The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation meets in China: is the Axis of Upheaval here to stay?

In the view of many historians, the 20th century was the “American Century” as it witnessed the rise and rise of the United States from an isolationist, hemispheric nation into an unrivalled superpower at the centre of a global network of military and economic alliances. In truth, it would be more accurate to speak of the “American half century” as the US’ rise to globalism took place largely after World War Two, when the country stepped into the power vacuum opened up by the decline of the European great powers and the demise of their overseas empires. Washington abandoned isolationism and learned to use its enormous power also to confront the expansion of the Soviet Union and its communist ideology in a doctrine of halting and ultimately pushing back against Soviet expansionism that came to be known as “containment”. For a brief moment, the US had over 60% of global GDP and, although it suffered more than its share of military setbacks in fighting communism and confronting jihadist terror in the subsequent decades, its military and economic power always remained supreme and enabled it to prevail finally in the Cold War struggle against Moscow.

Yet, history teaches us that the hegemony of great powers is never destined to last. Sooner or later, their maintenance of international order under their military protection leads to “imperial overstretch”, to use the phrase of Paul Kennedy. Their domestic public opinion tires of the cost of foreign entanglements and demands more attention to domestic concerns and priorities. Equally, allies and partners come to resent the dominance of the hegemonic power and the feeling that they are exploited, particularly in the economic domain, as much as they are protected. Or, sometimes even pressured and bullied to align with interests that are not always their own. Outside the bloc or sphere of influence of the hegemonic power, rivals and challengers dream of a multipolar world in which they will have more scope to exert their own power and influence. Used to being top dog, hegemons become complacent and fail to grasp their declining influence or the challenge posed by rising adversaries until it is too late either to co-opt them or to successfully contain them. As the hegemon’s own alliances begin to fracture once allies no longer view it as reliable or chafe under its demands, the rivals and challengers come to believe that they can replace the hegemon at the top of the global tree and establish a new global order enshrining their own values and standards. “New rules or no rules” has long been the slogan of Putin’s annual Valdai Discussion Forum. As their power rises, the challengers can prise the hegemon’s alliances apart by making attractive offers of cooperation to the more disaffected members who are either ready to change sides or want to hedge their bets by balancing between the old and new camps. Historians have often referred to this phenomenon as the “Thucydides Trap”, named after the great chronicler of the Peloponnesian Wars, in which the declining hegemon is overtaken by the new rising power. The friction often produces actual conflict which decides the issue of the global order of succession for several decades to come; for instance, the emergence of the British Empire at the expense of France in the Seven Years War or the eclipse of that same empire at the hands of the US and nationalist forces throughout Asia and Africa at the end of World War Two. Or, think of Spain which, having experienced its golden age of empire under the conquistadores in the 16th century, sank into prolonged decline and civil conflict, only emerging from its isolation after the death of Franco in the mid-1970s.

Since the return of Donald Trump to the White House last January, and his imposition of swingeing tariffs on allies and adversaries alike, speculation has grown that America’s opponents would seize the opportunity to rally those long critical of Washington and of US-led international institutions such as the IMF, World Bank and NATO behind a new, alternative model of cooperation, popularly known as the “Axis of Upheaval” in a play of words on President George W. Bush’s portrayal of an “Axis of Evil” in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001. The challengers would use this platform to oppose US foreign policy and try to escape from the stranglehold of US extraterritorial sanctions against their financial institutions, supply chains and trading relationships. In truth, these efforts began even before the first Trump administration when China emerged as the world’s number two economic power and began to look for partners to increase its influence and leverage over the US. Beijing found a ready partner in Moscow, as Russia emerging from the Cold War was unable to shake off the paradigm of rivalry and confrontation with the US that had dominated the Soviet Union. Fearful of the rising power of its vastly more populous neighbour to the east, Moscow decided sensibly to cooperate with Beijing rather than try to oppose it. Newly emerging powers, such as Brazil, India, Turkey, Iran and South Africa, were happy to participate in movements that demonstrated their freedom of manoeuvre on the global stage and ability to promote causes close to their hearts. It was also an insurance policy against shifting attention spans or sudden policy changes in Washington. Moreover, countries in what is loosely referred to as the “Global South”, having recently achieved their independence, were wary of involvement in organisations and arrangements controlled by their former colonial masters. Voting rights in the IMF and World Bank or their lack of representation on the UN Security Council or major UN agencies were a case in point. So, in 2006, the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India and China) was born, to be joined later in 2010 by South Africa. In 2024, the group expanded to include Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran and the UAE. Earlier in 2001, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), linking China, Russia and four former Soviet republics of Central Asia, was founded ostensibly to coordinate the fight against terrorism, but in reality designed to curb growing US influence in Central Asia in the wake of Washington’s intervention in Afghanistan and to provide a narrative of counter terrorism to cover Beijing’s crackdown on its domestic Uighur population. In 2017, the SCO expanded to India and Pakistan. Iran joined the group in 2023 and Belarus in 2024.

The US has also been its own worst enemy when it comes to encouraging the formation of an axis of resistance. The War against Terror of George W. Bush, the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 (seen by many as illegal and unwarranted) and Bush’s characterisation of countries as either subservient allies or implacable foes (“you are either with us or against us”) alienated many. So did Washington’s longstanding position of unconditional support for Israel, encouraging Tel Aviv to adopt a policy of repression against the Palestinians and deny them their statehood and their rights. Later, President Joe Biden reinforced the sense of many that they were being pigeonholed when he invented his concept of global politics as a division between authoritarians and democracies. He organised summits of democracies with highly selective (and somewhat subjective) invitation lists. Yet, all this pales into insignificance in contrast to the damage that Trump has inflicted on America’s system of alliances and the image of America as a trustworthy partner which will act fairly and have the back of its friends and allies. The massive tariff hikes have been linked to political as much as economic demands and will inflict considerable economic damage on America’s major trading partners and probably the US economy itself over time. In some cases, allies are being treated more harshly than adversaries and in a volatile and unpredictable manner that suggests that Trump is out to punish them rather than pursuing a coherent economic plan. America First has meant America Alone as Trump has slashed the humanitarian aid and overseas development budgets on which many of the world’s poorest depended. He has withdrawn the US from UN agencies, frustrated international climate change efforts, shown half-hearted support for NATO and Ukraine (reversing previous US commitments to NATO membership for Ukraine), shown a readiness to do Realpolitik deals with US adversaries at the expense of US allies and, despite his professed desire to be a peacemaker, launched military strikes on Yemen and Iran (in the latter case unprovoked and in violation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty). The US Navy has even fired at commercial ships off the coast of Venezuela, citing links to drug trafficking. Trump has also questioned the sovereignty of US allies like Canada and Denmark or of neighbours such as Panama. In the case of India, he has imposed 50% tariffs on Delhi due to India’s imports of Russian oil while refusing to impose similar measures on Beijing, a much larger importer of Russian oil and gas. This cack-handed approach has undone years of careful work by the Biden administration to bring India closer to the US through partnership in the QUAD in the Indo-Pacific region, more US arms sales and cooperation in space, technology and civilian nuclear power. All in all, the first six months of the Trump administration have created fertile ground for the development of groupings that aim more overtly to challenge US hegemony and replace it with a new international order. Across the globe, countries are seeking to reduce their dependence on the US, diversify their markets, trade, supply chains and payments systems, seek new security partnerships and increase their resilience to diplomatic or economic pressure. Up to now, organisations like the BRICS or the SCO have been mainly talking shops designed to let off rhetorical steam about “US bullying” and the injustice or even failure of the “Euro-Atlantic model”. They have been short on actual concrete measures to end the dependency on the US market, on US military protection or the supremacy of the US dollar as the global reserve currency. We are still waiting for a BRICS investment bank, or BRICS currency, a BRICS disaster relief and humanitarian assistance mechanism or SCO mutual security guarantees and a joint command structure along the lines of NATO. But could this be about to change? Is the Axis of Upheaval about to get real and take on a solid institutional shape based on serious resources and common projects? One too capable of challenging or even replacing the liberal international order traditionally under US leadership?

Hard on the heels of the BRICS summit in Kazan last October has come the summit of the SCO in Tianjin in recent days, followed by the move of the leaders in attendance to Beijing to attend China’s massive military parade to mark “victory” in World War Two- something that will strike many historians as strange given that the Chinese Communist Party largely sat out the war in its hideout in Yan’an, leaving much of the fighting against the Japanese to Chiang Kai-shek and his Nationalists. Yet, whereas Putin was centre stage at the BRICS meeting on his home territory of Kazan, this time round, President Xi was clearly the undisputed leader of the show. The SCO is headquartered in Beijing but, more importantly, if an organised and durable front of resistance to the US is to emerge, then it has to be actively led and financed by China, the power that in military, economic and financial terms stands head and shoulders above all the other current or potential participants. To attract allies the aspirant hegemon has to be able to deliver public goods, such as security, intelligence sharing, scientific and technical expertise and privileged trading relationships. And this is precisely what Xi set out to do at the SCO summit. He offered the 27 SCO member states and partners free development aid in 2025 totalling US$280mn and low-interest loans through an SCO banking consortium totalling US$1.4bn. These sums, however, seem quite paltry in comparisons to China’s wealth and the economic needs of the diverse SCO membership. This said, Xi touted the proposal for an SCO Development Bank, although how this would relate to the long-standing proposal to create a similar bank in the BRICS (with a largely overlapping membership and partner network) was not clear. Xi said that China would build a Cooperative AI Centre for the SCO and invited its members to participate in Beijing’s lunar research station. He also gave access to China’s BeiDou satellite navigation system as an alternative to reliance on the US GPS network. There was talk of future initiatives in the energy sector and in green technology where China has taken a lead in solar power and renewables. Similar to the BRICS, there were the usual references in Tianjin to the need to trade in currencies other than the dollar, using national currencies more in clearing and financial settlements and in taking advantage of an SCO “mega-scale market” (Xi) amounting to US$30tn. Moreover, and as has long been common in the efforts of Russia and China to reach out to the “Global South”, there were the customary denunciations of “Cold War mentalities” and the “bullying behaviour” of the US (even if not explicitly named) and the need to “continue to take a clear stand against hegemonism and power politics and practice true multilateralism” at a time when “global governance has reached a new crossroads”, to quote Xi himself. The Chinese president referred to his “Global Governance Initiative”, but did not spell out what in practical terms this means, beyond a desire to reduce Washington’s reach and influence. But Putin, as usual, was happy to echo Xi’s anti-western rhetoric, proclaiming that “this security system, unlike Eurocentric and Euro-Atlantic models, would genuinely consider the interests of a broad range of countries, be truly balanced, and would not allow one country to ensure its security at the expense of others”. Putin doubled down by blaming NATO for Russia’s troubles, and especially for the war in Ukraine.

Yet, given the immaturity of the SCO as a multilateral institution, it is perhaps not surprising that the gathering in Tianjin and Beijing was more important for the strengthening of a number of significant bilateral relationships. First, in putting more flesh on the “no limits” partnership between Beijing and Moscow. Anxious to show that this is more than just rhetoric or a temporary marriage of convenience, Xi and Putin signed a new gas deal to build a second Power of Siberia pipeline from the Yamal Gazprom field in Siberia through Mongolia into northern China. The aim is to enable Russia to export a further 50 bcm of natural gas to China each year on top of the 38 bcm that it receives via the Power of Siberia 1 pipeline. Yet, even if China doubled its gas intake from Russia, this is still far from compensating for the 177 bcm of gas that the EU was importing annually before Russia’s second invasion of Ukraine in 2022. At that time the EU obtained 45% of its gas supplies from Russia (today the figure is 18%) and 30% of its oil (today it is 3%). Consequently, Putin was pleased to sell more Russian fossil fuels to China to fund his war effort in Ukraine. But such large volumes (and Russia’s vulnerable situation) inevitably mean that Beijing will have negotiated very low prices and it is still not clear how the construction of Power of Siberia 2 and its 3000km of pipelines will be financed. Russia is now increasingly dependent on China for its economy as China is its largest customer for oil, second largest for coal and third for LNG. In this situation it is also not clear which partner will gain the most leverage over the other: the seller who needs to sell or the buyer who needs to buy? Who ends up needing the other the most? Yet talking up energy deals was an easier thing for Xi and Putin to do than mentioning China’s help to the Russian war effort in Ukraine by supplying drone technology and electronics components for Russian weapons. In a further gesture, Xi promised visa-free travel to Russian citizens.

A second bilateral relationship also occupied centre stage: the rapprochement between Beijing and Delhi. India is a founding member of BRICS and part of the SCO since 2017. But relations with Beijing had cooled in recent times as the Indian Prime Minister, Narendra Modi, moved closer to the US and the Indo-Pacific democracies and Delhi resented China’s continuing military and economic support for its arch rival, Pakistan. China and India have also exchanged fire several times on the Himalayan plateau and Beijing’s claims on Indian territory in Arunachal Pradesh remain unresolved. Yet, in Tianjin, we saw Modi, Xi and Putin putting on a common front. Modi, humiliated by Trump’s singling out of India for special tariffs and his embrace of Pakistan to conclude mining and crypto deals together with Trump’s unwanted involvement in the Kashmir dispute, appeared to have swung back to the authoritarian camp. By going to China, his first trip in seven years, Modi has demonstrated that he has options and that India, a US$4tn economy, will need access to the Chinese market as much as to the US and Europe for its future growth. But by alienating India, and not offering it anything in return for reducing imports of Russian oil, Trump risks driving Delhi away from further economic reforms, for instance lowering its tariff barriers to western goods and services, and returning to the policies of autarky, self-reliance and anti-Western rhetoric that characterised India after independence. The hour-long meeting between Modi and Putin in the latter’s Aurus limousine was not the sight that US diplomats who as recently as 2024 shared intelligence with India, conducted joint military exercises and signed a defence cooperation agreement wanted to see. It was also not good news for US business and companies like Apple which have moved production of things like iPhones from China to India in anticipation of improving US-India relations.

A third bilateral breakthrough came in the form of the North Korean leader’s armoured train arriving in Beijing for the military parade. For Kim Jong Un, it was his first ever participation in a multilateral meeting and the first time since 1958 that a North Korean leader had attended a military parade in the Chinese capital. For China, this step was important after Kim had pivoted away from Beijing and towards Moscow after Putin offered North Korea Russian missile and satellite technology in exchange for millions of ammunition rounds and thousands of missiles for use in Russia’s war against Ukraine. Kim had also sent around 12,000 North Korean soldiers to fight for Moscow. According to South Korea’s government, 2000 of them have been killed. Yet this did not deter Kim from offering Putin 6000 more troops and workers for Russia’s defence industries. He promised to give Moscow as much as he could. But his visit to Beijing also helped to improve relations with China, the critical supplier of food and energy to North Korea. In going to Beijing, Kim seemed to acknowledge that Putin’s war against Ukraine will end sooner or later and that Moscow’s aid to North Korea will decline. So for Kim, this was a good time to mend fences with Xi who had been taken aback by the sudden and opportunistic reorientation of Kim towards Moscow. After all, North Korea is the only country with which China has a binding defence agreement, dating back to 1961.

Finally, Iran gained some useful support too at the SCO summit. The European Three of France, Germany and the UK had announced that they would impose “snapback” sanctions against Tehran for failing to cooperate with the IAEA with regard to the transparency of its nuclear programme, particularly given the uncertainty surrounding the impact of the US and Israeli strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities during the 12-day war last July, as well as its overall foot dragging on new talks to curb its nuclear enrichment activities. However, President Pezeshkian in Tianjin received the support of Russia and China which insisted that the reimposition of sanctions was exclusively a matter for the UN Security Council where they have a veto ready to be deployed.

So what are we to make of all this frenzied activity in Tianjin and Beijing? Are we really witnessing the emergence of a new anti-western multilateral order where more and more countries, including significant medium-sized or even potential future major powers like India will enter into Beijing’s orbit and progressively take apart standards of democracy, human rights, collective security, the rule of law and free and open trade that the west has tried to nurture in the 80 years since the end of World War Two?

Certainly, the sceptics will point to the usual things. The SCO summit was more about reinforcing cooperation among the “Gang of Four”, the long-identified group of adversaries composed of Russia, China, North Korea and Iran that has coalesced around support for Russia in its war against Ukraine. Although 20 leaders showed up in China this past week, there was not the sort of institutional innovation that we associate with permanent organisations and the pooling of roles and responsibilities, even sovereignty, that is the basis of political, economic and military integration and true solidarity. Nothing like a European Commission or ambassadors gathering in a North Atlantic Council. No international secretariat or Secretary General to put a face on the multilateral form of the institution or committee structure or voting rights. Beyond the traditional Gang of Four, it was not clear from the other participants who is truly committed and willing to integrate, who is sitting on the fence and hedging their bets and who simply turned up for a bit of publicity and self-promotion, making a symbolic gesture of defiance in the hope of gaining Trump’s attention and getting a better deal with the US as a result. Certainly, it is tempting to view the presence of Robert Fico of Slovakia or Alexander Vucic of Serbia, European countries that have a lot more to worry about at the moment than fighting terrorism in Central Asia, in this light. The sceptics will also point to the repeated talk of new development banks and new reserve currencies not followed up by concrete action as further evidence that Washington does not need to fear the demise of the Pax Americana just yet. Security arrangements have also very one-sided. Last year, Russia signed a defence agreement with Iran, and Tehran has generously supplied Russia with its Shahed drones and missiles. But that did not mean that Moscow came to Iran’s aid when it was attacked by the US and Israel last July. Moreover, there are simmering tensions below the surface that could quickly reemerge: between India and Pakistan, between India and China over borders and territory or even the activities of Chinese tech companies like TikTok, or between Moscow and Beijing as, beyond the current war in Ukraine, Russia is forced to play the role of junior partner or sees China undermining its interests and influence in Central Asia, the Middle East and Africa. Countries of the “Global South” also fight each other or come close to blows, as not only India and Pakistan but also Thailand and Cambodia and the DRC and Rwanda demonstrated recently. This could put the SCO under pressure to mediate or to back one side against the other. Yet, how much faith should we put in the conventional wisdom of the sceptics?

Asked about the significance of the SCO summit and China’s massive military parade in which China showed off new ballistic missiles, underwater drones and pilotless aircraft, Trump was his usual dismissive self, expressing disapproval but no particular concern. He is so convinced that America is the dominant power that makes the international weather and will always do so because of its enormous internal market, or financial system or military might that he ignores all warning signs that nothing is forever and that things may be about to change. Bullying and rough tactics can more easily alienate partners than bring them to heel and force them to comply. It is true that it is not easy to achieve the hegemonic role and to keep it. As Henry Kissinger pointed out, the aspirant hegemon requires power but also legitimacy- or in other words confidence in its leadership role and a willingness to align and to follow. The SCO summit was an assertion of national power by Beijing, and particularly the military parade that followed. But it was also about China demonstrating its national pride and a warning to others to stay out of its backyard or try to halt its rise. A sort of China First to match America First. There is no real clarity yet on China’s readiness to assume the responsibilities and willingness to build coalitions that go with global leadership. But nonetheless, US and European policymakers need to take the SCO summit seriously. Within a decade, the organisation has morphed from a counterterrorism structure to a much more varied organisation embracing economics and social and political issues. It has drawn in a broader circle of members and partners from well beyond the original Central Asian core. Laos was welcomed in Tianjin as the latest partner and Indonesia would have been present as well had it not been for the unrest in Jakarta provoked by the scandal over the salary increases for MPs. It is one thing to have love fests with authoritarians such as Lukashenko of Belarus; but it is another thing when Asian or even European democracies join the process and embrace the anti-Western narratives of Beijing and Moscow. And the big gatherings of the Axis of Upheaval are occurring more frequently, in more parts of the world and with more countries disgruntled by their treatment by Washington and believing that they no longer need to take Western norms and standards seriously turning up each time. In this regard, much will depend on whether Washington wakes up to the challenge and tries seriously to win its friends and allies back. For instance, in agreeing to more reasonable and equitable trade deals, reaffirming its military commitments, taking a more balanced stance on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and re-engaging the “Global South” diplomatically and with restored humanitarian and development aid. It will be the special responsibility of Marco Rubio, thus far almost invisible as Secretary of State, to get out on the road and repair America’s global relationships. Above all, the US administration has to stop pretending that its adversaries are its friends, not embracing a policy of confrontation but pushing back against coercive behaviour, deterring aggressive military actions, calling out repression and human rights abuses and making once again the American offer attractive. Otherwise, the day when countries discover that they no longer need to have a robust trading relationship with the US to be successful and prosperous may arrive sooner than Washington expects. Europeans too have to change their approach. The fawning and obsequious behaviour that we saw from the European leaders attending the summit with Trump at the White House last August suggests that Europeans have come to accept that the only way to deal with Trump is to flatter his vanity and play to his distortions and prejudices. But this approach secures the illusion of progress rather than real policy change, as we have seen with Trump’s seesaw regarding Ukraine and issues such as the ceasefire and sanctions against Russia. Whatever the personal views of the President, the US Congress and foreign policy establishment have to be convinced that, although NATO allies will no doubt remain true to the US come what may, the rest of the world is up for grabs. Countries dealing with the daily realities of being shut out of the US market or denied valuable aid or diplomatic support may increasingly feel that the Chinese-led alternative cannot be worse, and that for once the devil that you don’t know is better than the one that you do. There is still time to repair the damage as tariffs, trade and security relations are still in flux and countries sitting on the fence can yet be persuaded to return to the western fold. They will have few illusions about what a China-dominated international order will mean for their independence in the long run. But how to bring the turnaround about and convince Washington that an all-mighty America First in an insecure, impoverished and profoundly anti-American world is no recipe for US global hegemony or even America’s own prosperity at home in the long run? That is the question to which even the wisest and most brilliant policymakers and analysts are still seeking desperately for an answer.

The views expressed in this #CriticalThinking article reflect those of the author(s) and not of Friends of Europe.