The post-summit outlook for EU-China relations

The EU-China Summit of 25 July served as a key barometer for the current state of the two powers’ relationship. While the summit’s tangible outcomes were largely constrained by a combination of new obstacles and structural hurdles, the EU and China are more likely to pursue a tense but pragmatic status quo, underpinned by a shared, albeit fragile cooperation on climate change. Given China’s desire for deeper cooperation, the trajectory of this relationship will now be determined by Europe’s willingness to engage further.

The six obstacles that prevented an EU-China ‘reset’

The EU-China Summit concluded with a notable absence of substantive results, a disappointing outcome considering the symbolic weight of the 50th anniversary of the diplomatic relationship. The lack of progress can be attributed to a combination of six challenges.

First, from the EU’s perspective, the most significant obstacle is China’s continued economic support for Russia as an indirect enabler of the war in Ukraine. Since 2022, China’s imports from Russia have experienced a substantial surge. Trade data from late 2024 indicates that total bilateral trade between China and Russia reached a record $245bn, a figure more than double that of 2020. [1] Most Europeans believe that the war in Ukraine will determine the future of EU borders and credibility. While the EU hopes that the war will come to an end due to Russia’s economic exhaustion, Chinese trade is perceived as a crucial lifeline to the Russian economy under Western sanctions.

Second, a structural ideological opposition exists between the democratic EU, claiming the universality of human rights, and the authoritarian China, promoting “country-specific path to human rights advancement”.[2] The dispute over China’s human rights record, which escalated into reciprocal sanctions between European parliamentarians and Chinese officials, was enough to derail in 2020 the Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI), a major step toward an EU-China rapprochement.[3]

Third, the intensifying geopolitical competition between the United States and China places the EU in a difficult position. Despite articulating a desire for ‘strategic autonomy’, the EU remains a core component of the transatlantic alliance and is, for now, structurally dependent on the US on a range of security issues. The US leveraging that dependence to pressure the EU to follow suit in an escalation of trade and export controls complicates EU-China cooperation. In 2024, the Dutch company ASML halted its export of microchip machines to China under US pressure [4] , which China may now use as justification to its export control on rare earth elements.[5]

Fourth is the concern over ongoing Chinese cyberattacks and espionage. Every month, critical infrastructures of the EU [6] are targeted by allegedly Chinese cyber attackers. Chinese attacks target government departments and tech companies.[7][8]

Fifth is the fear of the use of military force in the Taiwan Strait. Europeans perceive that this would unleash global disturbances and would hinder all ongoing cooperation with China. European private companies also take that risk into account, often judging it too significant a risk for investing in China.

The sixth obstacle, and a particularly significant one from China’s perspective, centres on trade. Facing restricted access to the US market, China is actively seeking alternative avenues for its exports. Meanwhile, Europe is concerned about the potential for its markets to be inundated by good-quality, lower-cost Chinese products, which could undermine the industrial growth and ‘renaissance’ that EU leaders are striving for. In response to this potential imbalance, the EU has initiated protective measures, most notably with anti-subsidy measures targeting electric vehicles (EVs).

Where is the path for cooperation?

Despite the six significant obstacles hindering a deeper bilateral relationship, the EU and China share a fundamental global responsibility to remain active and cooperative on global challenges.

The most prominent area of cooperation, confirmed by the summit’s Joint Press Statement on Climate Change [9] , is the environment. This declaration signals a mutual recognition that climate change is a critical, overarching threat that demands combined action.

Their partnership has been institutionalised through the High-Level Dialogue on Climate and Environment, which functions as a platform to exchange best practices, align positions in international negotiations, and monitor progress on the Paris Agreement. [10] A notable example is the EU’s contribution of technical expertise to the creation of China’s national emissions trading scheme [11], now the largest carbon market in the world. Collaboration also extends to biodiversity: China’s presidency of the CBD COP15 in Kunming provided a rare opportunity for alignment with the EU on ambitious conservation targets, such as the designation of 30% of land and sea as protected areas by 2030. [12] Ocean protection is another shared concern again recently promoted at the UNOC conference in Nice. [13] Through the EU–China Blue Partnership for the Oceans, both sides have pledged to work together on reducing marine pollution, tackling illegal and unregulated fishing, and supporting international efforts to establish new marine protected areas, including in the Southern Ocean [14] where China is fishing krill.

Beyond environmental issues, other avenues for cooperation against global challenges exist such as promoting global AI regulation, particularly concerning the prevention of autonomous weapons misuse. Both the EU [15] and China [16] produce such technologies, but also advocate for their international regulation. In the domain of global AI governance, the EU has advanced comprehensive proposals, notably the “Artificial Intelligence Act” (2021), which foregrounds a risk-based approach to regulating AI applications, including prohibitions on “unacceptable risk” systems such as those enabling social scoring or lethal autonomous operations. China, for its part, has issued normative documents such as the “Ethical Norms for New Generation AI” (2021), which similarly emphasise human control, security and accountability.

The recent EU-China Summit clearly showed that the relationship is at a delicate balancing point. The good news is that China has demonstrated a willingness to cooperate, especially on global issues like climate. This leaves the EU with a fundamental choice: to pursue deeper cooperation or to maintain the status quo. Regardless of the chosen path, the EU’s success hinges on its ability to present a united front. As history has shown, a fragmented Europe can only be dominated in its dealings with China, while a united Europe has the potential to act as a credible and strong global partner.

[1] Fabry, E. and Courtial, S. “2025: 50 years of diplomatic relations between the European Union and China and the 25th EU China Summit on 24-25 July”, Jacques Delors Institute, July 2025.

[2] Keynote Address by H.E.Wang Yi in Beijing, December 5, 2023.

[3] Kuang, S., Orbie, J., & Blancquaert, S. (2023). The rise and fall of the EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment: ‘open strategic autonomy’ in action. Journal of Contemporary European Studies, 32(3), 772–786.

[4] Bloomberg report on US pressure towards the Netherland, 1st January 2024.

[5] Anna Toso, Bloomsbury International Security Institute report, EU-China Summit: How will Europe Handle its Rare-Earth Elements Supply?, 20 August 2025.

[6] Antonia Hmaidi, Merics report, Chinese state-affiliated hacking for strategic goals, November 2023.

[7] Dr. Cristina Vanberghen, The digital battlefield: EU-China cybersecurity diplomacy in the 21st century, March 2025.

[8] As recently as May 28th, the government of Czech republic reported serious cyberattack

[9] Joint EU-China press statement on Climate, July 24th 2025.

[10] Readout from the 6th EU-China High-Level Dialogue on Environment and Climate, July 15^th 2025.

[11] Pascal Lamy, The European Union and China: decarbonising together?, Europe Jacques Delors, Blogpost, October 2022.

[12] Kunming-Montreal Biodiversity COP 15, Target N°3.

[13] People’s daily analysis of China-EU blue partnership at the UNOC Conference.

[14] Under the Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR).

[15] EEAS position on lethal autonomous weapons, December 2018.

[16] Chinese delegation statement at the 79th session of the UNGA on Conventional weapons, October 25th 2024.

The views expressed in this #CriticalThinking article reflect those of the author(s) and not of Friends of Europe.