Election in Hungary: a national vote with European consequences

Hungarians will soon head to the polls to cast their votes in what is widely regarded as the country’s most consequential parliamentary election in a generation. The ruling FIDESZ-led coalition faces the most significant challenge to its rule since Viktor Orbán took office in 2010. The stakes could not be higher. If Orbán’s main contender, Péter Magyar, succeeds in translating his considerable lead into election victory on 12 April, not only will Orbán’s exceptionally long reign come to an end but it would also open the door to long-awaited policy corrections and renewed alignment with Europe. Conversely, if Orbán manages to secure another term in government, Hungary’s drift towards Europe’s periphery will likely continue, and its future in the European Union will become increasingly uncertain.

The significance of this election does not stop at Hungary’s borders. Given Hungary’s highly controversial, and often obstructive attitude in the EU over the past years, a change of government would also impact on the EU’s credibility as a political community of shared norms, as well as its ability to take decisions and move to action on a variety of priority issues.

The stakes in Hungary

Once considered the wealthiest and arguably the fastest transforming and successful country in post-communist Central Europe, Hungary has become one of the EU’s most corrupt and poorest members. Much of this decline can be traced to Viktor Orbán, who has built in Hungary a “mafia state”, which he labelled an “illiberal democracy”. In practice, the country today is marked by the steady concentration of power, the weakening of institutional checks and balances, the political capture of a large majority of the media landscape and the emergence of a tightly knit economic and political elite closely aligned with Orbán and his allies. Over the years, the big majority of public procurement contracts and EU funds have been directed to enrich his closest circles and consolidate FIDESZ’s clientele. Loyalists have been placed in key positions across state institutions, regulatory bodies and public companies – many of these extending far beyond the electoral cycle to secure long-term influence irrespective of future electoral outcomes.

In foreign policy, Hungary under Orbán has cultivated close ties with other autocracies, notably Vladimir Putin’s Russia. This alignment has become particularly anachronistic since the launch of Moscow’s full-scale war against Ukraine and low-intensity hybrid warfare against Europe. His government’s echoing of Kremlin narratives and systematic obstruction of relevant EU decision-making related to Ukraine, Russia and sanctions have put Hungary on a collision course with European policies and the majority of EU member states.

Against this background, next month’s election is far from a routine democratic contest; it is widely seen as a genuine opportunity for “regime change”. Indeed, it might be a rare moment where the direction of this deeply entrenched political system could be altered through the ballot box. The campaign environment is highly asymmetrical, with government resources, media influence and messaging capacity overwhelmingly concentrated on one side, leaving a large majority of the population exposed primarily to pro-government narratives.

Defeat at the election carries unusually high risks for the ruling elite, which is fully aware of the stakes. In such an environment, the incentive to avoid defeat by any possible means becomes particularly strong, as losing power could expose the system to investigations, political, financial and even criminal accountability, and the dismantling of the networks that have sustained it.

Several scenarios could be considered by the government to avoid such a defeat. Among them, experts have raised concerns about a possible last-minute postponement of the election. In this scenario, an emergency situation may be declared in response to an alleged Ukrainian attack on Hungary’s critical energy infrastructure. Experts warn that such a situation may arise in response to a false flag operation carried out with Russian assistance. Whipping up an already extreme anti-Ukrainian rhetoric and the recent deployment of army units to protect key installations could be interpreted as preparatory steps towards such a scenario. It is to be noted that Hungary is already under a state emergency regime since 2010 continually. This has given extraordinary powers to Orbán and allowed him to govern by decree, bypassing Parliament and suspending the application of certain laws. A further extension of this regime would therefore not be entirely unexpected. Other measures often cited include changes in the country’s legal system to favour FIDESZ, gerrymandering to benefit the ruling party, and, in case of electoral defeat, administrative or legal obstacles that could complicate the implementation of election results.

The Ukraine card

A defining feature of the Orbán government’s political strategy over the past decade has been the continuous mobilisation of perceived external threats. Political campaigns have repeatedly centred on powerful narratives portraying Hungary as under attack from hostile foreign forces.

The focus of these narratives has evolved over time: migration, the influence of philanthropist George Soros and bureaucratic overreach from Brussels have all been cast as existential threats to Hungarian sovereignty and identity.

As most of these earlier drivers began to lose traction, the government’s communication team identified a new target for its fearmongering strategy: the war in Ukraine. The intent is to create an alternative reality in which Russia is no longer the aggressor. The real threat is Ukraine, which aligned with a belligerent Europe, seeks to drag Hungary into conflict, deny it access to Russian energy and impose economic costs for supporting European solidarity with Kyiv. To close the loop, the government speaks of a collusion between President Zelensky, the European institutions and the opposition party Tisza that only the Orbán government can defend against.

While this logic may sound ludicrous and absurd, the narrative has become a key instrument in domestic political mobilisation, energising FIDESZ’s core electorate. It is striking and alarming how many supporters of FIDESZ have come to accept Orbán’s pro-Russia stance, despite Hungary’s fraught historical relationship with Moscow. This illustrates the outsized influence of a highly personalised politics, where loyalty to the party and its leader can override common sense and historical memory.

Orbán’s continued, firm opposition to unblock the release of an already agreed €90bn loan to Ukraine, agree to a new sanctions package targeting Russia and lift Hungary’s veto regarding Ukraine’s path toward EU membership serve to demonstrate that he is the national leader in Hungary who can protect vital national interests against all adversaries, foreign or domestic. His belligerent and uncompromising attitude at the 19-20 March European Council meeting derives from this position. This is a stance he will not back down from before the election, and it is highly doubtful whether he would be willing and able to do so after it if he stays on government. It also means that even if oil starts flowing again through the Druzhba pipeline he will probably not change course on Ukraine.

Under Orbán, Hungary has provided one of the most permissive environments within the European Union for the circulation of pro-Kremlin narratives. Disinformation campaigns, often echoing and amplifying Russian talking points, have been present across social media, fringe outlets and mainstream, state-controlled channels. In some cases, the line between government communication and external influence operations appears increasingly blurred.

Securing another Orbán’s victory in the election is widely seen as beneficial for Russia. Given Russia’s track record in election meddling and hybrid operations, there is little doubt that he is  willing to go to any length to extend a helping hand to the Hungarian leader. Various unconfirmed reports on the arrival of Russian intelligence officers with expertise in digital space and social media manipulation can therefore not be ruled out. What we are witnessing today is a form of “foreign interference by invitation”.

Why does this election matter for Europe?

The implications of Hungary’s elections extend far beyond its borders. Unanimity required in parts of EU decision-making gives each member state considerable power to shape – or block – collective action.

In recent years, Hungary has repeatedly used this leverage to delay or obstruct decisions on strategic issues, including sanctions policy, foreign policy declarations and assistance to Ukraine. While disagreement among member states is normal in any union of sovereign countries, sustained obstruction by one government, and obvious abuse of consensus-building, has disproportionate consequences for the EU’s ability to act collectively and strengthen its relevance in the world – precisely at a moment when the whole global order is in flux.

Hungary’s abuse of veto power and its departure from Europe’s core norms have turned it into a structural challenge for the EU’s policy effectiveness and credibility among its partners. This requires urgent remedies.

More broadly, Hungary has also become a reference point in the wider European debate over the rise of illiberal political models. Governments and movements elsewhere in Europe watch developments in Hungary closely. A perceived consolidation or expansion of this political model could reinforce an emerging illiberal current across parts of the continent and many harmful practices could be replicated, as we have witnessed in the region. Autocracies do learn from and support each other, irrespective of their ideological or other differences, forming what Anne Applebaum has described as a “global network of convenience”.

Conversely, a shift in Hungary’s political trajectory could signal that such systems remain vulnerable to democratic change, as seen in Poland in 2023.

Hungary is an important battleground for foreign election interference. For Putin, losing a particularly friendly government within the EU and NATO would represent a strategic setback. Such a change would not be seen as a welcome development in Washington either, which has thrown its full weight behind Viktor Orbán on multiple occasions. As the US is engaged in a culture war with Europe over democratic norms and liberal values, this approach is not likely to change soon.

Lessons for the European Union

The Hungarian case offers several important lessons for the European Union – irrespective of the outcome of the election next month.

First, the EU must confront persistent internal deviations from its core principles more directly and consistently. For many years, European institutions and governments often preferred to treat democratic backsliding in member states cautiously, hoping that gradual engagement and dialogue would resolve tensions.

This approach may appear more convenient and certainly less confrontational in the short term. Yet over time, it has proven costly. Avoiding difficult confrontations allows problematic practices to become entrenched, normalised and politically resilient. Moreover, implicitly they can encourage others to go down the same road, as the case of Hungary has shown.

Second, the Union must strengthen its mechanisms to protect democratic institutions, media pluralism and the rule of law within member states. This includes reinforcing citizens’ critical thinking skills and investing in ‘pre-bunking’ strategies. As social media has become an increasingly decisive tool in elections and influencing public attitudes, it is necessary to create an environment in which big corporations like social media companies substantially improve their content management and mark AI-generated deepfakes – already a growing feature of political campaigns, including in Hungary.

It is to be noted that the influence of large US platforms, like Facebook or TikTok, which prioritise content through opaque algorithms, could in fact be just as influential as Russia’s widespread disinformation methods. Effective safeguards must therefore be put in place and, crucially, enforced. As Noah learned: “Predicting rain does not count. Building arks does.”

We know that the EU was not built with persistent deviations by its members in mind, and it therefore lacks proper internal mechanisms to address such problems effectively if they occur within its ranks. It is nonetheless clear that adaptation is required: financial conditionality tied to EU funds has begun to play a role, but such instruments must be applied predictably and credibly. The same applies to procedures related to voting rights. Otherwise, the EU will be torn apart from within.

Third, the EU should improve its capacity to counter large-scale disinformation and foreign influence operations targeting democratic processes within the Union. These efforts must combine regulatory tools, transparency requirements for online platforms and support for independent journalism. Any effective protection against such practices, which will likely stay with us for longer, cannot rely on a predominantly reactive and defensive mindset. In today’s world, especially when we are at war, such an approach cannot be successful. The EU must be on the offensive and become more proactive, anticipating threats and moving beyond an overly legalistic approach, which only limits our ability to counter hostile intent.

Finally, European decision-making itself requires reforms, institutional adjustment. In areas of critical strategic importance – particularly foreign policy and sanctions – excessive reliance on unanimity leaves the Union vulnerable to paralysis. Exploring mechanisms that preserve national sovereignty while preventing systemic obstruction should become a serious priority.

A test of resilience

Hungary’s elections will therefore be more than a domestic political contest. They will serve as a test of the resilience of democratic institutions inside the EU – and of the Union’s willingness to defend the principles on which it was founded.

The outcome will shape not only Hungary’s future but also the broader European debate about democracy, sovereignty and the rule of law in an increasingly turbulent geopolitical environment.

The views expressed in this #CriticalThinking article reflect those of the author(s) and not of Friends of Europe.