Moldova: between EU opportunities and Russian threats

Just ten days before Moldovans headed to the polls last October for their presidential election and a landmark referendum on embedding EU integration into the constitution, the European Commission announced the Reform and Growth Facility for the Republic of Moldova, a €1.9bn plan to accelerate Moldova’s socioeconomic reforms, promote investment and advance its EU integration process. It was an expected move, especially since other EU candidate countries had already received similar support through initiatives such as the Ukraine Facility and the Growth Plan for the Western Balkans. Still, the timing of the announcement was highly convenient; a well-placed, perhaps even deliberate, effort to protect Moldova’s EU path from external authoritarian interference.

However, the referendum results showed that more effort, or at least a more strategic use of the tools the EU has, is needed to prevent Moldova from drifting back into Moscow’s orbit. While the October elections were won by a pro-EU coalition, the constitutional amendment to anchor EU integration passed by only a slim majority of 50.46%. Following the referendum, the re-elected President, Maia Sandu, called the vote just the first battle in a difficult and unjust fight. Her statement prompted reflection in Brussels on how the EU can better support Moldova, particularly in light of Moscow’s growing interference. With parliamentary elections approaching on 28 September, alongside the ongoing screening process and the implementation of the Growth Plan, the key question is: how is Moldova’s EU integration really progressing?

Moldova, together with Ukraine, applied for EU membership in March 2022. In remarkably little time, candidate status was granted and accession negotiations were opened. By June 2024, Moldova had held its first intergovernmental conference. The screening process is now underway, with the European Commission assessing Moldova’s alignment with the EU acquis to identify the key reforms required for full compliance. The acquis is divided into six thematic clusters covering 33 chapters, while Chapters 34 and 35 are handled separately. The outcome of the screening for Cluster 2 on the Internal Market is currently being reviewed by the Council of the EU.

Moldova’s path has been closely tied to that of Ukraine, just as Albania and North Macedonia previously moved together. But Moldova and Ukraine have advanced at a notably faster pace. For comparison, Albania waited 11 years from its application to the start of accession negotiations. Moldova and Ukraine waited just two. This speed sends a clear message about the determination of both Moldova and the EU. It may not indicate short-term membership, but it does suggest the path should not be excessively long. Still, is political will enough?

This commitment is not just symbolic, but is also being translated into action. Alongside the pace of negotiations, the Moldova Growth Plan demonstrates the EU’s tangible support. The Plan is built on three pillars: increased financial assistance for 2025–27, better access to the EU single market and support for Moldova’s socioeconomic and institutional reforms. In a recent public appearance in Brussels, Moldova’s Prime Minister, Dorin Recean, called the plan clear proof of the EU’s trust in both the Moldovan people and their government. He described it as a genuine opportunity to attract investment and bring European living standards to Moldova, including better jobs, modern roads, kindergartens and hospitals. He also noted that the plan can help attract investors in sectors like renewable energy, electronics and pharmaceuticals by making the business environment more secure and predictable.

On 7 May, the Moldovan government approved the associated Reform Agenda, the blueprint for implementing the Growth Plan. Funds will be disbursed in instalments based on progress made in carrying out reforms. The Reform Agenda includes 56 reforms and 153 specific measures, grouped under seven key pillars: economic competitiveness and private sector support, digital connectivity and infrastructure, economic governance, social capital, green transition and natural resources, energy security and efficiency and fundamental values.

The ultimate goal is for Moldovan citizens to feel the impact of these reforms in their daily lives. One of the EU’s persistent challenges, both in enlargement and within its current membership, is demonstrating that the European project is not abstract nor distant, but real and relevant.

However, despite reforms, investment and support, one actor continues to destabilise Moldova’s progress: Russia, or more specifically, Vladimir Putin. In a Union genuinely based on the values outlined in Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union, all member states would consistently and clearly condemn Russia. Yet, the EU often holds candidate countries to high standards while appearing more lenient with some of its own members. This inconsistency damages EU credibility and, more urgently, undermines Moldova’s pro-European ambitions.

The results of the October referendum were sobering for many Moldovans who support EU integration. Despite polls showing widespread backing, the referendum passed by only 11,000 votes. Here, the diaspora vote was decisive. Moldovan authorities, EU and US officials, and independent observers pointed to unprecedented attacks on Moldova’s democracy by pro-Russian actors and criminal networks. Two weeks before the vote, Moldova’s police and anti-corruption agency reported that around 12% of votes had been bought. Fugitive oligarch Ilan Șor, leader of the banned pro-Russian Shor (Șor) Party, is believed to have funnelled $39mn into vote-buying operations in September and October. Șor, still politically active despite being on the run, denies the allegations.

Now, less than a year later, Moldova faces the same challenge. With parliamentary elections scheduled for 28 September, Russian interference is again intensifying, particularly in the information space. Moldova has become a testing ground for Russian disinformation. On 3 June, Euronews reported a massive visual identity theft campaign. Malicious actors had copied Euronews branding to circulate fake videos aimed at discrediting Moldova. These videos, shared by fake accounts posing as Euronews journalists, falsely claimed that Moldova has the highest rate of sexually transmitted diseases in Europe, that Moldovan migrants are driving crime waves in Rome and that Moldova is Europe’s leading hub for human trafficking.

Speaking again in Brussels, Prime Minister Recean said that part of the Growth Plan funding will go toward strengthening Moldova’s capacity to resist Russian interference. Nevertheless, he warned that anti-EU propaganda is spreading rapidly, describing Moldova’s current media space as an “intoxicated information environment”. The problem is especially acute in Transnistria, a breakaway region that declared independence from Moldova in 1990 and maintains strong links to Russia, where anti-EU narratives are deeply embedded. The Prime Minister underlined the need to reduce Transnistria’s dependence on Russia and reintegrate it with the rest of Moldova through targeted support mechanisms.

Recean also revealed that Russia is spending 1% of its GDP on propaganda efforts. He urged the EU to act decisively, not only to help Moldova push back against Russian influence, but to keep the country’s EU integration on track. He did not rule out the risk that Russian efforts could produce an anti-EU parliamentary majority in the September elections.

He acknowledged that the Growth Plan and the Reform Agenda are helping attract investment, improve living standards and support long-term reforms in Moldova, but this alone might not be enough. The EU needs to do a better job of communicating these benefits, both those already delivered and those still to come. Russia’s disinformation campaign has been ongoing for months. If left unchallenged, it could seriously erode public support for the European path. To avoid losing momentum ahead of the September elections, both the EU and Moldova must fully leverage the tools at their disposal, including the Growth Plan.

In this context, holding the intergovernmental conference on Cluster 1 on Fundamentals as soon as possible would send a strong signal that the process is moving forward. However, this raises a critical question: will Moldova’s path need to be decoupled from that of Ukraine, given Hungary’s ongoing efforts to block Kyiv’s progress? Could Moldova become the new Albania, while Ukraine risks becoming the new North Macedonia, stalled by political obstruction? And does that make Hungary the ‘central European Bulgaria’? A provocative scenario, especially for a process that the EU repeatedly describes as merit-based.

The views expressed in this #CriticalThinking article reflect those of the author(s) and not of Friends of Europe.