, the US has been involved in wars where the fighting continued for years after all the achievable objectives had long been attained. Korea in the early 1950s is a prime example. The US and its allies lost over two-thirds of their total casualties in the last two years of the war (1952-1953), trying to capture hills of marginal military significance and defending a line along the 38th parallel, which had already been consolidated after the first 12 months of fighting.

In Iran, Trump toyed initially with regime change as his objective. It is certainly the goal being pursued by Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel who seems determined to bomb Iran until the last Israeli bomb and bullet. He believes that by killing old leaders, he can somehow stop new leaders from emerging. But Trump hastily abandoned the regime change objective when he saw that the “Venezuelan scenario” of decapitating the leadership, expecting the remaining leaders to all fall into line, was not going to work in Iran, where the regime structures built around the Revolutionary Guards are deeply entrenched and rehearsed for replacement at multiple levels. So far there has been no sign of a popular uprising, and the continuation of the US bombing campaign seems designed to rule this out. In fact, as civilian targets like schools and hospitals continue to be destroyed, the campaign may cause many Iranians to rally behind a regime they once hated.

If Trump was hoping to see an insurrection by Iranian Kurds in the west and operating from Iraq against the regime of the Mollahs, he hasn’t done much to organise it, neither by training and equipping the Kurdish militias, nor providing them with air cover. In any case, the Kurds, whether in Iraq or Syria, have a long history of being used and then left in the lurch by the United States as its Middle East priorities constantly shift, and their confidence in Trump’s reliability to support them against a much stronger Iranian adversary is as low as with the US’s other partners and allies. Regime change makes no sense if you have no idea of what you want to have instead: the restoration of the monarchy, a military dictatorship, a government of technocrats supported by a foreign military occupation or a democratic opposition that remains to be created, let alone prepared to govern? In sum, the longer the US campaign continues, the more it is conveying a sense of drift, stuck between already achieved objectives and unachievable objectives that the US has long abandoned. The US open-ended approach seems increasingly to be pursuing destruction for its own sake. It violates the first principle of war, which is to use force only as a last resort when peaceful means of resolving a conflict have failed and then only at the minimal levels required to achieve a limited and finite political objective.

The paradox of the Iranian war, however, is that as its military objectives become more cloudy, the political and economic fallout worldwide becomes more long-lasting and damaging. Whatever limited success the US may achieve in Iran seems increasingly overshadowed by the geopolitical implications. Trump announced that his Iran mission would enhance security and stability across the globe and benefit countries well beyond Israel and the US. But does this claim match up to the actual results?

Take, for instance, the Gulf states, hitherto close allies of the US, which launched the war against Iran against their advice, and which has failed to protect them against limited but persistent Iranian missile and drone attacks. They have seen the tourists and expatriate workers (up to 90% of the population in the UAE) depart in droves and cancellations pour in as prospective visitors switch to the more peaceful Western Mediterranean. Dubai airport, one of the busiest in the world, has been repeatedly closed with thousands of flights cancelled or rerouted.

So far, according to the Financial Times, the Gulf states have lost $15bn in oil and gas output. This is the equivalent of $556mn a day if tax revenues as well as production and export losses are factored into the equation. Saudi crude production is down by 2mn barrels a day and Iraqi production by 3mn barrels. Overall, 6.2mn barrels have been cut from average daily production across the Gulf region. Qatar, the world’s second largest producer of LNG, and the country that makes up 90% of the Gulf’s LNG output, has lost $185mn a day in production. Refined oil markets have also been hit, as in the closure of Saudi Arabia’s largest refinery at Ras Tanura. Iran has largely closed the Strait of Hormuz to tanker traffic and, by setting ablaze a dozen or so ships, has persuaded shipping companies to halt operations by driving up commercial insurance rates. Oil has now surpassed $100 a barrel for the first time since the onset of the war in Ukraine four years ago. If the US and Israel stop their attacks soon, the Gulf energy producers may yet be able to avoid lasting economic damage, but they already fear for their reputation as reliable oil and gas suppliers. The Strait of Hormuz is also important for the transit of other things that the Western economies need, such as ammonia for fertiliser, iron ore and aluminium. As the World Food Programme has warned, millions could be pushed into hunger due to shipping disruptions and higher prices for foodstuffs and fertiliser.

Trump may not care about the hike in oil and gas prices or consider that this is a price worth paying, as the US is now a major producer of oil and LNG and the US oil majors stand to earn an extra $60bn this year if the oil price stays at $100 a barrel. Yet the impact will certainly be felt by America’s allies in Europe, Japan and South Korea. Iran is demonstrating the advantage of asymmetric tactics in warfare: whereas the US is using massive military force for small results, Iran is using limited strikes and the mere threat of strikes to achieve massive economic dislocation.

The Gulf states now see their business model based on a carefully nurtured reputation for stability and economic dynamism in danger. They will need to tap into their sovereign wealth funds to rebuild their damaged oil and gas infrastructure and spend billions more on upgrading their air defences. Given their use of US weapons systems, they will need to turn to the US for much of this equipment; but a sense that Trump has been led by Israel into reckless and unjustified military actions and not listened to them will inevitably make the Gulf governments seek to diversify their foreign relationships. China will clearly be the main beneficiary here, as will Türkiye and perhaps over time India as well. It will be hard for the Gulf governments to forgive Iran, but hard too for them to forgive Washington for rushing into a war without thinking through the likely Iranian reactions and the consequences. Recently, the Gulf states committed $17bn to Trump’s Board of Peace for the reconstruction of Gaza, but considering their own economic downturn, they may well now reconsider these pledges.

A second big loser has been Lebanon as Israel has used the US action against Iran as cover to settle its remaining scores against Hezbollah, and Iran has been keen to divert the Israeli military away from Iran itself. Israel now appears to be focusing its operations more on Lebanon than on Iran itself. It has struck central Beirut for the first time, whereas in the past it has focused on the Hezbollah strongholds in the southern districts of the city. Its bombing and compulsory evacuation orders have forced 800,000 Lebanese (a quarter of the population) to flee their homes and head north, sleeping in their cars or in the open where they cannot find temporary shelter or relatives to take them in. This is a humanitarian catastrophe and not far behind what Israel has inflicted on the population of Gaza, and again, for minimal strategic advantage given the destruction that Israel had already inflicted there. It is true that Hezbollah fired some rockets into northern Israel, but, as in Gaza, this represents a wholly disproportionate response. It will further weaken the already fragile and bankrupt Lebanese state and also undermine the situation next door in Syria as thousands of Syrian refugees in Lebanon try to escape the mayhem and head home. By invading southern Lebanon, Israel is committing itself to another military occupation of its northern neighbour, which again is a containment of the security problem rather than a viable, long-term solution. A dysfunctional Lebanon where the Lebanese army is weak, unable and unwilling to cooperate with Israel and unable to guarantee internal security is a recipe for new extremist and anti-Israeli groups to emerge in place of Hezbollah sooner or later. Past is prologue.

Ukraine is also a loser. In just two weeks, the US and its Gulf partners have fired off more air defence missiles than the US has given to Kyiv in four years of war against Russia. If the Iran operation continues for much longer, the US will have to send even more of its Patriot and THAAD batteries to the Gulf, both for its own purposes and to resupply its Gulf partners and Israel. It has already pulled Patriot batteries out of South Korea to the consternation of Seoul. The US will then have to reprioritise replacement production from US contractors to its own armed forces and the Gulf partners to restore its damaged credibility. This is bad news for Ukraine, which depends on US weapons supplies paid for by the European allies. President Zelensky has said that Ukraine can cope for now, but Russia clearly sees an opportunity here and has begun daylight missile and drone strikes against Kyiv and other Ukrainian cities. Keen to keep international attention on Ukraine at a time when much of the media has decamped to Abu Dhabi and Jerusalem, Zelensky has sent 200 drone defence experts to the Gulf to advise the Gulf militaries on tactics, techniques and technology. Yet whether the Gulf countries will return the compliment by giving Kyiv more financial aid and diplomatic support remains to be seen. If the Iranian war had started two years ago, it might have conceivably helped Ukraine by stopping Iran from exporting its Shaheed 136 drones to Russia.

Alas, in the last two years Russia has transformed this Iranian drone into its own turbocharged Geran, which it is able to manufacture by the millions each year. It is deeply disappointing for Zelensky that at a moment when his forces are having some success in recapturing territory from Russia around Zaporizhzhia and Kherson, he is once again the victim of American inconsistency. Trump’s unnecessary war of choice has used up valuable resources that could have made all the difference in Europe’s war of necessity on the battlefields of the Donbas.

Both economically and strategically, Europe, too, is a loser. At a time when it was trying to recover from the COVID-19 pandemic and the impact of the war in Ukraine, especially on energy prices, it now sees a new crisis in the Middle East, cutting the continent’s already anaemic growth levels. The UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer has already announced a new £50mn subsidy to help those on welfare to pay their gas and electricity bills. The UK government was planning to remove its much larger energy subsidy programme this summer but is now having second thoughts. Expect announcements in due course that with inflation, unemployment and interest rates on the rise, it can no longer raise the defence budget to 2.5% of GDP in the lifetime of the present Parliament due to the economic headwinds. Also expect more backtracking from climate and CO2 emissions reduction targets as the UK and other countries across Europe increase gas storage to guard against price spikes, and develop more oil and gas fields. There will also be debates about ending Russian LNG imports or Russian supplies of nuclear fuels and fertiliser in new sanctions packages. Populist parties on the far-right and far-left – and some EU governments, too – will say that it was a mistake for the EU to wean itself off cheap and reliable Russian oil and gas and that, notwithstanding Ukraine, normal relations with the Kremlin should be restored. Indeed, figures such as Bart de Wever have already argued for normalising relations with Russia, becoming the first Belgian prime ministerial figure to call explicitly for such a shift.

Yet the Iran war has once again been a lesson for Europe in US unreliability and the failure of strategies to appease Donald Trump and hope for the best. This is not Europe’s war. It was not forewarned nor consulted. And yet with his typically cavalier attitude towards the European allies, Trump has demanded that they contribute warships to escorting tankers through the Strait of Hormuz. He has claimed that the US always comes to the aid of Europe but never vice versa. This is not true. Thousands of European soldiers fought alongside the US in Afghanistan after 2003 and suffered casualties proportionally equivalent to the US. Thousands were also engaged in Korea in the 1950s. Yet the difference on these occasions was that the Europeans worked with Washington to define and obtain a legal mandate at the United Nations. They were consulted on the mission objectives on the basis of “no taxation without representation” and participated because they felt that US actions were serving their own security interests. This is palpably not the case with Iran, where the US has no clear exit strategy going forward and expects allies to blindly follow whatever the US administration demands. If not, Trump has again threatened to withdraw US commitments to NATO. The alliance is, however, a defensive pact against outright aggression and not a supportive framework for US foreign interventions, as Chancellor Merz has pointed out.

This time round, the Europeans are standing firm and refusing to send warships automatically to the Strait of Hormuz without a discussion on a ceasefire and an exit strategy. Japan, Australia, South Korea and China have also refused to participate. Even the usually US-loyal UK is holding firm, given the opposition to the Iran war among UK public opinion. It is not just a question of the risks given that Iran is currently blocking the Strait of Hormuz. It is also that escorting a limited number of tankers through the Strait will be a complicated and slow process which, without a resolution of the conflict, will not return tanker traffic (carrying 20% of global oil and gas supplies) to normal anytime soon. It is a band-aid rather than a real solution, a costly diversion of European warships that are also needed for NATO’s Baltic Sentry and Arctic Sentry missions as well as missile defence in the Eastern Mediterranean, especially the protection of Cyprus. China and India have also shown that by not intervening and instead negotiating with Tehran they can sail their tankers through the Strait unimpeded.

European countries have thus far ruled out redirecting the EU maritime mission, Aspiras, in the Gulf of Aden to protect shipping against attacks from the Houthis in Yemen. The European approach to the Strait of Hormuz is also complicated by the fact that Trump constantly sends mixed messages, calling on the Europeans to provide help one minute and saying he doesn’t need them the next, and that they are coming to the war after it is all over. Yet whatever the outcome, one thing is clear: transatlantic security ties will be further weakened, US support for Ukraine will diminish further, putting even more of the burden onto the shoulders of the Europeans and Trump will not give the Europeans credit for the contributions that they do make.

Rather than refuse point-blank to lend a hand, European countries like Greece, France and the UK have deployed air defence frigates in the Eastern Mediterranean and used their warplanes to shoot down Iranian drones and missiles over Jordan and Qatar, both during the current campaign and during previous Iranian retaliatory strikes last year. NATO has also deployed extra air defence units to southern Türkiye. But the Iran war has shown again the fundamental split in the transatlantic security relationship: Europe is focused on broad and long-term security interests, while the US is focused on immediate and narrow national priorities untethered from any coherent global strategy.

Finally, in the camp of the losers may well be the US too, even though Trump will proclaim that the US is the winner of whatever outcome the war brings. Not only will Washington lose influence in the Gulf region but inflation and higher gas prices at home may well drive US voters towards the Democrats in the November midterm elections. A distinct majority of Americans are opposed to the US intervention and Trump’s MAGA camp has divided over perceptions that Trump has broken his campaign promise to stay out of foreign interventions. Trump’s Counter-Terrorism Chief, Joe Kent, has resigned in protest against the US action and Vice-President JD Vance has been notoriously quiet, perhaps sensing that his scepticism about the war will serve him well with MAGA loyalists in the 2028 presidential race. Trump’s difficulties will be compounded if the Iranian regime doesn’t surrender or agree to meet all US demands, or if Trump puts US Marines ashore in Iran, for instance in occupying Kharg Island or the Iranian Gulf shoreline, and US losses (low thus far) begin to mount. Trump has repeatedly promised Americans that the war will end soon, but frustrations will increase as the weeks go by and nothing happens.

There are not usually many winners from wars and even those who think they are the victors often pay a heavy price. However, in the winning camp thus far are undoubtedly China, which is usually happy to see the US expend blood and treasure in foreign adventures which open new diplomatic and economic opportunities for Beijing, and Russia, which has earned thus far $2bn on extra oil sales. The US Treasury has lifted US sanctions on the Russian sales to India and China as a “temporary” measure. We will have to see how “temporary” this exemption proves to be. Moscow is certainly seeing it as a significant weakening of the sanctions regime imposed on it for its invasion of Ukraine and a lifeline at a moment when its financial situation was rapidly worsening and the Kremlin was dipping into its sovereign wealth reserves to fund the “Special Military Operation” in Ukraine.

So, what should European policy be towards the US and the war in Iran?

First, to insist on a ceasefire and a halt to Israeli operations against Lebanon. Israel should restrict its operations to its northern border with Lebanon and stop strikes in Central Beirut and other urban centres. The Europeans need to stick to their red line that they will take defensive measures only as long as Iran does not attack European territory or forces deployed in the region. They should propose to Washington to discuss a joint plan to ensure maritime security in the Persian Gulf but only in the context of a ceasefire that enables normal commercial shipping to resume. Europe also needs to pressure both the US and Israel to address the dire humanitarian consequences of their military actions in terms of food, shelter, medicine and electricity supplies to the civilian populations of Iran and Lebanon.

Second, the EU, working closely with the UK, Norway, Canada and other partners, needs to examine options to engage the new Iranian leadership once the war is over. With the Israelis killing more Iranian security and intelligence chiefs by the day, and the new Supreme Leader nowhere to be seen, it is far from clear what the new leadership in Tehran will look like. But it is unlikely to be made up of Iranian exiles or budding democrats from the protest movement, and it is unlikely to want to talk to Washington or Tel Aviv. It will be very isolated. All the more reason for the EU to try to engage it early on and test its readiness to de-escalate, discuss the status of the Iranian nuclear programme and security cooperation in return for phased sanctions relief. Iran will be ruined and desperately needing aid and finance and so this could be a window of opportunity for Europe to obtain restraint in Iran’s internal and external behaviour.

Third, the EU needs to reinforce its relations with the Gulf countries, which are also important commercial partners. There will be opportunities for European companies to rebuild damaged infrastructure especially in the energy sector, and to consolidate security relationships. The Gulf countries may well welcome an expanded European military presence in addition to personnel and aircraft already stationed in Bahrain, the UAE and Qatar as they seek to reduce their dependency on the US. Europe also produces world-class air defence systems such as the Franco-Italian SAMP-T or the German IRIS and so cooperation on defence procurement, including anti-drone technology, can be stepped up. Europe can also help the Gulf countries improve their resilience and civil defence capabilities as European companies review their emergency plans and European expatriates return to their jobs in the Gulf financial and industrial sectors.

Fourth, the EU will need to update its Energy Package if the disruption to global energy markets continues and oil and gas prices remain high. The summer months will need to be used for increasing stocks and reserves for the winter months ahead and to ensure security of supply across the Union. Inevitably climate goals will need to be adjusted to the need for longer-than-planned oil and gas production. European countries may need to revise tax regimes to encourage more exploration for new reserves in the North Sea and elsewhere. But the use of renewables should also be accelerated. Given the different lobbies and business interests involved, as well as different views and positions across the political spectrum, finding a new balance between fossil fuels and renewables will not be easy. Italy has already called for a weakening of the EU’s carbon market, while others, including Spain and France, are pushing in the opposite direction for a faster transition to green energy. As the UN climate chief Simon Stiell has put it, “Sunlight doesn’t depend on narrow and vulnerable shipping straits. Wind blows without massive taxpayer-funded naval escorts.” As will avoiding the temptation to fall back on Russian energy and the negative political consequences for Europe’s autonomy and security that it will bring. Yet the European energy debate cannot be postponed or avoided.

Finally, Trump will probably not withdraw the US from NATO, but he may well take some steps to show his displeasure with the Europeans for failing to pull his chestnuts out of the fire in Iran. For instance, withdrawing more US troops from Germany or Eastern Europe or officers from the NATO command structure. Or refusing to send US ships and aircraft to Europe for NATO exercises. He may cast doubt on the nuclear umbrella that the US extends to Europe through the NATO arrangements. Less US support for Ukraine has already been factored into this equation. Pulling US forces out of NATO’s missions in Kosovo or Iraq may come next. The Europeans need to consult quietly among themselves on what is most likely coming their way from Washington (for example, more pressure over Greenland) and discuss their options for filling the gaps that the US may well create in NATO’s force posture in the future. Already, France has started a useful debate about how European national nuclear forces could be extended to cover Europe more comprehensively. The Europeanisation of NATO is ongoing and without creating self-fulfilling prophecies or unduly provoking the Trump administration, European allies need a common plan and clear commitments to take this now to the next level.

Henry Kissinger used to say that the “beginning of wisdom in international relations is realising that there are no satisfactory solutions to international problems”. Sometimes the best that can be achieved is limiting the damage, and this is the task that Europe must urgently turn its attention to.

The views expressed in this #CriticalThinking article reflect those of the author(s) and not of Friends of Europe.