Ballots under fire: how foreign interference is testing Europe's resilience

“Last year was bad, but not as bad as the next.” This adage describes rather accurately how many Europeans look at 2026. It is hardly surprising. As we enter the new year, Europe’s security, cohesion and political resilience are being put to the test. Russia’s ongoing war against Ukraine and its intensifying hybrid attacks against Europe, combined with the fracturing of the international order as we have known it – with its rules, norms and alliances – coincide with internal challenges, including growing political polarisation within European societies. All these factors increase Europe’s vulnerabilities. The Trump administration’s open hostility towards European unity and multilateralism, as well as its confrontational and bullying tactics, add further uncertainty to an already volatile strategic environment.

In times like these, leadership and a strong unity of purpose across Europe are essential. Failure to stand up for Europe’s long-term strategic interests and respond firmly to efforts aimed at undermining them carries significant risks. Important steps have been taken in recent years, but Europe needs to take a hard look at how it conducts its business in a much harsher environment and adapt and reform, as required.

Elections under pressure

The coming two to three years will likely see an intensification of hybrid activities by external actors seeking to exploit Europe’s vulnerabilities. Disinformation, cyber operations, sabotage, covert political financing and election interference have become standard tools in their repertoire. These methods are designed to weaken public trust in institutions, exploit fractures within societies, and influence political outcomes without triggering conventional responses.

In today’s geopolitical environment, the information space has become an invisible yet decisive battlefield. While influence operations take place continuously, elections are prime targets for malign actors seeking to shape political choices and undermine trust in democratic processes. Elections must therefore be understood not only as the highest expression of democratic legitimacy, but also as events of heightened security risk, when Europe’s resilience is tested most severely.

Europe’s election calendar is crowded. Several elections scheduled for this year and next stand out, with outcomes that could significantly alter national political trajectories and shape Europe’s collective direction. In 2027, the French presidential election and Poland’s parliamentary elections are particularly significant, as both have the potential to be turning points not only domestically, but also in their role within the European Union.

In 2026, the Hungarian parliamentary election deserves particular attention. For the first time in 16 years, a change of government appears genuinely possible according to opinion polls. Such a shift would enable Budapest to alter its highly controversial and often obstructive stance within the EU on key issues ranging from Russia’s war against Ukraine to Hungary’s own relationship with the Union and Ukraine’s EU accession. A change in Hungary could open the way for policy realignment and reduce incentives for others to weaken or delay EU decision-making.

Later in the year, elections in Sweden, Denmark, Estonia and Latvia are also likely to be exposed to significant foreign influence operations, even if their scale and impact vary.

Who should we worry about and why?

Several foreign actors possess both the intent and the capability to influence upcoming European elections. Their objectives and methods differ. Three deserve particular attention: Russia, China and the United States.

Russia stands out as the most hostile actor, with a long and well-documented record of election meddling both inside and outside the EU. It is the most unscrupulous player, running extensive and well-coordinated disinformation campaigns that frequently rely on outright falsehoods to sow division and advance strategic objectives. Moscow deploys a wide array of tools – from exploiting societal anxieties over migration, energy or security to covert intelligence and cyber operations, often carried out through non-state actors or foreign proxies.

Russia’s objectives are clear: to divide the West, weaken Europe and reduce its capacity to act against Russian interests, including in Ukraine. Equally important is its aim to undermine the credibility of Europe’s democratic model, so that it no longer serves as a source of attraction for audiences in Russia and in countries Moscow considers part of its sphere of influence.

China’s approach is more subtle and less overtly confrontational, yet strategically aligned with its broader interests. Beijing seeks an inward-looking Europe, more detached from the US and increasingly vulnerable to economic coercion and technological dependencies. Chinese influence activities tend to be more risk-averse and largely confined to legal or grey zones. Unlike Russia, China’s primary objective is not to destabilise Europe, but to ensure a cooperative EU that avoids confrontation over sensitive issues such as human rights or Taiwan. The preferred outcome is a fragmented yet functional, technocratic Europe in which national economic interests take precedence.

The US stands out as an outlier on this list, fundamentally different from the other two actors – particularly from Russia. While Russia is a hostile power seeking to undermine the EU and trust in democratic processes through covert and deniable means, the US is a longstanding ally, bound to Europe by deep institutional, security and economic ties. These differences are profound and should not be blurred.

At the same time, it would be a mistake to ignore that under the Trump administration, US policy towards Europe has shifted markedly in both substance and tone, shattering Europeans’ trust in the US. Senior US officials have made little secret of their ambition to weaken the EU and reshape its members’ political trajectory by “cultivating resistance” from within, including through open political support for nationalist and anti-EU forces on the far right. This stance has been articulated publicly since the administration took office, from J.D. Vance’s confrontational speech at the Munich Security Conference through multiple high-level speeches, including by the President to recent official US strategic documents, such as the US National Security Strategy.

This does not place the US in the same category as Russia in terms of intent, methods or overall objectives. Nor does it suggest equivalence between covert Russian interference and largely open, contestable US political signalling. However, it does mean that political influence over Europe’s future direction – including electoral outcomes in key member states – has become an explicit and acknowledged element of US policy.

For Europe, this is particularly unsettling precisely because it comes from its most important strategic ally. A disunited Europe, modelled on Trump’s vision of America, is openly seen in Washington as a more desired partner. Recent concerns voiced by the Danish government that Greenland could become the target of US influence campaigns to advance American claims/interests over the island underline just how far trust has eroded and how conceivable political manipulation by the US has become in the eyes of even its closest allies.

There is also a degree of structural convergence between Chinese and US preferences regarding the kind of Europe they seek to engage with: fragmented rather than unified, open to leverage and limited in its capacity to act autonomously. Some observers have even suggested that limited online convergence between elements of the MAGA movement and Russian narratives cannot be ruled out, particularly when it comes to dividing Europe and hollowing out the European project.

Autocracies, notably Russia and China and increasingly Iran, also align and reinforce each other’s messaging. They promote narratives portraying Western democracies as divided, failing, and hostile to so-called traditional values such as family or faith. Russian talking points on Ukraine are frequently recycled within this framework. The ease with which such narratives resonate in parts of the ‘Global South’ highlights some of Europe’s own shortcomings and underscores the need for far greater investment in countering them.

Internal political dynamics within EU member states further amplify foreign interference risks. Support for far-right and nationalist parties – often hostile to European integration and in some cases openly sympathetic to Moscow – has grown across several countries. Upcoming elections in 2026 and 2027 create opportunities for these forces to come to power or exert influence. Their success, particularly if coupled with cross-border cooperation among like-minded governments, would have direct implications for EU cohesion and policy continuity.

In some member states, including Hungary, governing elites exercise significant control over the information space, often choosing not to counter Russian narratives but rather to further amplify them instead. This creates fertile ground for foreign influence and weakens collective European resilience.

Methods and tools

Interference efforts in 2026 are likely to rely heavily on large-scale disinformation, intelligence operations, manipulation of digital platforms, and cyber operations targeting political actors and electoral infrastructure. Russia will almost certainly remain the most active actor, but it will not be the only one seeking to exploit vulnerabilities.

Beyond sophisticated influence operations, hostile actors continue to rely on spreading falsehoods, conspiracy theories and deliberate confusion, creating an environment in which objective truth becomes elusive. Traditional intelligence activities – including covert funding, bribery and kompromat targeting politicians and parties – remain part of their toolkit, despite the reputational costs when such operations are exposed.

Social media platforms have become the most effective instruments for manipulating public opinion, blurring the line between truth and deception. The Romanian presidential election illustrated this vividly, as TikTok and algorithmic amplification helped propel far-right candidates to the point that the result ultimately had to be annulled.

The rise of automated bots and, increasingly, artificial intelligence (AI) has transformed disinformation campaigns, dramatically lowering costs while enabling unprecedented scale and personalisation. Russia’s “Portal Kombat” operation, which used AI to generate millions of articles and flood search engines with pro-Kremlin narratives, is a case in point. In Moldova, AI-driven disinformation campaigns ahead of parliamentary elections marked another escalation. This evolution is fueling demand for a new generation of digital propagandists.

Impact and response

A recurring question is whether foreign interference actually works. The answer is mixed. European institutions and most member states now have a solid understanding of hostile tactics and have developed monitoring and response mechanisms. Where countermeasures are weak and no credible alternative narratives are offered, however, disinformation can be highly effective.

This has been particularly evident in parts of Africa, where long-standing grievances – from colonial legacies to perceptions of Western double standards – have been exploited and amplified by Russian information operations. In countries such as Niger and the Central African Republic, sustained disinformation campaigns have significantly reduced Western influence and shifted public and elite opinion. This success reflects not only Russian persistence, but also Europe’s failure to engage early and consistently with credible narratives of its own.

Europe today has greater awareness, stronger cyber defences and more resilient electoral infrastructure than it did a few years ago. EU legislation, including the Digital Services Act, the NIS2 Directive and the European Democracy Shield, has improved transparency, platform accountability and protection of electoral processes.

Nevertheless, important gaps remain. Enforcement is uneven across member states, media literacy varies widely, and political incentives sometimes discourage robust responses to disinformation. AI-driven influence operations will continue to grow. While AI can help detect manipulation, overreliance on platforms to self-police carries risks. Consistent enforcement of EU regulation remains essential. It is important to recognise that Russia no longer poses merely a foreign interference threat: it has built networks and strategic positions within political elites and has thus become a menace from within.

Europe is engaged in an information war that cannot be won outright or deterred in the traditional sense. The task is instead to strengthen societal resilience, close vulnerabilities and sustain political cohesion. How effectively Europe manages this challenge in the coming period will shape not only individual outcomes, but also the Union’s strategic posture for years to come.

Recommendations – Strengthening Europe’s resilience against election interference

Europe’s response to foreign interference must move decisively from awareness to resilience. The following recommendations outline concrete steps that can strengthen Europe’s ability to protect electoral integrity and democratic trust in the coming election cycle and beyond.

1. Shift from reaction to anticipation
   Europe should invest more in early detection and intervention, intelligence-led analysis and scenario-building to identify hostile intent before interference campaigns peak. Anticipating narratives and acting proactively is far more effective than debunking falsehoods after damage is done.
2. Enforce platform regulation consistently
   EU legislation, particularly the Digital Services Act, must be implemented rigorously and uniformly across member states. Social media platforms should be held legally accountable for the amplification of disinformation, including mandatory labelling of AI-generated content and rapid removal of coordinated manipulation campaigns.
3. Address AI-driven manipulation directly
   Common EU standards for detecting deepfakes and synthetic content are urgently needed. Public authorities should invest in AI tools that support detection and attribution, while avoiding excessive reliance on platforms’ self-policing mechanisms.
4. Increase transparency in political financing
   EU-wide rules should further restrict and monitor foreign funding of political parties and organisations. Achieving this requires enhanced financial-tracing capabilities and closer cooperation between national financial intelligence units.
5. Target influence infrastructure
   Beyond content moderation, Europe should focus on identifying and disrupting the technical and financial infrastructure that enables large-scale manipulation, in close cooperation with technology companies and cybersecurity actors.
6. Take the fight to them
   The Kremlin prefers to wage the information war in Western societies rather than at home. This keeps Europe on the back foot, forced into a reactive posture. By shifting the fight into Russia’s own information space, Europe could move out of a purely defensive position and force Moscow to divert resources.
7. Use the full EU toolbox
   Where appropriate, sanctions, cyber measures, and restricting access to EU markets and services should be considered as part of a broader deterrence strategy against persistent offenders engaged in foreign interference.
8. Strengthen coordination at EU and national levels
   Information sharing between intelligence services, election authorities, cybersecurity agencies and law enforcement bodies must be deepened. At the same time, local actors – including independent journalists and civil society organisations – should be empowered as frontline defenders of democratic resilience.
9. Invest systematically in media and civic literacy
   Long-term resilience hinges on education and regular training. Media literacy and critical thinking skills should be reinforced across all segments of society, starting at the school level. Safeguarding media freedom and encouraging foreign-language competence are essential components of any successful counter-disinformation strategy.

The views expressed in this #CriticalThinking article reflect those of the author(s) and not of Friends of Europe.