The future European security architecture: a new middle powers’ bargain

Friends of Europe’s high-level debate “Future European security architecture: a middle powers’ bargain” brought together frontline policymakers, strategic thinkers and practitioners to examine whether Europe can move from rhetoric towards a genuine Defence Union incorporating defence and preparedness structures.

The discussion featured Zanda Kalniņa‑Lukaševica, Deputy Speaker of the Saeima and European Young Leader (EYL40); Petras Auštrevičius, Member of the European Parliament’s Security and Defence (SEDE) Committee; Sylvie Goulard, former French minister of defence, former Member of the European Parliament, and Trustee of Friends of Europe; and Jaroslava Barbieri, Research Fellow for the Ukraine Forum at Chatham House.

Moderated by Dharmendra Kanani, Director of Policy & Programmes and Chief Spokesperson at Friends of Europe, the debate centred on three interlocking challenges: Europe’s political and institutional readiness for wartime realities; the transformative lessons from Ukraine and the Baltic frontline; and the need for a coherent institutional framework that fully integrates Ukraine into Europe’s security architecture.

Frontline perspectives: Ukraine, the eastern flank and the centrality of societal resilience

Speaking from Riga, Zanda Kalniņa‑Lukaševica described how the war has moved closer to everyday life in Latvia. In recent months more drones have entered Latvian airspace, some of them Ukrainian drones whose control was hijacked or jammed by Russia. Several have crashed in Latvian cities. Night‑time air raid alerts on citizens’ phones are becoming routine.

Latvia’s response has been to intensify cooperation with Ukraine, including a new drone agreement that channels Ukrainian experience directly into Latvian defence. “We cannot survive without Ukrainian knowledge, practice and technologies,” she underlined.

Kalniņa‑Lukaševica argued that societal resilience and a whole‑of‑society approach constitute the top priority if Europe wants to withstand modern warfare. Today’s conflict targets public trust, democratic institutions and social cohesion at least as much as physical infrastructure. A credible strategy therefore requires citizens able to withstand disinformation, cyber operations and intimidation without allowing fear to erode support for Ukraine or push governments towards accommodation with Russia.

She summarised Europe’s key priorities in four directions:

• Resilience – with societal resilience at the heart of a whole‑of‑society approach;
• Deterrence – credible forward defence, including air and missile defence, anti‑drone capabilities and ammunition stocks;
• Unity – strong internal cohesion and strategic integration of Ukraine, Moldova and the Western Balkans;
• Pressure on Russia – sustained sanctions and a clear refusal to drift back into energy and trade dependence.

Jaroslava Barbieri called for a paradigm shift in how Europe views Ukraine. Rather than a passive recipient of European assistance, Ukraine has gone from being a recipient of assistance into a key contributor and exporter of security, whose strengths must help shape Europe’s future security architecture. Barbieri added that a safe Europe is impossible without a strong, resilient Ukraine at its core.

Ukraine now fields Europe’s largest battle‑tested army and has become a hub for military innovation in drones, electronic warfare and integrated civil‑military resilience. Barbieri highlighted that elements of integration are already underway: the European Defence Readiness 2030 plan, the SAFE mechanism, and initiatives such as “Build with Ukraine” and “Built in Ukraine” are embedding Ukraine in Europe’s industrial and technological base. Major European firms are localising production and maintenance in Ukraine, while Ukrainian entities are gradually gaining access to joint procurement.

Yet she warned that parts of Europe still assume a long‑term US security backstop. Unless this perception changes, Europe will struggle to mobilise the speed and scale required.

Institutional design, investment and the question of a European Defence Union

On the institutional front, speakers argued that Europe’s governance structures remain misaligned with the threats it faces. Petras Auštrevičius underlined that no EU country is far from danger in a world of hybrid threats, cyberattacks and political warfare. While welcoming progress such as the creation of a full Security and Defence Committee in the European Parliament, he highlighted the gap between large defence allocations and actual capabilities. If European defence spending continues to be channelled through 27 separate national procurement logics and markets, Europe will strengthen national arsenals but fail to build a coherent security and defence ecosystem. He argued for interoperability, standardisation and common platforms anchored in a genuine European Defence Union and backed by shared responsibility for societal resilience and threat assessments across all member states.

Sylvie Goulard sharpened this critique by contrasting today’s defence debate with earlier integration milestones in coal and steel, and later with the euro. The EU’s defence initiatives are still remain fragmented and lacking in interoperability, which she deemed insufficient. Goulard was equally critical of the absence of a clear blueprint following the December 2023 decision to open accession talks with Ukraine: to date there is no concise public document setting out what a larger Union and a Defence Union would require in terms of institutions, budget and policies. Without such a blueprint and a firm political and legal anchor, she warned, Europe cannot be a credible security actor, and nationalist narratives will increasingly fill the vacuum.

Ramūnas Stanionis, Cabinet Member of European Commissioner for Defence and Security Andrius Kubilius, underlined that defence remains predominantly a national competence, limiting the European Commission’s scope for action mainly via industrial, financial and regulatory tools. Stanionis reminded the participants that the Commission cannot unilaterally drive defence policy and must work with and through member states, the European External Action Service (EEAS) and agencies such as the European Defence Agency (EDA). He highlighted three ongoing initiatives led by the European Commission:

• The €90bn Ukraine Support Loan, including a procurement component to deliver equipment and support Ukraine’s industrial base;
• The European Defence Industry Programme (EDIP), defining tools to strengthen European defence production and setting out European Defence Projects of Common Interest in areas like Eastern flank surveillance, multi‑layer air defence, maritime security, artillery and space;
• Work on military mobility, aimed at removing regulatory and infrastructure bottlenecks that currently slow the movement of troops and equipment.

He welcomed the proposal for a two‑page roadmap from Friends of Europe and its network, noting that an external, expert call for greater ambition could support the Commission’s case with member states.

From the Secretariat‑General’s office, Florin Urseanu focused on crisis management and preparedness. He argued that Europe needs to move from today’s largely reactive posture to a more anticipatory one. Currently, investment follows shocks: after subsea cable attacks, major cyber incidents or new technological shifts in warfare. Urseanu called for regular scenario planning and exercises to become standard EU practice.

Key takeaways

• Europe’s security environment is deteriorating faster than its political and institutional response. The challenge is no longer one of awareness, but of speed, coherence and implementation.
• Modern warfare targets not only armed forces, but also public trust, democratic institutions and social cohesion. Societal resilience must therefore be treated as a core security capability, not a secondary concern.
• Additional defence spending will have limited impact if it continues to reinforce fragmented national approaches. What matters is whether new resources generate interoperable, deployable and jointly usable capability.
• Higher defence spending is being introduced against a backdrop of social fatigue, constrained living standards and doubts about fairness. This tension will likely be further exploited in upcoming major elections in Europe.
• Ukraine is not only a recipient of support, but a central provider of security for Europe. Its battlefield experience, defence innovation and whole-of-society approach should be treated as strategic assets for Europe’s own future security architecture.
• Europe still lacks a clear political and institutional blueprint for its security future. Without stronger direction, implementation risks lagging behind the scale and pace of the threat.
• Reactive crisis management is no longer enough. Europe must strengthen common threat assessments, scenario planning and anticipatory preparedness across military, civilian and hybrid domains.
• Sustained support to Ukraine and continued pressure on Russia remain indispensable to any credible European security strategy.

Related content:

• Event | Clearing the skies: elevating European capabilities in drone and counter-drone systems
• Event | Clearing the skies: scaling Europe’s drone and counter-drone innovation
• Insight | Europe cannot rearm without Ukraine
• Podcast | Policy Voices – Why is Europe at war and what needs to be done

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