Hybrid warfare through disinformation: the case of Romania's presidential election

A crisis unfolding: Romania’s elections and hybrid warfare

In the last eight months, Romania has witnessed one of the most tumultuous periods of its existence as a democratic, post-communist state, following two rounds of presidential elections, initially cancelled in December 2024, that ultimately led to the election of pro-European independent candidate Nicușor Dan in May 2025. These elections were marked by a wave of propaganda and disinformation enhanced by Russian interference, which led to the first-round win of far-right pro-Russian candidate Călin Georgescu, despite his near-total absence from electoral polls just a few weeks prior.

The bizarre circumstances in which the initial presidential election took place only deepened after the Romanian Constitutional Court annulled the 2024 presidential election before the end of the second round, citing “Russian hybrid actions” and the manipulation of TikTok algorithms in Georgescu’s favour. The controversial and unprecedented ruling was seen by some as a necessary, but delayed, intervention, while others condemned it as an abuse of power and a breach of democratic principles. The court decision threw Romania into uncharted territory, both domestically and in its relations with its allies. Georgescu, who emerged as a messianic figure to his supporters following the election annulment, was barred from participating in the 2025 elections and is currently being investigated on six counts related to disinformation, the creation of a fascist organisation and actions against the constitutional order.

Breaking down the numbers, over 34 Russian hybrid attacks against Romania were documented in 2024 alone, with over 25,000 TikTok accounts and 5,000 Telegram channels being mobilised in favour of the far-right candidate. Moreover, a Global Witness investigation revealed that, during the electoral period, TikTok’s algorithms fed new and politically balanced users an average of three times more far-right content than any other. These continuing trends created the perfect storm in which coordinated hybrid warfare actions, societal discontent and passiveness, or complicity, from both social media companies and national authorities shook the foundation of Romania as a democratic state.

Weaponised narratives: exploiting divides in Romanian society

Considering this context, which Russia-promoted or related disinformation narratives have proven themselves to be most efficient towards the Romanian public?

Unlike in neighbouring countries, overtly pro-Russian narratives tend to fall flat in Romania, due to a century-long adversity towards Moscow’s influence and imperialist tendencies. However, malign actors linked to Russia were able to successfully adapt their tactics by exploiting certain local societal vulnerabilities efficiently. These include:

1. Pandering to ultra-conservatism: as part of a deeply conservative, Orthodox Christian nation, many Romanians are particularly vulnerable to narratives framed as defending traditional values. Disinformation campaigns have thus effectively exploited anxieties around sexuality, religion or the perceived “global conspiracy” against Christian values and traditions.

• Claims that Nicușor Dan wants to instate sex education (a highly sensitive topic in Romanian society) and “LGBT propaganda” to children, starting from kindergarten.
• False accusations that Dan did not baptise his children and is not truly Orthodox Christian. A deepfake video showing him in a synagogue tried to imply he is Jewish, thus exploiting antisemitic stereotypes present in Romanian society.
• Narratives portraying Russia as the true protector of the Orthodox faith, as opposed to the “decadent” and “satanic” West.

2. The ‘death of democracy’ narrative: this was used to criticise Romanian authorities, implying the existence of a coordinated ‘deep state’ campaign against Georgescu, thus creating a deeply entrenched paranoia.

• The annulment of the elections along with Georgescu’s barring from the May 2025 elections were portrayed as proof of democracy itself being cancelled in Romania.
• The idea that the May re-elections would also be cancelled, was widely spread and solidified the claim that an autocratic regime was forming.

3. The ‘rigged elections’ narrative: following Dan’s win, this narrative became a major far-right talking point, attempting to reduce the legitimacy of the sitting president.

• Assertions that the result is not legitimate and Romanian authorities committed voter fraud against far-right candidate and second round loser in the 2025 elections, George Simion.
• This was especially the case in the Republic of Moldova, where Dan obtained 88% of the diaspora vote, and where rumours spread that voters “had their votes checked and were blackmailed with losing their jobs”.

4. The ‘foreign intervention’ narrative: ironically, while Russia was actively interfering in the Romanian elections, disinformation from far-right claimed that Western powers such as France were the main perpetrators of foreign interference.

• Claims that France meddled in Romania’s elections in favour of Dan, supported by the ‘fact’ that the head of the French Foreign Intelligence Service allegedly visited Romania a few days before the election.
• Assertions that Romania was ‘transferred’ from the United States’ sphere of influence to that of France. This stems from the deeply entrenched narrative that Romania is a Brussels/Washington colony with no autonomy and sovereignty over its territory, institutions or resources. As a result of this ‘colonisation’, it is claimed that the Romanian diaspora was forced to move abroad, and is now treated as second-class citizens in their host country and being used as cheap hard labour by the West.
• Narratives calling for the nationalisation of Romanian resources to restore sovereignty and independence from foreign companies exploiting Romania.

5. The anti-Ukraine and ‘war scare’ narratives: Romania and Ukraine’s historically complex relationship was fully exploited by Russian narratives to stir xenophobia along with the generalised fear of entering a direct war with Russia.

• Claims that Ukrainian refugees (especially children) are receiving thousands of euros in welfare checks, and overall much more welfare support than Romanians in need.
• Warning that Dan’s presidency would lead to Romania’s entering a war with Russia; sending Romanian children to die in Ukraine.
• Accusations that Romania is being used by NATO’s leadership to start World War III.
• Allegations that billions of dollars of foreign aid are being sent to Ukraine as part of an elaborate corruption scheme, while Romanian citizens are struggling.
• Calls for Romania to ally with Russia against Ukraine and take back the Chernivtsi and the South Odessa regions (former Romanian territories during the interwar period, annexed by the Soviet Union).
• Reports that Romanians in Ukraine are being persecuted by Ukrainian authorities.

6. The ‘strongman’ narrative: stemming from the deeply entrenched belief, a residue of communist authoritarianism, that only a strong, iron-fisted despot can lead Romania and help it regain its sovereignty and dignity.

• Narrative that Romania needs ‘strong, patriotic’ leaders – much like glorified leaders such as Vladimir Putin, Victor Orbán or Robert Fico – that can break the rules, challenge Brussels (or generally the perceived global world order) and put national interest above foreign influence.
• Portraying such leaders as ‘pacifists’ who refuse to fund a war ‘that is not theirs’, namely the Russia-Ukraine conflict.

Building resilience and countering disinformation

Considering these six types of narratives perpetrated in Romania’s presidential elections by malign forces, one could create the approximate sketches of individuals who are most likely to be swayed by them. As such, they could be an anti-Western Orthodox dogmatist, a communist with a nostalgia for economically nationalist influences, a frustrated diaspora labourer, a young MAGA-style supporter angered by the corruption of establishment politicians or even an ultranationalist who supports annexing Ukrainian territories. These represent very different strata of society and ideologies that go across the political spectrum, but if manipulated systematically through complex algorithms, they can change the course of democratic nations in a matter of months.

The Romanian case study raises critical questions about the appropriate means through which hybrid threats can be countered. Future challenges will call for more than debunking, namely for the increase of societal resilience through state-led social media education and pre-bunking techniques, initiatives that are currently nonexistent in Romania. As such, a possible solution would be to form EU-wide working groups on education that exchange best practices towards the creation of an anti-disinformation curriculum. While this practice does exist at an NGO level, institutions such as the Council of the EU should prioritise similar initiatives in the education committees. Furthermore, EU states themselves should cooperate on this pressing issue and treat weaponised disinformation as a national security imperative.

Some EU states have already achieved an impressive level of social media literacy, such as Finland, where students are taught from primary school how to spot lies and how to engage with online content. Such programmes should be adopted EU-wide and dedicated not only to minors, but also should be part of lifelong learning initiatives, so that other generations are not left behind.

To conclude, it was not propaganda alone – as some quasi-mystical, immovable force – that drew Romanian voters towards abhorrent, and at times dangerous, narratives. Instead, disinformation campaigns gained traction by exploiting an already unstable foundation created by decades of corruption and distrust in authorities, laid after numerous examples of bad governance on both sides of the political spectrum. As such, combating disinformation won’t be the panacea to radicalism. It will have to be combined with good governance and regional development that can reach the often-forgotten citizens of Romania.

Do you want to counter propaganda? Indeed, educate and regulate, but also listen to the needs of the most vulnerable.