Europe cannot rearm without Ukraine

Unmanned aerial systems (UAVs), or drones, have become a defining feature of the war in Ukraine, central to both Russian offensive operations and Ukrainian defensive efforts. Ukraine’s defence ecosystem has expanded at extraordinary speed, growing from fewer than 10 defence companies in 2022 to around 1,500 in 2025, including roughly 500 firms focused on aerial systems. On the Brave1 Market, part of Ukraine’s government-backed defence-tech platform connecting innovators, procurement agencies and end-users, UAVs account for 46.9% of listed products, ahead of components and electronic warfare systems. The estimated annual UAV production rose from 2,000 units in 2022 to 4mn in 2025 with a planned production of over 7 million drones in 2026 (Snake Island Institute, 2026). With several Ukrainian drone manufacturers already operating at nine-figure scale and the sector continuing to expand rapidly into 2025-26, Ukraine’s drone industry is no longer a niche wartime capability but has become a high-throughput defence-industrial base.

UAVs have become the asymmetric warfare tools par excellence and military superiority in future wars will be determined by the ability to counter them. Through four years of adapting to Iranian-made and Russian-enhanced Shahed-type drones, Ukraine has become the world’s most experienced actor in countering unmanned systems. As similar threats now confront the US and its partners in the Middle East, a growing number of states are turning to Ukraine for battlefield-tested, cheaper and more adaptive air-defence solutions. Ukraine sent over 200 air defence experts to the Middle East and Zelensky is negotiating air defence agreements with Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates. For Europe, the implication is straightforward: the continent cannot afford to rearm while sidelining the only country already operating at the speed and scale new threats demand.

While drones (and to some extent counter-drone systems) are cheaper and often more effective, most Western nations’ current defence industrial bases – and certainly all European NATO Allies’ – are not structured for, nor are they capable of, mass drone production. That is largely because investment remains tied to legacy systems. The tension between traditional security and defence manufacturers, whose models have changed little, and the realities of emerging and future digital warfare will likely grow rapidly.

As European NATO Allies and EU member states rearm at levels not seen since the Cold War, the key question is no longer whether Europe is spending more, but whether it is spending in line with the changing character of warfare. Germany offers a telling example: Wolff et al. (2026) show that 95% of the Bundeswehr’s €100bn Special Fund was allocated to uses other than autonomous systems, data centres and satellites, with close to 90% going to traditional crewed platforms and only 4% to autonomous systems and related digital capabilities.

This strategic misalignment is compounded by the fragmentation of Europe’s defence market, which continues to stunt scale, innovation and efficiency. According to the 2025 NATO Secretary General Annual Report (March 2026), European NATO Allies spent an estimated USD 530bn on defence in 2025, making Europe the world’s second-largest defence spender and placing it well ahead of Russia. Europe’s weakness is not so much a lack of money, but rather the way those funds are dispersed across fragmented national markets. If Europe continues to spend within its current fragmented architecture, even today’s historically high defence budgets will remain insufficient. If Europe were able to integrate its 27 defence markets, pool demand and scale production, however, the current level of spending would go much further and allow Europe both to sustain necessary legacy capabilities and to invest seriously in emerging and unmanned technologies.

However, Europe cannot rearm effectively while treating Ukraine only as a beneficiary of support. Ukraine is a net contributor to European security, and the EU must place it at the centre of its own defence adaptation, as a co-designer of future procurement, innovation and industrial strategy. That means moving beyond generic calls to “learn from Ukraine” and embedding Ukraine in the systems through which Europe will actually rearm.

First, Ukraine should move from recipient to co-designer. Europe should not consult Ukraine episodically, after strategic choices have already been made. It should bring Ukraine into the design of standards, procurement logic, testing ecosystems and industrial planning from the outset. Ukraine’s combat-hardened experience must become the operational benchmark for modern warfare. This requires structured EU-Ukraine co-design of standards, faster inclusion of Ukrainian defence companies and industrial bodies in European programmes, and a more deliberate effort to treat Ukrainian operational knowledge as a strategic asset.

Second, European rearmament is, in large part, a market integration problem. Europe needs a defence market that can spend resources more coherently. Only around 1% of defence transactions are conducted under the EU’s Defence Procurement Directive, a stark reminder of how limited the Europeanisation of defence procurement still is in practice. In this context, SAFE should not be understood merely as a €150bn financing instrument. Its real significance lies in its political purpose: to encourage common procurement, aggregate demand and push member states towards a more integrated European defence market. Integrating Ukrainian firms, expertise and operational lessons into joint procurement and industrial planning is a precondition for making European rearmament more adaptive, scalable and fit for the wars of the future.

Third, Europe is still rearming for the last war. There is a stark contrast between Europe’s continued attraction to exquisite, high-end platforms and Ukraine’s demonstrated preference for systems that are affordable, mass-produced and iteratively improved. Europe still treats drones too much like Rolls-Royces, when many should be treated more like rifles – available in volume and good enough to be fielded quickly. That does not mean abandoning sophisticated systems. It means accepting a dual-track model in which low-cost mass capabilities and higher-end systems are developed in parallel. Europe will not regain deterrence by relying on legacy platforms alone.

Fourth, testing is the missing link in European rearmament. A core lesson from Ukraine is not only what to buy, but how to test, adapt and field capabilities at wartime speed. Europe lacks battlefield-like environments in which systems can be tested under realistic conditions and improved through continuous feedback. Ukraine has built exactly this kind of ecosystem out of sheer necessity, where operational value trumps technical compliance and rapid iteration is normal. Europe, by contrast, remains too risk-averse and makes it too hard to test, too slow to certify and too burdensome for smaller innovators to enter the defence market. If procurement agility is to mean anything, Europe needs dedicated testing and training ecosystems, closer links between end users and industry, and faster regulatory pathways for upgradeable systems.

Fifth, Europe must put the end-user back at the centre of its procurement strategy. One of the most valuable Ukrainian lessons is that procurement is not just about acquisition, but about keeping a live connection between battlefield needs, feedback, procurement agencies and industry. Brave1 and other initiatives are important not simply because they fund innovation, but because they shorten the distance between frontline demand and industrial response. Europe still struggles with this. Too much of its procurement culture remains compliance-driven rather than user-driven, and too little attention is paid to whether personnel can actually absorb and operate the systems being acquired. A European rearmament effort that fails to centre the end user will remain too slow, too expensive and too detached from operational reality.

Finally, rearmament must keep the human dimension in view. This is not only a debate about industrial efficiency or technological relevance. It is also about reducing the human cost of war and shielding citizens and critical infrastructure from sustained attack. Ukraine’s frontline experience is relevant not only for military adaptation, but also for citizen protection, infrastructure resilience and a broader whole-of-society understanding of preparedness. Europe must integrate that lesson into its defence planning as deliberately as it integrates industrial lessons.

The future of warfare is no longer hypothetical. Ukraine is a world leader in developing drone and counter-drone systems and a major contributor to European security. The EU must place Ukraine at the centre of its defence adaptation as a co-designer of future procurement, innovation and industrial strategy. Europe’s peacetime mindset must shift decisively towards wartime logic, changing laws, decision-making habits and the speed of action. Integrating Ukraine more deeply into European defence structures is therefore not charity, and not even only solidarity: it is how Europe equips itself for the realities of war that are already here.

The views expressed in this #CriticalThinking article reflect those of the author(s) and not of Friends of Europe. This piece contributes to the Jacques Delors Friends of Europe Foundation’s Spending Better initiative, of which Friends of Europe is a co-lead.