

AUTUMN 2018

DEBATING SECURITY PLUS

CONFLICT, COMPETITION AND COOPERATION
IN AN INTERCONNECTED WORLD

6TH EDITION



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 **friends**
of europe



Debating Security Plus (DS+) is a global online brainstorm, bringing together over a thousand participants from 86 countries, with the aim of crowdsourcing policy recommendations to the world's security threats. The brainstorm spans international security architectures, cybersecurity defence and deterrence, urban management, arms control and disarmament, EU-NATO's defence capabilities in Europe's eastern and southern neighbourhoods, migration and human security, and transatlantic relations. DS+ is part of Friends of Europe's Peace, Security and Defence programme, and supported by the United States European Command (EUCOM).

Unless otherwise indicated, this report reflects the rapporteur's understanding of the views expressed by participants. These views are not necessarily those of the partner organisations, nor of Friends of Europe, its Board of Trustees, members or partners.

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Rapporteur: Paul Ames

Publisher: Geert Cami

Directors: Nathalie Furrer and Dharmendra Kanani

Senior Programme Manager: Clotilde Sipp

Programme Manager: Mikaela d'Angelo

Programme Assistants: Alexandra Gerasimcikova and Saskia Llewellyn

Editor: Iiris André

Design: Elza Lőw

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FOREWORD

For the sixth edition of Debating Security Plus (DS+), Friends of Europe has yet again brought together a unique coalition of stakeholders – including national governments, international organisations such as NATO, the EEAS and other EU bodies and agencies, think tanks, media, businesses and key civil society organisations – for a global brainstorm with the aim of crowdsourcing policy recommendations to the world’s security threats. A thread running throughout this year’s brainstorm is the strain on the liberal and rules-based world order undermining Western democracies. With a declining faith in mainstream political parties, institutions and values, and in a context where leaders and media distort the truth, the world is increasingly unpredictable and uncertain. With the multiplicity and interconnectivity of threats that know no borders, there is a need for collaborative responses from the world’s leaders.

Debating Security Plus is the only platform that enables a truly global whole-of-society consultation on issues as diverse as how to counter hybrid threats in the cyber age; how to build EU strategic autonomy; addressing human mobility and migration; fraying arms control regimes; realigning the crime-terror nexus; and building scenarios of the future relating to Russia, Europe and US relations.

Around 1,200 participants from 86 countries took part in the brainstorm, and they were joined by 37 VIP debaters. This report documents the online debate and sets out 10 top recommendations addressing practical policy goals underpinned by a realistic roadmap for security. As in previous years, the DS+ recommendations aim to inform and shape the development of security and defence policies of member states, the European Union’s approach and activities in common and foreign security policy and more widely the work and focus of international multilateral organisations such as NATO and the United Nations, amongst others.

Unlike previous years, the DS+ recommendations have been formulated at a critical time for Europe as it enters a cycle of elections and the formation of a new European Commission and European Parliament. As such, these recommendations will feed into Friends of Europe's #EuropeMatters project, which aims to set out a range of options and policy choices for the new Commission and Parliament, where security and defence will be a core pillar.


Without our partners, DS+ would not be possible and therefore our warmest thanks to them who made this exercise possible. These include: the United States European Command (EUCOM), Civocracy, Argentine Council for International Relations (CARI), European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM), European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats (Hybrid CoE), Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations, German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP), Hedayah (International Center of Excellence for Countering Violent Extremism), Institute for Security Studies (ISS), Johns Hopkins University Centre for Transatlantic Relations, NATO Strategic Direction Southern Hub, OCP Policy Centre and Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC). Our thanks must also go to the coalition partners who gave Debating Security Plus its truly global and multidisciplinary nature.

Friends of Europe looks forward to placing these recommendations at the heart of our work.



Giles Merrit

Founder and Chairman
of Friends of Europe



Geert Cami

Co-founder and Managing
director of Friends of Europe



Dharmendra Kanani

Director of Strategy
of Friends of Europe

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY



“Today we face a new set of challenges and the return of Cold War-like tensions”

Izumi Nakamitsu,
United Nations Under Secretary-
General and High Representative
for Disarmament Affairs

The urgent need to find solutions to global security challenges has seldom seemed more pressing. Geopolitical certainties that have anchored the international order for decades are eroded tweet by tweet. From the ties of transatlantic unity to the irreversibility of European integration and the irresistible progress of liberal democracy, those certainties are now in doubt.

Against this anxious background, Friends of Europe hosted its sixth worldwide online security forum Debating Security Plus in June. An essential rendezvous for experts and policymakers, the event drew over a thousand participants from every continent for two days of intense deliberation on the most demanding security issues of this age of unpredictability. Debating Security Plus is indeed truly global in its scope, with 1,200 participants from 86 countries – from Austria to Australia, Argentina to Azerbaijan.

‘We have lived through difficult and dangerous times before, but arms control and disarmament measures have played a key role in conflict prevention and risk mitigation: in short, in keeping us safe and secure. Those institutions appear to be now under threat,’ cautioned [Izumi Nakamitsu](#), United Nations Under Secretary-General and High Representative for Disarmament Affairs. ‘Today we face a new set of challenges and the return of Cold War-like tensions.’

As with previous years, the 2018 edition of Debating Security Plus focused on the search for concrete policy recommendations in response to fast-evolving contemporary security challenges. Ten top recommendations that emerged from the debate will be forwarded to key international bodies including the European Commission, the European Parliament, the European Council, the European External Action Service, NATO and Defence Ministries of EU, NATO member states and globally.

Recommendations from previous Debating Security Plus reports have found echoes in ongoing policy discussion, for example on strengthening Europe's legal migration options to counter human trafficking, recalibrating NATO defensive deployment on the eastern flank, or the rapidly growing role of women in key security roles. Last year's call to strengthen Europe's defence capabilities toolkit has been reflected in the rapid development of the European Union's Permanent Structured Cooperation in defence (PESCO) and the European Intervention Initiative launched by France in June 2018 to foster a greater European expeditionary culture and provide rapid crisis response. Yet there is a clear need to do more and fast, given both the multiplicity of the threats and the uncertainty straining traditional bonds of alliance.



“Many of the current and future security challenges cannot be addressed on a national level alone”

Stefanie Babst,
Head of the Strategic Analysis
Capability at NATO

Europe’s problems loomed large with the continent squeezed between Russian belligerence to the east, instability in the south and the unpredictability of Trump-era transatlantic relations. ‘Europe is becoming bigger and bigger on defence and for a good reason, the demand is out there, and the world is not a safe place,’ said [Maciej Popowski](#), European Commission Deputy Director-General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations. ‘When we look at Europe’s neighbourhood to the south and to the east the situation is far from perfect. There are threats emanating from these regions and countries and we should be ready to respond.’ Across the debate was a realisation that the scale and diversity of contemporary threats know no borders and demand collaborative responses that run counter to the growing trend for unilateral actions. ‘Many of the current and future security challenges cannot be addressed on a national level alone,’ said [Stefanie Babst](#), Head of the Strategic Analysis Capability at NATO. ‘How do we want to tackle terrorism if not collectively? Or how to we want to face the huge challenge of illegal migration if not collectively?’

The 36-hour brainstorm was structured around six topics: countering hybrid threats in the cyber age; Europe as a global security actor; regional approaches to global migration; fraying arms control regimes; realigning the crime-terror nexus; and building scenarios of the future relating to Russia, Europe and the US relations.



DEBATING SECURITY PLUS IN NUMBERS



1,200
registered participants



Over 3,000
visits to the platform

FROM 86 COUNTRIES



1,840
comments
posted



50+
sessions



36 hours
of debating



37 VIP
debaters



THE TOP 10 RECOMMENDATIONS AND ROADMAPS

1. MOBILISE URBAN PLANNING AS A TOOL AGAINST EXCLUSION THAT BREEDS RADICALISATION

Local authorities can play a crucial role in promoting integration of immigrants to avoid the social exclusion that breeds marginalisation, criminality and radicalisation. This should be better recognised and enhanced. Urban planning, in particular, ought to be developed as a tool against radicalisation, and planning measures should be complemented with housing, education and social-service authorities to prevent the formation of ghetto areas and create spaces where communities and neighbours can mix. This would facilitate the emergence of productive and diverse urban areas. Local community leaders should be brought into discussions with police and city authorities to develop smart approaches to neighbourhood security. On a broader level, more powers should be

devolved to the city from national authorities on the management of migration and integration issues. The current infrastructure of European and global city networks should consider how urban planning can be incorporated in their activities, which involve sharing good practice, and they should engage in a focused exercise to produce a guiding framework on urban planning to promote inclusion and reduce disadvantage. The EU should combine forces with the OECD to create an index on how urban planning impacts integration, exclusion and economic disadvantage, the purpose of which would be to establish guidance and standards for municipalities on how to improve the use of urban planning to reduce exclusion and produce more balanced economic growth for all communities.

THE ROADMAP



Short term

Governments should grant greater powers to local authorities over migration and integration policies; municipalities should encourage more international exchanges between urban centres to share best practices and boost cultural understanding. European and global city networks should mainstream urban planning into their activities, focusing on how to promote inclusion and reduce disadvantage. The EU and the OECD could create an urban planning index to map its impact on integration, exclusion and economic disadvantage, the purpose of which would be to establish guidance and standards for municipalities on how to improve the use of urban planning to reduced exclusion and produce more balanced economic growth for all communities.



Medium term

Municipalities and local authorities should engage with citizens on the best ways to promote tolerance and cultural diversity. Mayors should take safety issues seriously by investing in police forces and in fighting crime, so that future generations do not grow up in a city where drug dealers and theft are the norm. They should develop spaces where communities can meet and intermingle. This could include making community centres like libraries, cinemas or parks more inviting in those areas that suffer from ghettoisation and recruit young interns over a space of time to be social workers in their neighbourhoods.



Long term

Local authorities can help build a resilient local civil society by mobilising the education, health, housing, social and youth services to develop urban planning standards that encourage diversity and counter ghettoisation. Mayors should mainstream diversity into city planning.

2. CREATE AN INTERNATIONAL CODE OF CONDUCT ON THE MILITARY USE AND SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF AI

Artificial Intelligence (AI) has enormous positive potential in the security area, from monitoring arms control agreements to crisis prediction, counter terrorism and thwarting cyber-attacks. Yet, there is clearly a dark side: amid fears of robot armies, drone air fleets, mass bot assaults and the increasingly computerised control over nuclear arsenals, there's a pressing need for an international agreement to regulate the military applications of AI. It is time to recognise AI's potential to develop as the "new nuclear" and work towards international AI arms control agreements. Steps must be taken

to build trust among rival powers, especially the United States and China so they can agree to limit AI's military applications, even as they race each other to harness the commercial and economic benefits. NATO needs to define its own position on the technical, ethical and political implications of the coming AI revolution. A crucial step in the short to medium term is for NATO to join forces with the EU and the UN to establish a commission to assess the impact of AI with a view to developing a code of conduct.

THE ROADMAP



**Short
term**

Educate policymakers on the potential impact – both positive and negative – of AI on security (such as defence, intelligence, diplomacy, surveillance, cybersecurity, information, etc.). Policymakers should establish an evaluation framework that would measure and track progress in AI capabilities internationally so as to reduce any future malicious use of AI by state or non-state actors. In parallel, companies should inform engineers and developers of AI of the political and ethical dimensions of their work. Increased awareness should allow NATO and other Western structures to clearly define their own standards and guidelines on AI use, act decisively to prepare for (mis)use by competitors and take advantage of the opportunities the application of AI presents.



**Medium
term**

Build trust among world powers, including through cooperation on the positive use of AI for data classification, anomaly detection, prediction, or optimisation in areas of common security interest such as cybersecurity, counter-terrorism or disaster management.



**Long
term**

Aim towards an international code of conduct or international agreement on regulating the military use of AI, based on those developed on nuclear or chemical weapons. A first step could be for the EU and NATO to create a formal Group of Governmental Experts (or a Commission) to study the issue and assess the impact of AI with a view to developing a code of conduct. European member states, China, Russia and the United States will need to develop clear national AI strategies that make clear the benefits of AI while mitigating its disruptive effects.

3. WORK TOWARDS EU STRATEGIC AUTONOMY AS A SERIOUS POLITICAL PROJECT

Europe is under pressure from all sides: Russia's military posture, interventions and meddling in Western elections cause concern; instability in the south fuels the migration fears that have shaken up European politics; the White House has cast doubt on transatlantic unity. Europe needs to speed up its steps towards strategic autonomy, including picking up pace on structures like PESCO and CARD and reviewing their impact to improve a joint strategy making process. The underpinning factors are more defence investment, increased sharing of diplomatic responsibilities and intensified outreach to allies such as Canada, Japan, ASEAN and Latin America. Europe should step forward with its own voice in the Middle East and forge a strong post-Brexit

security relationship with the UK. Thought should be given to replacing unanimity with majority-voting on some foreign and security policy issues. Given the unlikelihood for the EU to have a single seat on a reformed UN Security Council, the European Council, which understands the politics and trade-offs of this agenda, should undertake a significant policy review on how to strengthen a common strategic EU approach to defence and security, without ducking the issues of joint procurement and missions, the speed of decision-making and inaction. Pragmatism should prevail and this policy review should result in identifying two to three issues on which progress can be made and trust can be built.

THE ROADMAP



Short term

Trump is right – European nations need to boost defence spending at least to the NATO target of 2% of GDP. Yet they should not lose sight of the required increase in investments and keep in mind that spending more is not enough; how they spend their defence budgets is key. Meanwhile, Europeans should focus on pursuing their interests on Iran, the Middle East, international trade etc. even when that runs counter to ideas from the White House.



Medium term

European leaders must show greater efforts to boost the development of a common European security culture, notably through PESCO, the European Defence Fund and the new European Intervention Initiative. The harmonisation and standardisation of requirements to foster the pooling and sharing of European defence equipment is key. European leaders need to create the right framework and incentives for joint planning and procurement processes. There should be greater security cooperation with friendly powers apart from the US, and especially with post-Brexit Britain.



Long term

The EU needs more majority voting in foreign and security policy decisions, as well as more shared diplomacy. The European Council should undertake a significant policy review on how to strengthen a common EU strategic approach to defence and security by identifying issues on which progress can be made and trust can be built.

4. EXPAND REGULAR MIGRATION CORRIDORS

Migration should be viewed as a phenomenon of human mobility that is inevitable and unstoppable, to be regulated not repressed. Walls and externalised borders are not going to stop it. The best way to confront the horrors of human trafficking is to expand regular migration opportunities. Regional and cross-regional labour mobility should be facilitated through international and bilateral cooperation arrangements, such as free movement regimes, visa liberalisation or multiple country visas. Rather than rolling back its Schengen free movement initiative, the EU should be promoting it as a model for others, encouraging similar schemes being developed in Africa. Greater attention should be focused on the causes of migration, looking

at conflict prevention and resolution as well as the impact of climate change. Greater efforts must be made to facilitate job opportunities and local integration in countries of first asylum. More creative use could be made of current EU funding to develop pathfinder projects in these countries that can be the basis of future development. Sanctions should be used against oppressive regimes whose policies add to migratory push factors. Politicians need to step up honest narratives on migration, stressing the two-way benefits in host countries with ageing populations, countering populist critiques with facts – for example that just 8% of migration into Europe comes from Africa and that 80% of African migrants stay within the shores of their own continent.

THE ROADMAP



**Short
term**

All governments need to impose tougher measures on human traffickers, including through extra-territorial prosecutions and greater international cooperation; introduce sanctions on regimes whose policies increase forced migration through conflict, human rights abuse, corruption etc.



**Medium
term**

Politicians need to change the narrative on migration, recognising human mobility as an unstoppable and positive phenomenon and explaining its benefits to the electorate; Rather than threatening the Schengen agreement, they should present it as a major achievement that should be adopted as a model in Africa and other parts of the globe. They should also improve education for potential migrants about real conditions in their desired destination.



**Long
term**

The expansion of legal migration opportunities should be accompanied by increased training and recruitment to match emigrant skills with job-market gaps; a greater focus should be placed on the idea of two-way migration making it easier for migrants to move across borders and back, depending on circumstances.

5. BUILD A CREDIBLE AND EFFECTIVE CYBER-DETERRENCE FRAMEWORK

The cyber-defenders of NATO nations are in action against a constant bombardment. Cyber-attacks form an integral part of hybrid warfare operations and are often viewed as a low-cost, high-benefit operation by aggressors. Western powers need to build a credible and effective deterrence system by upping their game in assigning attribution for attacks and laying down clear sanctions for those who break them. Electoral systems must be given the same priority in defence from cyber-assaults as other critical infrastructure. Global agreements should be sought to commit nations not to attack elections and other civilian targets. The EU's Cyber Rapid Response Force initiative should be quickly put in place and expanded. The EU should facilitate a concordat between cities and

large private sector companies which aims to clarify roles and responsibilities ahead of an attack. The EU might consider establishing a prototype cyber deterrence framework trialled in two EU regions to understand how to better create a Europe-wide framework. Given the time and complications that would be involved in negotiating a comprehensive global cyber agreement, sectorial and regional approaches should be pursued and the existing legal frameworks should be used where possible. Such limited agreements could be expanded over time. More work should be done with the private sector to prevent attacks, identify perpetrators and build resilience. Care should be taken with launching pre-emptive or counter-attacks to avoid the risk of escalation.

THE ROADMAP



**Short
term**

Speed up work together with the private sector on the technical developments needed to identify the perpetrators of cyber-attacks so that they can be appropriately sanctioned. Processes that can cause delays (such as securing agreements amongst several countries) need to be streamlined. More member states should join the existing six countries in EU cyber rapid response teams. The EU should produce a heatmap of infrastructure and areas most prone to attack. It should also partner with NATO to facilitate simulation exercises that would address preparedness, responsiveness and post-crisis management in case a key agency or city is attacked.



**Medium
term**

Establish clear legal definitions, rules and standards on cyber-attacks and the appropriate response. This means NATO needs to operationalise cyberspace into its defence policy and planning. NATO and the EU should work together in creating cybersecurity requirements and benchmarks, adopted by the European Defence Agency, that measure member states' capabilities in cyber defence. Such an agreement could be reached among allies and partners and gradually expanded to other countries.



**Long
term**

Work towards an international agreement committing states not to attack civilian targets, especially critical infrastructure and electoral systems. For that, governments could elevate election infrastructure to the same status as critical infrastructure requiring priority cyber protection.

6. PROMOTE AN OSCE-TYPE BODY FOR THE MIDDLE EAST

An incremental approach to overcoming decades of strife in the Middle East could include plans for an entity similar to the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), which emerged in the 1970s as part of a drive to promote ties between the antagonistic Western and Soviet blocs. It could work on areas such as arms control, economic cooperation or the fight against human trafficking. Boosting cooperation among the growing number of MENA states that are developing nuclear energy could be a particular incentive, enhancing safety or developing monitoring regimes that would give

reassurances that atomic power programmes for ostensibly civilian purposes could not be weaponised. Despite the United States' decision to pull out of the Iran nuclear deal, its verification measures could still serve as a model for a wider agreement across the Middle East and North Africa. The EU should consider collaborating with NATO to establish a co-investment fund which both parties would provide initial seed funding to and to serve as an incentive for MENA states to contribute to establishing an OSCE-type structure for the needs of the region and its future challenges.

THE ROADMAP



**Short
term**

The EU should step up its diplomacy in the MENA region, filling the gap created by the uncertain US position, using its example and soft power to develop confidence-building measures among willing states. The EU should consider collaborating with NATO to establish a co-investment fund which both parties would provide initial seed funding to and to serve as an incentive for MENA states to contribute to establishing an OSCE-type structure for the needs of the region and its future challenges.



**Medium
term**

Encourage cooperation in less contentious issues such as environment protection, economic development and human trafficking; use the growth of nuclear energy in the region to push for peaceful cooperation over safety and verification mechanisms to ensure nuclear power programmes are not fronts for the development of atomic weapons.



**Long
term**

Help countries in the region build a new security architecture based on the OSCE model; provide international mentoring and monitoring, as required, for arms control and other agreements. The EU should step up its engagement especially on promoting arms control with countries such as Iran and Israel. The EU should use the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action regulating Iran's nuclear programme as an example for verification mechanisms that ensure other atomic energy plans are not used to develop weapons.

7. USE CRIMINAL REHABILITATION PROGRAMMES AS A MODEL FOR RE-INTEGRATING VIOLENT EXTREMISTS BACK INTO SOCIETY

In recognising the nexus between organised crime and terrorism, society should also look at applying successful solutions used against criminal gangs to combat violent extremism. Rehabilitation programmes designed to ease former gang members back into society could be adapted for use with repentant extremists. Judiciary and penitentiary systems should be reformed to ensure that rehabilitation and reinsertion work starts in prison. Prisons should work with families, schools, employer and social structures should be adapted to ensure former extremists who renounce violence can be re-integrated into society. Psychological

support structures must be strengthened. There should be a special focus on children and youths recruited by extremists to ensure their rehabilitation. Within wider communities, work is needed to build societal acceptance of the rehabilitated. The potential of reformed, former extremists in countering and preventing violent extremism has to be recognised. A distinct role the EU could play in this regard is to enable a review of rehabilitation programmes that have emerged and where this approach is being taken in order to be able to demonstrate the social and economic benefits of such programmes and promote these across the EU.

THE ROADMAP



Short term

Government agencies, with the help and direction of the EU, should team up with think tanks or specialised centres of excellence to produce a study on criminal rehabilitation programmes successfully used to reform gang members to see how they can be adapted to violent extremists; they should look at those rehab programmes already used for terror group members, for example in Saudi Arabia. The study would demonstrate the social and economic benefits of such programmes and the EU could promote these across the continent. Prisons should set up psychological counselling for detained extremists, and in particular for any children that have been caught up with terror groups.



Medium term

The criminal justice sector should develop tools and approaches that would successfully dis-engage (ceasing an extremist's violent behaviour and activities) and de-radicalise (change beliefs and attitudes) violent extremists. A good starting point is to map previous dis-engagement and de-radicalisation programmes and look into what has worked and what has not. Individual "needs assessments" in order to develop a tailored approach should be conducted.



Long term

Rehabilitation centres should work with families, schools, employers and community groups during the extremist's rehabilitation process so as to prepare reformed extremists for a return to outside life and prepare society to accept them back. Rehabilitated extremists can also play a positive role to inspire or educate vulnerable individuals in their community susceptible to radicalisation or pass on information to social workers or security agencies before any real threat can develop.

8. BUILD A TRUSTED, TRANSNATIONAL PUBLIC SERVICE INFORMATION SYSTEM AS PART OF A STRATEGY TO COUNTER PROPAGANDA AND FAKE NEWS

During the Cold War, public service broadcasters were an effective tool to counter propaganda and promote democratic values, but funding for them has been in steady decline. That means Western powers have fallen behind in the information battle, leaving our societies open to hostile propaganda and the destabilising effects of fake news. A transnational, European public service information system could be set up to provide news with impartiality, accuracy and integrity, funded by – but independent of – the EU and its member states. An important consideration would be to involve social media companies and canvass the

views of consumers in order that the body has relevance and does not become another EU body. In more general terms, impartial state support for quality media should be expanded. Governments should support more proactive social media operations to engage and counter hostile narratives, with greater investment in initiatives such as the European External Action Service's East Stratcom Task Force. Social media companies and tech platforms should be engaged to counter extremism, propaganda and hate speech, and to call out fake news. All such initiatives should ensure full respect for freedom of speech.

THE ROADMAP



Short term

Governments should boost funding for existing public service broadcasters, especially those with international reach, and for other quality, fact-based media to provide a credible counterbalance to the propaganda operations run by Russia and others. Governments and their specialised agencies should work with tech companies and social media platforms to quickly spot and denounce fake news and block the work of hostile “troll farms”; provide further backing to operations such as the EU's East StratCom Task Force which work to debunk disinformation.



Medium term

Governments should establish better dialogue with its citizens to build awareness about threats. Think of creative ways to use media to build societal resilience, such as Norwegian television's fictional series *Okkupert* (Occupied) about a Russian takeover of the country or Sweden's information campaign on how citizens should prepare for invasion.



Long term

The EU and the Council could set up an independent, trans-national public service broadcaster in the shape of a European Public Service Information Bureau. It could be funded by, but independent of, the EU and its member states. The Bureau could be created through wide public-private consultations and be given the mission to reinstate the trust that has been lost in the information system.

9. INCLUDE BOTH NUCLEAR AND NON-NUCLEAR STATES TO GUIDE THE PROCESS OF TANGIBLE DENUCLEARISATION

Non-nuclear weapon states can play a key role in nuclear arms control, notably through acting as intermediaries during the setting up and holding of negotiations, and in verification regimes once arms control agreements have been struck. Increased mediation from non-nuclear states could help guide the process of denuclearisation. Non-nuclear states should put pressure on the United States, Russia and other nuclear powers to reduce their weapon stockpiles; they could also help inject new vigour into dialogue on the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty and the New Start Treaty on compliance and extension. Other countries should support the United States in ensuring pressure is maintained on North Korea to guarantee its denuclearisation.

States and international organisations should be prepared to monitor the implementation of the Trump-Kim agreement. Greater scope ought to be given to the input of civil society in arms control processes. European nations must become more involved in talks around the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons to preserve the legitimacy of nuclear deterrence, even if they stop short of signing it. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Organisation (CTBTO) should collaborate and host an international summit to iron out disagreements and establish cooperative arrangements for credible verification, surveillance and annual review mechanisms.

THE ROADMAP



Short term

A credible verification on North Korea's denuclearisation would require North Korea to relinquish all its nuclear capabilities, starting by freezing the testing and production of nuclear weapons. A second step is to ensure the production of enriched uranium is terminated and the country's nuclear complexes subsequently dismantled. A longer-term goal includes relinquishing ballistic missiles, chemical and biological weapons and any means to produce them. The EU should work to keep the Iran nuclear deal despite Washington pulling out of the agreement.



Medium term

European allies should join other nations in lobbying the US and Russia to tone down nuclear rhetoric, respect existing arms control commitments and work towards new agreements to limit nuclear stockpiles and weapons. Non-nuclear states can prompt discussions on the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty and the New Start Treaty. Europeans should join talks on the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, even without immediate plans to sign it.



Long term

Non-nuclear states should offer their services to initiate and mediate arms control negotiations among the nuclear-armed powers and to verify any agreement; civil society should be given a greater role in arms control processes.

10. TAKE THE COMMUNITY POLICING APPROACH AS A BENCHMARK PRACTICE

Community policing can be a force for good in preventing tensions at a local level, building trust between communities and a source of intelligence on high risk individuals and communities. Key to making community policing successful is the effective training and support of police officers and for their role to be seen as legitimate and to have access to resources to enable them to facilitate community support. As a result, at times of terror attacks and crises in a city, community police officers could be a vital resource in de-escalating tensions but also

in sharing intelligence to improve the work of security agencies. A key element in the success of community policing is the trust in them by the communities they serve. Therefore, this requires bold and transparent measures to tackle abuse as well as improved accountability. Another ingredient in building trust locally can be achieved through events which take a bottom-up approach and which are determined by the communities that are being served. There should be a stronger focus on police, rather than military, responses to extremism.

THE ROADMAP



Short term

Governments should re-think their policing strategies to have more neighbourhood police officers on the beat, presenting familiar faces who can become a trusted part of communities; city and commune mayors should hold social and sporting events between officers and the public they serve, to build confidence and mutual understanding. Helping members of a community feel a sense of belonging to a larger group can help people to bond.



Medium term

Police commissioners should step up monitoring of their staff to root out abusive behaviour and punish offenders whose actions add to public hostility and feed radicalisation among marginalised communities. Security agencies need to make it clear to the communities they are serving that they are there to build trust and are not spying on the communities in question. The police could be aided by a local CVE coordinator, who would act as a facilitator between law enforcement and security agencies by sharing information, though only when behaviour is deemed to be suspicious. CVE coordinator positions should be set up across different cities to act as information sharing hubs.



Long term

Governments need to invest more in police training and education to raise awareness of sensitive community issues. Governments should work with experienced practitioners to collaboratively develop and share guidelines on training local and regional police and intelligence forces. Law enforcement should recruit more minority officers to ensure the force reflects societal diversity; meanwhile, civil society organisations should adopt a less-antagonistic approach to law enforcement, including by hiring ex-officers.



IN DEPTH: THE TOP 10 RECOMMENDATIONS

1 MOBILISE URBAN PLANNING AS A TOOL AGAINST EXCLUSION THAT BREEDS RADICALISATION

The very structure of our cities can play a key role in shaping the way immigrants and minority communities are integrated. When used wisely, urban planning can prevent the development of closed, monocultural neighbourhoods that breed marginalisation and radicalisation among disaffected youth.

‘City planning and urban architecture are incredibly important tools in building a stronger community cohesion, as well as a more cosmopolitan, pluralistic city,’ wrote [Bjørn Ihler](#), Founder of Khalifa-Ihler Institute and Kofi Annan Extremely Together Young Leader. ‘City planning, however, does not only need to challenge ghettoisation and create affordable housing – it also needs to create good urban spaces for actual interaction,’ he told Debating Security Plus. ‘We also need to keep those spaces in mind, make them inviting and nice to be in – that also takes shape in community centres such as libraries, cinemas, cricket fields and other things that often are not prioritised in the places that suffer from ghettoisation.’

Housing, education, social benefits policies at local level all need to be harnessed to promote inclusive urban communities, argued [Dharmendra Kanani](#), Director of Strategy at Friends of Europe. ‘Municipalities need to work harder at tackling disadvantage, reducing the perception of “them and us” in terms of access to resources, whether this is housing, benefits or training and to create greater opportunities for communities to mix and enjoy better and equal life chances – this is also an urban planning challenge for the 21st Century,’ he said.



“City planning and urban architecture are incredibly important tools in building a stronger community cohesion, as well as a more cosmopolitan, pluralistic city”

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Founder of the +Khalifa-Ihler Institute
and Kofi Annan Extremely
Together Young Leader

[Renske Van Der Veer](#), Director of the International Centre for Counter Terrorism (ICCT) in the Netherlands, thought city service layouts may be a major factor in explaining why her country has not suffered a recent terror attack. ‘My gut feeling says it does have something to do with the quality of life in the Netherlands. I feel that even in the neighbourhoods in the larger cities in the Netherlands where it is socially and economically hard compared to other areas, there is still a relative high standard of security and accessibility,’ she wrote. ‘We have no neighbourhoods where a police officer does not dare to walk around after six at night – that is how it is in some neighbouring countries.’

Local authorities can play a crucial role in promoting the integration of immigrants. Powers over migration and integration policies should be devolved to city halls, as they have a closer relationship with both native and incoming communities, and a more intimate understanding of local issues.



Cities are not only in the frontline of forced migration, with 60% of the world's refugees and 80% of internally displaced, explained [Robert Muggah](#), Co-Founder and Research Director of the Igarapé Institute in Brazil, they also serve as bulwarks against anti-immigrant populism. Although not immune to it, cities experience less derogatory rhetoric towards migrants: 'Cities are a kind of antidote to the brand of reactionary nationalism and populism that denigrates migrants, including refugees and asylum seekers. This is partly because populism thrives in semi-urban and rural areas where native born populations are often in decline.'

Networks between cities at national and international level should be broadened and strengthened to ensure the exchange of experience and best practice. The work of EUROCITIES, the Global Parliament of Mayors, and the Sanctuary City movement was highlighted. National and international authorities also need to work with and learn from cities.

'Cities and mayors are often in the frontline in addressing these issues and the lessons they learnt "in the trenches" should help shape national policies,' said [Lamberto Zannier](#), OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities. 'It is not only central level leaders having the responsibility, but also leaders at all levels of government have a role to play. The principle of downward accountability should shape local governance and policy decisions. This will also serve to address basic needs of local communities and help them choose responsible leaders.'

According to [Saad Amrani](#), Chief Commissioner and Policy Advisor of the Belgian Federal Police, bad urban management, especially with regards to migration flows and diversity, can lead to threats and systemic risks. Local authorities on the other hand 'can help build a resilient local civil society, have a positive influence on

"Cities and mayors are often in the frontline in addressing these issues and the lessons they learnt "in the trenches" should help shape national policies"

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“The rise of populism and intolerance, and a growing polarisation in different Western nations are seriously undermining the stability of our democracies and threatening the “togetherness” in major cities”

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of the Belgian Federal Police

housing strategies, as well as get the school system respond to the specific needs. The combination of all that can prove successful.’

He stressed the importance of communities and local authorities working together to develop “smart cities” that redesign safety and security in neighbourhoods. The EU can help play a role there, said [Alena Šimková](#), Chairperson of CEN/TC 325 Crime prevention through building, facility and area design at the European Committee for Standardisation (CEN). ‘I see particular solutions in the preparation of EU guidelines – European standards for design and operation of buildings, facilities and public space focused mainly on crime prevention,’ she said. That could include analysis of crime risks in the surroundings, situation crime prevention and design guidance on a building and area basis.

Amrani warned that the cohesion of cities is coming under threat from the emergence of new political forces. ‘The rise of populism and intolerance, and a growing polarisation in different Western nations are seriously undermining the stability of our democracies and threatening the “togetherness” in major cities,’ he said.

In response to such threats, Muggah argued for a direct approach in the urban space, citing facts that show that cities with larger concentrations of foreign born residents tend to have lower crime when compared to cities without mixed populations, or that migrants in Europe are twice as likely to start a business than native-born neighbours. ‘We need to confront populist ideologies that fuel anti-immigrant bias in the public square. This means engaging with populists in debate – not excluding them,’ he wrote. ‘Cities need a political voice. They also need to support interaction and exchange between identity groups since we know that increased contact can reduce the prejudice that fuels populism.’

2 CREATE AN INTERNATIONAL CODE OF CONDUCT ON THE MILITARY USE AND SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF AI

The nightmare scenario of super computers and terminator cyborgs dragging humanity into an apocalyptic future was once the realm of science fiction. Now, serious tech brains such as SpaceX and Tesla magnate Elon Musk or Skype founder Jaan Tallinn are warning that humanity is threatened by the risk of Artificial Intelligence (AI) running amok. Musk has warned the rise of AI was probably the “biggest existential threat” facing humankind. Debating Security Plus presented a near-future scenario, developed by the German Council on Foreign Relations and the Center for Transatlantic Relations at Johns Hopkins University, where superpower rivalries and the lack of international controls allows a Chinese-developed sentient AI programme to get out of control threatening global infrastructure networks, including nuclear power plants, with potentially devastating effect.

In the face of such fears, an international code of conduct to regulate the military applications of AI could be created to build trust between rival powers, such as China and the United States, even as they compete to maximise the commercial and economic benefits of the new technology. While cautioning against the risk of overreacting, participants asked whether AI should be considered as a threat on the scale of nuclear weapons, requiring international arms control agreements to head off the risk of artificial intelligence triggering mass destruction.

“With the development of artificial intelligence and sophisticated software becoming more available worldwide, nuclear weapons are more vulnerable than ever to hacking and technological failures”

Natalia Viakhireva,
Programme Manager and Roman
Maika, Programme Assistant, Russian
International Affairs Council (RIAC)

‘The key question is, do we assess AI as similarly challenging and threatening, so that the key players are willing to agree on a code of conduct?’ asked [Stefan Meister](#) of the German Council on Foreign Relations. In a changing world, which is increasingly multilateral and diverse, different regions of the world perceive the threat of AI differently, perhaps hindering progress in getting to an agreement. An international code of conduct could also spur cooperation to limit the risk of AI being used in conjunction with nuclear weapons. ‘With the development of artificial intelligence and sophisticated software becoming more available worldwide, nuclear weapons are more vulnerable than ever to hacking and technological failures,’ warned Programme Manager [Natalia Viakhireva](#) and Programme Assistant [Roman Maika](#), of the Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC).

Difficulties prevail, however, in building the confidence needed among rival powers to secure an international code of conduct on the use of AI given current international tensions, for example over the trade measures initiated by the United States against China. ‘A lack of trust inhibits any common effort to tackle sentient AI,’ cautioned [Daniel Hamilton](#), Austrian Marshall Plan Foundation Professor at The Johns Hopkins University. A bigger risk is perhaps not the AI technology itself, but rather the lack of willingness to cooperate by the international powers and the lack of trust.

[Stefanie Babst](#), Head of Strategic Analysis Capability at NATO, acknowledged that NATO has only just begun to look at the potential impact of AI and has yet to define its position on the technical, ethical and political implications. In addition, AI currently remains mostly a subject of discussion amongst very specific tech communities: ‘Many of the AI developers that I have come across are pretty inexperienced in politics and philosophy ... as many policymakers are in technology.’ Policymakers and tech

teams, Babst added, need to be putting their heads together to ask the right questions about, for instance, the unintended results of AI, its impact on human thought processes and values or the responsibility and liability of AI. ‘NATO has only started to look at AI from a broader strategic and political perspective ... and I reckon we still have quite a long way ahead.’

As the possibility of robot soldiers and AI controlled drone fleets looms, robotics specialist [Marzio Di Feo](#) said the way such technological elements are integrated into strategic thinking and the moral impact of such weapons will be crucial. ‘AI is not a silver bullet. How soldiers integrate any disruptive capability into a larger system of tactics and training is what alters military power,’ he wrote. ‘What about any ethical implications and limits for such a key element of victory?’ A degree of caution is urged to avoid any over-reaction to the supposed dangers of AI, that would restrict its use for good in the security field, in areas such as arms control verification, strategic foresight, counter terror or battling cyber-attacks.

[Sameer Patil](#), Director of the Centre for International Security at Gateway House, a leading Indian think tank, raised the question of AI being mobilised to counter online extremism. ‘Do we need “good” bots to counter the activities of “bad” bots?’ he asked. In reply, [Sasha Havlicek](#), Chief Executive Officer of the Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD), pointed to the role AI could play in uncovering the perpetrators of bad behaviour on the internet and mounting a response that competes with them. ‘There is potential in AI, both in terms of getting us closer to identifying bad actors, but also potentially in helping mount the proportional competition strategy we need,’ she said. ‘While not something that the main social media companies would welcome, I do think there is some potential in bots for good.’



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Chief Executive Officer of the Institute
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Another positive application of AI, was mentioned by [Mikaela d'Angelo](#), Programme Manager at Friends of Europe, who pointed to the UK Home Office's recent announcement that it had created an AI programme that can detect online propaganda by the Islamic State and other extremist groups. However, she warned that even AI applications that appeared beneficial on the surface could have negative implications. 'The development of AI for less disruptive means has its own drawbacks ... If the United States were to develop the ability to track and monitor another nuclear powers' nuclear abilities, in a peace situation, this might be fine but in a crisis situation it might increase the chances of inadvertent miscalculation.'



3 WORK TOWARDS EU STRATEGIC AUTONOMY AS A SERIOUS POLITICAL PROJECT

A perfect storm is battering the cosy assumptions that have underpinned Europe's security thinking for decades. Russian troops and their proxies have muscled into NATO's eastern neighbours and manoeuvre menacingly on the EU's eastern borders, while the Kremlin's destabilisation tactics in the West extend from cyberattacks and election meddling to the recent deadly chemical attack in rural England. To the south, strife-riven states in Africa and the Middle East create breeding grounds for terrorists and trigger migratory flows that have rocked the European political consensus. At the same time, dependence on the US security umbrella has been eroded by the antics of Trump's White House, causing transatlantic rifts over trade, Iran and NATO.

A clear message that emerged from Debating Security Plus was that Europe needs to take urgent steps to bolster its own security: 'Europe needs to take care more of its security itself, nobody else will,' declared [Franziska Brantner](#), Member of the German Bundestag and Chairwoman of the Subcommittee on Civil Crisis Prevention, Conflict Resolution and Networked Action, and European Young Leader. 'We need a joint strategy, we need faster decision-making procedures.'

That involves overcoming current internal divisions within the EU to step up efforts already underway to give the EU strategic autonomy. [Nathalie Tocci](#), Special Advisor to the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Federica Mogherini and Director of Instituto Affari

Internazionali, urged the EU and its member states ‘to have the ability to pursue their interests and objectives as much as possible and to the extent possible, working with partners and allies, but to the extent that partners and allies may not want to pursue a particular interest or objective with the European Union, the EU should be in a position to do so on its own.’

Forging European strategic autonomy won’t come easy. Tocci warned it could take up to three decades but it is high time to accelerate efforts to build on the foundations already laid such as PESCO, the European Defence Fund and the European Intervention Initiative. Key to success is forging a common culture of security solidarity so that, for example, southern European nations are as aware as their eastern partners of the threat from Russia, while eastern and northern allies take on southerners’ concerns over challenges around the Mediterranean.

‘Strategic autonomy for the European Union cannot be achieved without an alignment of threat perceptions and at least some advancements in aligning strategic cultures and ways of doing things in theatre. Is it feasible to think that at some point in the future France will have the same threat perception as Poland, or Italy the same as Romania?’ asked [Tania Latici](#), Information Specialist for External Policies of the Union at the European Parliament. ‘Is the way forward perhaps indeed in small coalitions of the willing and in a division of labour in terms of covering geographical theatres and broader cooperation in countering transnational threats such as hybrid, cyber and disinformation campaigns?’

Meanwhile, [Philippe Rio](#), Head of the EUCAP SAHEL Mali Mission, stressed the EU’s unique capabilities in regional security operations. ‘Only the EU has the capacity to carry out military and civilian CFSP missions,’



he said. 'The EU has no alternative but to strengthen its capacity to prevent or mitigate such threats before they enter or impact the EU and its citizens.' However, Rio said the EU must act faster to detect critical situations and assist fragile countries before crises spill out of hand. He urged stronger interaction between military and civilian operators.

'Civilian CFSP non-executive missions, by developing the host nation's capacities to tackle transnational crime are contributing to global security, but hardly deliver significant results on the short term,' Rio added. 'Their mandate must be strengthened to include executive functions such as intelligence management or common investigation teams and bridges to EU internal security actors such as EUROPOL and FRONTEX.'

“Post Brexit, 82% of the defence spending in NATO will be by non-EU nations. The question is: would Europe be willing to make those large investments in defence to achieve this strategic autonomy?”

Chris Kremidas Courtney,
European Interagency Cooperative
Engagement Officer and Liaison to
NATO and EU at the US military's
European Command (EUCOM)

Building up European strategic autonomy will however require nations doing more than signing up to grand sounding plans. ‘Your scenario would require a very large upswing in European defence spending since, post Brexit, 82% of the defence spending in NATO will be by non-EU nations,’ explained [Chris Kremidas Courtney](#), European Interagency Cooperative Engagement Officer and Liaison to NATO and EU at the US military's European Command (EUCOM). ‘The question is: would Europe be willing to make those large investments in defence to achieve this strategic autonomy?’

Beyond the purely military aspects of strategic autonomy, Bundestag member Brantner put forward some radical ideas to bolster Europe's diplomatic cloud – from putting aside the need for unanimity in foreign and security policy issues and switching to majority voting to creating a European seat at the UN Security Council.

The debate revealed a range of views over the extent to which President Trump's rhetorical blasts against NATO and the EU represent a real threat to transatlantic security bonds. ‘Of greatest impact, it would appear, is the apparent rule set up that the United States can agree to a pact or a system and then, on the whim of the President, renege on such an agreement on a whim. This is deeply destabilising and should be unsettling to the entire world, which is what Macron, Merkel, Boris Johnson and any number of others tried to tell Trump. But he listens to no voice but the large, amplified voice he hears from within,’ said [David Andelman](#), award-winning columnist for CNN and USA Today. ‘Donald Trump is presiding over a global sunset to democracy. He is, it would seem, more comfortable dealing with autocrats rather than democrats.’

François De Kerchove d'Exaerde, Permanent Representative of Belgium to NATO, took a more diplomatic approach. 'The President has his own way of communicating that can be quite a challenge in itself. For NATO, however, what he says may have less importance than what he does. So far, under Trump's Presidency the US has sent more troops and military equipment to Europe in the framework of European reassurance and has made more budgetary means available for NATO than his predecessor. In reality NATO remains, very much, an Alliance based on a strong transatlantic solidarity.'

Yet the strains between Europe and the United States led several contributors to suggest that the EU needed to reach out to other allies, such as Canada, Japan, the ASEAN bloc and friends in Latin America. 'Europe needs to respond strategically,' wrote Georgios Plevis, Senior Research Associate at Public International Law & Policy Group. 'Try to keep the deal with Iran, by exploring alternative allies that could take the place of the US. Respond to the trade wars diplomatically ... while attempting to mitigate the effect by reaching out to and building or enhancing trade relationship with other regions like East Asia, Africa and Latin America. Invest in stability in the Middle East to counteract the inflammatory rhetoric of the US.'

Trump's decision to pull out of the Iran nuclear deal could provide an opportunity for a stronger European role in the region if EU nations and their businesses can handle the risks of continuing to do business with Tehran in the face of US opposition. 'Europe can very well fill part of the void, both financially and also politically. That is in fact what the Iranians are hoping and have said publicly,' explained Negar Mortazavi, Iranian-American Journalist and European Young Leader.



“I don't want to prejudge the outcome of the ongoing (Brexit) negotiations, but I am pretty sure it will include important provisions and security and defence cooperation”

Maciej Popowski,
European Commission Deputy
Director-General for Neighbourhood
and Enlargement Negotiations

‘But we must not forget that although the US was only one party to this agreement, it was a very important one. So, the void is very large, and Europe must take real big steps to fill it.’

One country where the EU should make a special effort to maintain good security ties is post-Brexit Britain. ‘The UK is a key partner, major development donor, important security provider with many historical and current links to our neighbourhood. I don't want to prejudge the outcome of the ongoing negotiations, but I am pretty sure it will include important provisions and security and defence cooperation,’ said [Maciej Popowski](#), European Commission Deputy Director-General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations.

4 EXPAND REGULAR MIGRATION CORRIDORS

Central to the debate is that migration and human mobility must be accepted as an inevitable and unstoppable fact. ‘It is a phenomenon that has always been with us and will in all likelihood be with us for centuries to come,’ highlighted [Maureen Achieng](#), the International Organisation for Migration’s Ethiopia Chief of Mission and Representative to the African Union, the Inter-Governmental Authority for Development and the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa. ‘We know that as long as economic disparities exist, both within and between countries, people will continue to move from where there are fewer opportunities to where there are more.’

Rather than a repressive approach of building walls and turning away boats, a better approach is to expand regular migration opportunities, taking the fate of migrants out of the hands of unscrupulous human traffickers and promoting the virtues of immigration in countries whose ageing populations need working-age newcomers.

‘Migration today is increasingly viewed mostly as a problem, rather than as the force for good that it has historically been ... the positive impact of migration by far outweigh any of its threats,’ said Achieng. ‘Governments especially need to have the political courage to speak more honestly about migration.’

While politicians across Europe have been whipping up anti-migrant sentiment, their countries will actually face



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Mission to Ethiopia and
Representative to
the African Union

long-term demographic crises if they close their borders. 'Far from being a burden, refugees may represent an opportunity, and they should be competing for them not trying to keep them away!' said [Khalid Koser](#), Executive Director of the Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund (GCERF) in Switzerland. 'Most industrialised states need more not fewer migrants, but there are reasons – some legitimate and some less so – why these states are nervous about more migration especially from the Global South. One of the most egregious arguments often used is that these migrants pose a security risk, but there is very little evidence that is true.'

Current repressive migration measures in Europe are undermining international law and basic human values, claimed [Jérôme Oberreit](#), Secretary-General at Médecins sans Frontières (MSF). 'As long as safe and legal passages are not at the heart of policies and recognition of the need to reduce human suffering not at the forefront of concern, we will not be able to counter the current trend of rejection and closure of borders,' he said. 'While our European leaders vaunt the efficacy of their recent measures and the resulting reduced migration flow (based on questionable data), key international, regional and national legal frameworks are under attack – frameworks that should defend humanity when individuals are faced with the worst life has to offer.'

The idea of externalising migration policy by having migrants stopped and processed in third countries before they reach Europe has been gaining ground, but was quickly dismissed by [Matina Stevis-Gridneff](#), Africa Correspondent for the Wall Street Journal and European Young Leader, on the grounds that these policies often lead to bad outcomes. The plan to create remote application centres for migrants aiming to reach Europe is nothing new, she said. 'This idea is



the cockroach of migration policy, it literally has survived every change in EU policymaking.’ She pointed out to the difficulties in implementing such an idea in practice, which would require setting up asylum offices from Eritrea all the way to Gambia. The outcome of this would be the creation of semi-permanent refugee camps around these remote asylum centres, which will likely lack the resources and capacities to process applications quickly.

Despite fevered debate in many European countries, Africans represent just 8% of migrants in Europe and 80% of African migrants stay in Africa. While European nations are debating rolling back the free movement regime enshrined in the Schengen Agreement, Africans are looking to it as a model to ensure greater labour mobility as an economic benefit to both home and host countries. [TSION TADESSE ABEBE](#), Senior Researcher in the Migration Programme of the Institute for Security

“Seeing that the Schengen system is one of the greatest achievements of the EU, I would hope and pray that the member states agree on the need to keep the system up and running”

Andrea Riester,
Deputy Head of the Deutsche
Gesellschaft für Internationale
Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) Sector Project
for Migration and Development

Studies (ISS) in Ethiopia, raised the regional free-movement agreements within the Economic Community for West African States (ECOWAS) and the East African Community (EAC), as well as the African Union's recent Free Movement Protocol to which 31 countries have signed up. ‘It is an indication of Africa's commitment to a more integrated and more prosperous future,’ she said. ‘The EU has the experience of Schengen from which the AU could draw lessons.’

Debaters from Europe also underscored the importance of defending Schengen. ‘Seeing that the Schengen system is one of the greatest achievements of the EU, I would hope and pray that the member states agree on the need to keep the system up and running,’ said [Andrea Riester](#), Deputy Head of the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) Sector Project for Migration and Development. ‘This means: no individual solutions for single nation states, but one unified approach to protecting the borders of the EU and sharing the responsibility of hosting asylum seekers and refugees.’

[Anna Terrón Cusi](#), Spanish Secretary of State for Migration (2009-2011), President and Co-Founder of InStrategies and Trustee of Friends of Europe, agreed. ‘We have developed the most sophisticated transnational tool for managing human movement in a transnational area: the Schengen acquis,’ she wrote. ‘The more we amalgamate migration policy, border control and security policy the less efficient we'll be in migration management, border management and on security.’

Participants contended that more focus should be placed on the causes of migration, looking at conflict prevention and resolution, and increasingly on the impact of climate change. ‘Climate-induced migration is expected to increase,’ warned Tadesse Abebe.

She pointed to a World Bank study suggesting up to 12.1m people could be displaced by climate change in East Africa by 2050.

A greater concentration on the push factors that drive people to migrate could include more work on conflict prevention and resolution, better targeted development aid and sanctions against oppressive regions. 'Regional and international organisations (should) punish states that treat their people poorly and reward them for treating them well,' said [John Bruni](#), CEO at SAGE International Australia. 'A properly working carrot and sticks methodology may be criticised as neo-colonial, but the alternative of uncontrolled migration will only make the international situation a far crueller place to the migrants.' Tougher measures against people smugglers were also urged.



5 BUILD A CREDIBLE AND EFFECTIVE CYBER-DETERRENCE FRAMEWORK



“It’s time to show adversaries that what today may seem like high benefit, low cost increasingly becomes low benefit, high cost”

Jamie Shea,
Senior Fellow at Friends of Europe and
Deputy Assistant Secretary-General for
Emerging Security Challenges at NATO
(2010-2018)

Around the world, states and societies are increasingly under attack by offensive cyber warfare, putting civilians at risk. In Lithuania for instance, of the 55,000 cyber-attacks detected by the Lithuanian government last year, 27% targeted the energy sector, 22% were related to the Interior Ministry – such as turning off police radios – and 25% hit foreign policy and defence operations. Lithuania does have a large neighbour with a history of cyber-interference in the Baltic States, but it is far from alone in having to field a barrage of assaults on its networks.

In light of these threats, deterrence and resilience are key. As Jamie Shea, Senior Fellow at Friends of Europe and Deputy Assistant Secretary-General for Emerging Security Challenges at NATO (2010-2018), explained, ‘it’s time to show adversaries that what today may seem like high benefit, low cost increasingly becomes low benefit, high cost’.

This increases the need for international norms to govern behaviour in cyber space, and for this, legal norms need to be established to define what constitutes an attack and what the level of response should be. In particular, improvements are needed to verification processes to unmask cyber-attackers and deny state perpetrators the “it-was-private-hackers-who-did-it” excuse. Allies have to develop counter measures that can be deployed without provoking an uncontrollable escalation. ‘We want to alter the calculus of potential adversaries ... but without escalating, getting us into hot water,’ said Shea. To that end, NATO is looking to determine when cyber and other hybrid warfare activities move from

being a nuisance to becoming real security threats. Legal definitions are essential, Shea says, but attempts to establish a global convention on hybrid warfare are likely to get bogged down for years, so smaller scale or sectoral approaches are the best way forward. [Tobias Feakin](#), Australian Ambassador for Cyber Affairs, agreed that negotiating a legally binding UN treaty to regulate cyber relations would take too long – and would be outpaced by technological developments. Instead, he said, mechanisms were needed to ensure existing agreements are applied and that appropriate action is taken should those nations decide to bypass those agreements. Developing accurate and speedy detection methods to ensure countries that breach the rules are rapidly named and shamed would be a significant step in the right direction. Several participants called for sanctions against countries that launch cyber-attacks.





“Too often there are no consequences after attacks, even if perpetrators are known. We need both deterrence and accountability”

Marietje Schaake,
Vice-Chair of the European Parliament
Delegation for Relations with the
United States and Trustee of Friends
of Europe

The need to raise deterrence levels was also taken up by [Marietje Schaake](#), Vice-Chair of the European Parliament Delegation for Relations with the United States and Trustee of Friends of Europe. ‘We must make the price of attacks higher, whether by an individual or a state, by making systems and networks more resilient,’ she said. ‘Too often there are no consequences after attacks, even if perpetrators are known. We need both deterrence and accountability. In the case of individuals, criminal or civil law may be enough, while in the relation between states, different mechanisms for prevention and deterrence should be clarified.’

Feakin urged more international cooperation as an essential element in building up an effective deterrence regime. ‘Recent events suggest that malicious actors believe that their improper behaviour in cyberspace is immune to punishment,’ he said. ‘We are looking at developing greater international cooperation and coordination between like-minded countries to respond to malicious cyber behaviour.’

Speakers suggested groups of nations should work on agreements that can later be expanded to include other countries. ‘The starting point has to be to develop a community in the West that agrees on terminology and a common set of norms and standards. This can then spread progressively to other countries,’ said Shea. ‘Expecting to go straight to a global agreement is unrealistic ... the only problem is that arms control is meant to restrain and deter your adversaries, not your friends. So how can we get beyond NATO and EU to start engaging those adversaries?’

Schaake suggested all nations would want to sign up to an agreement on a crucial area: cyber-meddling in elections. ‘How do we deter bad actors from interfering with our elections? I’m not even talking about inferring

by influencing voters through the spreading of so-called fake news or disinformation. What I'm most focusing on is the hacking of electoral systems or voter databases,' Schaake said. 'I support the creation of an international norm that state and non-state actors should not pursue, support or allow cyber operations intended to disrupt technical infrastructure essential to elections.'

States would have an incentive to respect such minimal norms because there is a risk for all when elections are hacked, she said. Civil society should be mobilised to put pressure on governments to support international norms that guarantee electoral integrity. She suggested elevating election infrastructure to the same status as critical infrastructure requiring priority cyber protection.

François De Kerchove d'Exaerde, Permanent Representative of Belgium to NATO, was among those who cautioned about the risks of shifting from cyber defence to a pro-active offensive approach. 'This is very sensitive and not yet determined, far from that even. It is still work in progress. Defensive cyber measures are rather openly discussed, it is not the case for cyber offensive measures where every single allied nation demands to retain full political authority,' he said. 'Will NATO be having a leading role here? I do not think so ... there is a very big difference between cyber defensive and cyber offensive.' Building up societal resilience was the best way of deterring cyber-attacks, he said. 'Our first line of defence and even of deterrence will be our resilience, the way our societies are able and equipped to resist such attacks.'



“We need to share not only information, but also human resources, expertise, tools and experience ... fighting together with our best friends and neighbours is critical”

Edvinas Kerza,
Lithuanian Vice-Minister of Defence

Lithuania was the driving force behind the plan to set up an EU Cyber Rapid Response Force which six European nations signed up to, with other member states expected to join later. ‘In Europe we need to work in a more efficient way,’ said [Edvinas Kerza](#), Lithuanian Vice-Minister of Defence. ‘We need to share not only information, but also human resources, expertise, tools and experience ... fighting together with our best friends and neighbours is critical.’

The plan should ensure that participating nations can share experience and good practice while avoiding duplication in the development of cyber-defence initiatives. The project has two main objectives, Kerza explained: to develop and facilitate co-operation in combating cyber-threats through mutual assistance, including information sharing, joint exercises, operational level support, research and capability development as well as the creation of common cyber tools; and to form rapid response teams to assist nations in countering a cyber-attack incident, including the deployment of rapid response teams in EU institutions and on EU Common Security and Defence missions.

Debating Security Plus participants also underscored the necessity of bringing the private sector into the drive to bolster cyber-defences and create a stronger deterrence. ‘It is imperative that the big tech and online companies begin to work collaboratively to frame collective lines of defence, protective shields, memorandum of understandings, binding conventions and protocols to address the challenges of cyber-threats and attacks,’ posted [Kaleem Hussain](#).

6 PROMOTE AN OSCE-TYPE BODY FOR THE MIDDLE EAST

European integration was born out of the horrors of the Second World War. While there have been many suggestions of using that as a model for the Middle East, continued tensions and conflicts between nations in the region have stymied progress. Could the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) serve as an example for the region? It emerged in the 1970s to promote ties between countries still divided by the Cold War and has remained a successful platform for cooperation in areas such as arms control, counter-terrorism, environment protection and economic development.

‘As a result of the wars in Europe in the previous century, we now have a very well-developed security and stability architecture in Europe. The challenge is to make it work, but this has to do with the political situation and not with the architecture itself,’ wrote [Marjolijn van Deelen](#), Head of Non-Proliferation, Arms Control and Disarmament at the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs. ‘Not all regions in the world have functioning security architectures. How about an OSCE-like structure for the Middle East?’

With support from outside, such a structure could provide a step-by-step approach to building confidence measures between states in areas of common interest – leaving more contentious issues on the side. It could start with a relatively small group of states and be expanded as more see the benefits and sign up. As with the OSCE, arms control could be a key element, especially among

the growing number of countries in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region that are developing nuclear power. 'Improvement of the arms control regime is one of incremental steps,' said van Deelen.

Cooperation plans have been floated in the past without success, but the expansion of nuclear energy in the region is upping the stakes and should provide an incentive for governments to seek structures that ease tensions and forge cooperation. Nuclear power production in the Middle East is expected to almost quadruple over the next 10 years according to a recent report by the US Energy Information Administration (EIA). As well as planned increases in output from Iran, the United Arab Emirates, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Turkey are all expected to develop nuclear power plants over the coming decade, the EIA said in March. Egypt announced in July that it would start construction on a first nuclear power plant – to be built by Russia – in the next two-and-half years with the aim of having it up and running by 2026. Others in the region, from Morocco to Kuwait, are making plans to follow suit.

Against that background, it is imperative to find frameworks that ensure peaceful nuclear power programmes are not used as a platform for the development of atomic weapons and to develop collaborative approaches to nuclear safety. 'The region should prepare for a Fukushima-like accident by forming a regional working group on emergency preparedness, because the impact of a nuclear accident would not be limited to one country,' posted [Antonia Dimou](#), Head of the Middle East Unit at the Institute for Security and Defence Analyses in Athens. An OSCE-type body could help, but countries and agencies outside the region should already be working on building trust and promoting cooperation.

‘We need to build bridges between entrenched positions on a few key issues, and this will require substantive, honest dialogues,’ said [Izumi Nakamitsu](#), United Nations Under Secretary-General and High Representative for Disarmament Affairs. Among her suggestions: finding a solution on the implementation of the 1995 resolution on a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other WMDs; demonstrating progress on past commitments to create an atmosphere for further progress; and finding a mutually acceptable way to refer to the new Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons.

The EU should be stepping up its engagement to promote arms control in the region, especially given the signs of fading US influence. ‘Considering Trump’s erratic policy making, I believe it would be wise for the EU and European countries to continue their course on working towards non-proliferation in the Middle East. This means continuing engagement with Iran and Israel, as well as countries seeking to develop nuclear capabilities,’ typed [Saskia Llewellyn](#), Programme Assistant at Friends of Europe.

Even after Trump’s decision in May to withdraw from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action regulating Iran’s nuclear programme, the JCPOA can still work and even serve as an example for verification mechanisms that ensure other countries’ atomic energy plans are not used to develop weapons. ‘President Trump was dead wrong about the JCPOA,’ said [Ramesh Thakur](#), Director of the Centre for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament at the Australian National University. ‘The deal had effectively shrink-wrapped Iran’s nuclear weapon ambitions in a tough agreement with robust curtailment, dismantlement, transparency, verification and consequences regime. And it was working.’

“President Trump
was dead wrong
about the JCPOA”

[Ramesh Thakur](#),
Director of the Centre
for Nuclear Non-Proliferation
and Disarmament at the
Australian National University

Regional states can still be persuaded to sign up to similar verification regions. ‘The JCPOA’s verification measures should serve as a model. Regional states should voluntarily apply measures from the Additional Protocol (which facilitates inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency) to standard safeguards agreements,’ said Dimou. ‘For such an approach to be successful, there would need to be a coordinated strategy to convince states that voluntary implementation would be beneficial.’

The need for Europe to enhance its role in the MENA region given the uncertainty surrounding US policy runs beyond arms control. ‘Europe needs to respond strategically: try to keep the deal with Iran, by exploring alternative allies that could take the place of the US,’ wrote [Georgio Plevis](#), Senior Research Associate at Public International Law & Policy Group. ‘Invest in stability in the Middle East region to counteract the inflammatory rhetoric of the US against Iran, and push to resolve longstanding issues in Syria, Yemen and Palestine. This is easier said than done, of course, but in my opinion, a re-assessment of the alliances in the region should be concluded, not in an aggressive way against the US, but in a way that will demonstrate that regional peace is crucial for all.’



7 USE CRIMINAL REHABILITATION PROGRAMMES AS A MODEL FOR RE-INTEGRATING VIOLENT EXTREMISTS BACK INTO SOCIETY

“Like politics,
all terrorism is local”

Thomson Hunter,
Director of Capacity Building
Programs at Hedayah

Allowing those who have supported, planned, instigated or participated in terrorist attacks to return to society is a tough concept for many to swallow, but as the nexus between violent extremism and organised crime becomes more apparent, we may have to look more at how the successes of rehabilitation and reintegration programmes applied for “common” criminals can be extended to boost the fight against radicalisation and terror.

‘In the rehab of youth, we’ve seen risk and needs assessments designed for use with US gang members being applied to those involved in radicalisation. The principle of “not reinventing the wheel” should apply across many aspects of CVE (Countering Violent Extremism) work,’ posted [Thomson Hunter](#), Director of Capacity Building Programs at Hedayah, the Abu Dhabi-based platform for expertise and experience to counter violent extremism.

‘Like politics, all terrorism is local, and people radicalise within communities and are (hopefully) reintegrated to communities, so we need to be smarter in helping communities deal with both elements,’ Hunter added. ‘How can we help communities and those who are marginalised from them? And how do we encourage communities to accept returnees or those released from prisons? How do we leverage decades of experience from the criminal justice system and adopt and adapt good practice?’

More work is urgently needed to look at how people who have been radicalised can be brought back into the societies they have turned against. 'There is not yet enough that has been thought about or done with regards to rehabilitation,' acknowledged [Saad Amrani](#), Chief Commissioner and Policy Advisor of the Belgian Federal Police. 'There are not many countries that are fully ready for that, but the awareness regarding the need to rehabilitate is there! An in-depth thinking process is ongoing.'

Participants suggested that European and North American countries can learn from rehab experiences underway in the Middle East and North Africa. [Shamil Idriss](#), Chief Executive Officer of Search for Common Ground, the world's largest peacebuilding non-profit organisation, recalled a recent visit he made to Morocco. 'The Prison Authority is run by a former prisoner himself and the King has made more than 50 visits to prisons during his tenure (I might faint from shock on the day a Head of State in my country visits a prison),' he wrote. On the first week of an incarceration, Idriss explains, prisoners develop a "personal development plan" detailing how they will deepen or expand their skills and knowledge by the time of their release. 'They have also experimented with the opposite approach that others have for incarcerating those convicted of extremism-related offences by seeking to integrate them with others in the prison under the watchful eye of the prison authorities, while many other countries seek to segregate them explicitly out of fear that they may recruit others,' he added.

A number of debaters advocated reform of judiciary and penitentiary systems to counter the problem of radicalisation within prisons – which has been linked to a number of attacks in Europe. Dealing with Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTFs) in prisons was recognised as a serious and delicate challenge. 'Special programmes

both in and outside of formal penitentiaries are needed to pull away both young, low-range terrorists, and senior criminals. These will also aid in providing the former additional educational incentives,' wrote the Consejo Argentino para las Relaciones Internacionales (CARI).

Amrani said no country had yet found a "golden nugget" solution for preventing the cross-influencing of inmates – either by separating violent extremists from regular criminal inmates or by allowing them to mix under surveillance. 'Dealing with FTFs in the penitentiary system was in itself a challenge,' he wrote. 'Isolation to protect the contamination of others or mixing those with the normal public. Based on the last attack in Liège we know that contamination is a serious issue.' In May 2018, two police officers and a civilian were killed in the Belgian city of Liège by a prisoner on parole who had apparently been radicalised while in prison for drugs offences.



Prisons may be the starting point of rehabilitation programmes, but they have to look far beyond the penitentiary system. 'The nexus between crime and terror is not limited to what happens in prisons, it also extends to effective governance and community resilience to the threat of violent extremism and recruitment, what happens in the prison system, and then what happens in the parole and reintegration process for former fighters,' wrote Idriss.

A wide range of educational, economic, and social support structures should be employed to ensure former extremists who renounce violence can be re-integrated into society. Families, schools and social actors can play a pivotal role in both preventing radicalisation and reintegrating extremists after they have served their sentence. Special care needs to be taken to ensure that children who have been dragged into extremist activity can return to normal life. 'Children should be seen first as victims, as foreseen by the Convention on the Rights of Children. This should lead to specific risk and need-assessment tools, specific juvenile justice systems, specific social and psychological care, etc.,' said [Gilles De Kerchove](#), the European Union Counter-Terrorism Coordinator.

[Sasha Havlicek](#), Executive Officer of the Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD), made the point that, once rehabilitated, reformed extremists can become a vital part in countering and preventing violent extremism. 'We do need theologically-trained intervention providers to engage young people online and offline. We do some of this work with our network of former extremists as well as with religious scholars,' she said. As well as helping former extremists and their families reintegrate into communities, work must be done within wider societies to build acceptance for the rehabilitation process. 'An effective approach is not only about prevention but also

about reintegration. How can we ensure that society is more willing to accept back former terrorists once they are fully rehabilitated?’ asked [Cristina Mattei](#), Programme Manager for Capacity Building Programmes at Hedayah.

Difficulties in securing societal acceptance, apply not only to the former extremists, but often to their wider family circle, setting up a vicious circle of isolation, cautioned [Renske van der Veer](#), Director of the International Centre for Counter Terrorism (ICCT) in the Netherlands. ‘The real damage of terrorism lies in the stories of people that are affected by terrorism in broader society and where entire families can be disrupted: the father of a returnee that loses his job because his employer does not want to be associated with a "terrorist family", the ex-girlfriend of a now FTF who is bullied in school to the extent that she suffers from severe depression, the brother of an ex-convict who is phoned regularly by his bank because they don't trust his financial activity,’ she wrote.

Women can play a critically important role in helping reintegration efforts, said Idriss. ‘Women often experience the exclusion and marginalisation of extremist ideology long before others in society do and they often hold a unique and important role in granting or withholding social acceptance or legitimacy for ideas,’ he explained. ‘Therefore, there are steps that should be taken that are specific to addressing and engaging women and there are other steps that should be taken which will simply include women as critical voices in any community-wide engagement.’

8 BUILD A TRUSTED, TRANSNATIONAL PUBLIC SERVICE INFORMATION SYSTEM AS PART OF A STRATEGY TO COUNTER PROPAGANDA AND FAKE NEWS

Fake news pushed by the broadcasters, disinformation services and “troll farms” of authoritarian regimes, extremist groups or populist politicians have become a fact of life. Launched in 2005, Russia’s international television network RT now claims to have extended its reach to cover over 70m viewers a week with 24-hour channels in a variety of languages. In the West, meanwhile, public service broadcasters have seen funding slashed in recent decades. Faced with a multiplicity of information sources on a bewildering array of platforms, citizens are finding it increasingly hard to know which news services to believe and the lack of trust is having a clear political impact.

‘External disinformation is a genuine security challenge,’ says [Giles Portman](#), Head of the East Stratcom Task Force at the European External Action Service. ‘Disinformation like this is out there to confuse us, to slow our consensus and to slow our response ... it seeks to undermine faith in mainstream politics, media and democracy and it’s part of a much wider hybrid threat.’

A clear recommendation emerging from Debating Security Plus was to consider the creation of a transnational, European public service information system, able to provide news with impartiality, accuracy and integrity. It could be funded by, but be independent of, the EU and its member states.



“A new European Public Service Information Bureau could be created through wide public-private consultations and be given the mission to reinstate the trust that has been lost in the information system”

Annalisa Piras,
Director of the award-winning
documentary “Europe at Sea”

‘A new European Public Service Information Bureau could be created through wide public-private consultations and be given the mission to reinstate the trust that has been lost in the information system,’ proposed [Annalisa Piras](#), Director of the award-winning documentary “Europe at Sea”. ‘I believe that we need to go back to the original charter of the public service broadcasters and re-imagine it for the 21st Century.’

Such a new news platform must be publicly funded, transnational and robustly independent from any political interference, Piras insisted. The EU and the Council of Europe could be leading players in setting up such services, relying on their fundamental principles covering freedom of expression and independent information. ‘As information has become a weapon and a vulnerability, it is very urgent to try to find updated ways to deal with it,’ she added. ‘A shared awareness (of threats) in Europe is starting to materialise but we are still far behind what is needed.’ For Piras, existing platforms are not up to the task because they are underfunded, have their independence compromised by governments, or lack the scale needed to tackle issues that cut across borders. ‘While the interconnected, international challenges we face are escalating, our responses to them remain mainly national,’ she concluded. ‘Part of the problem is that most media tend to deal with these problems through national lenses.’

In more general terms, impartial state support for quality media should be expanded. ‘There is much more we need to do to protect freedom of expression and opinion based on facts and genuine reporting ... also on the need to support the development of quality media in our region as a way to foster a better information environment,’ said Portman. The financial squeeze forcing the closure of many traditional media outlets in the face of competition from online news is driving debate on revived public


funding. ‘Perhaps it is time to consider alternative ways of funding media,’ said Debating Security Plus contributor [William Lauste](#). ‘Traditional news organisations are unable to support quality journalism to the extent that they used to. We have immensely wide (courtesy of social media) but invariably shallow coverage of national and international stories. Should public money be used to fund media to help us be better informed?’

There were also calls for more support for initiatives like the East Stratcom Task Force, which was set up in 2015 and runs the EU vs Disinformation campaign to better forecast, address and respond to pro-Kremlin disinformation.

Unconventional media means can also be used to build resilience and awareness in society, said [Elliot Brennan](#), Non-Resident Research Fellow with the Institute for Security and Development Policy’s Asia Programme in Sweden. He referred to Sweden’s decision this year to

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distribute an updated Cold War-era pamphlet, entitled "If Crisis or War Comes" to households around the country with advice about where to find bomb shelters and how to secure basic necessities. Another example is the hit Norwegian television series *Okkupert* (Occupied) about a Russian invasion of the country. 'Sweden's dissemination of information on how citizens should be prepared for war was a shock-and-awe move that may help jolt a population into wider and deeper debate and ultimately preparedness and resilience,' Brennan wrote. 'Do we need to be establishing better dialogues between government and citizens on these issues to build resilience? ... If so, how best may we achieve this: pamphlets, commissioning film/television, content, educational programs in schools/universities/community centres, military service?' In a different context, [Shamil Idriss](#), Chief Executive Officer of Search for Common Ground, explained how his organisation produces a drama series in the Democratic Republic of Congo about a police captain who resists attempts to corrupt him. 'We produce that show with the police in DRC and use it to open dialogues ... between communities and the police force,' Idriss explained.

Private media and technology companies also need to be brought into the fight for truth. 'It seems logical that the private sector has to be involved meaningfully: 1) by having social media companies/platforms be subject to media laws and thus enforcing a higher level of accountability; 2) by creating a clearing house where fake content, especially with the rise of ... falsified video and speech, can be flagged,' said [Silva Kantareva](#), Senior Advisor at Palacio y Asociados in Madrid. 'It should be feasible ... to have validation tools, where the veracity of a story can be vouched for, to curtail manifestly false/fake news from going viral.'

9 INCLUDE BOTH NUCLEAR AND NON-NUCLEAR STATES TO GUIDE THE PROCESS OF TANGIBLE DENUCLEARISATION

Non-nuclear weapon states can have a dual role in pushing forward nuclear arms control: as intermediaries to facilitate negotiations and mediate once they are underway; and in the verification regimes after arms control agreements have been struck. ‘As non-nuclear weapon states, we should keep calling for effective dialogue between the nuclear weapon states,’ said Marjolijn van Deelen, Head of Non-Proliferation, Arms Control and Disarmament at the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs. ‘Reductions in numbers of nuclear weapons can only come from nuclear weapon states – and we should keep urging them to work towards these reductions. But the non-nuclear weapon states can contribute by helping to build the architecture needed for disarmament. I am thinking of the Test Ban Treaty, a fissile material cut-off treaty and the verification of disarmament that will be essential once the numbers of nuclear weapons get lower.’

Van Deelen was among several participants who warned about the recent increase of diplomatic friction over nuclear weapons, which has included the US withdrawing from the Iran nuclear deal, the standoff between Washington and Pyongyang over North Korea’s nuclear weapons and missile programmes and Russian President Vladimir Putin’s boasting in March about his new generation of “invincible” intercontinental ballistic missiles. ‘In the last two years we’ve seen



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Control and Disarmament at the Dutch
Ministry of Foreign Affairs



a marked increase in international tensions and we've seen a negative dynamic between nuclear weapons states,' van Deelen warned. 'This situation can lead to miscalculations and in the worst-case scenario even to the use of nuclear weapons.'

[David Andelman](#), award-winning columnist for CNN and USA Today, added his voice to the concern. 'Sadly, it would appear that all sides are developing increasingly deployable battlefield nuclear weapons that could have much shorter fuses for triggering their use,' he said. 'Trump has often said "why have nukes if we aren't prepared to use them", but like one punch thrown in a bar that precipitates an entire bar fight, one nuke fired in one constrained situation can quickly escalate out of all control!'

With international arms control regimes on both nuclear and chemical weapons under threat in current tense times, [Izumi Nakamitsu](#), United Nations Under Secretary-General and High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, called for countries to take action. 'States that possess nuclear weapons must take steps to reduce all

types of nuclear weapons, ensure their non-use, reduce their role in security doctrines, reduce their operational readiness, constrain the development of advanced new types, increase transparency of their programmes and build mutual trust and confidence,' she said. 'All states must work together, in all available forums, to achieve concrete and irreversible steps to prepare for a world free of nuclear weapons, including by making the nuclear test ban permanent, developing approaches for nuclear disarmament verification and ending the production of fissile material for use in weapons.'

Non-nuclear states could also help inject new vigour into dialogue on the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty and the New Start Treaty on compliance and extension. [Ramesh Thakur](#), Director of the Centre for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament at the Australian National University, said there were a number of steps European nations – both nuclear and non-nuclear – could take to help push forward denuclearisation. In the short term, EU and NATO countries should pressure the United States and Russia to reduce their nuclear stockpiles to under 500 bombs each, taking their 1,800 weapons off high alert status, adopting no first use policies unilaterally, exploring a global convention on no first use, dismantling tactical weapons, and other measures, he said. In the long-term, they should work to achieve nuclear disarmament through a universal "Nuclear Weapons Convention", using the Chemical Weapons Convention as a starting point. Even if they don't all plan to sign it, Thakur said European nations should also engage in talks on the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (NWPT), which has been signed by 59 countries since its adoption last year. That includes EU members Austria and Ireland, but not NATO nations who have claimed the Treaty risks undermining international security. 'They should explore the best ways and means of establishing convergence

and harmonisation between the NPT (Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons) and the Ban Treaty, instead of simply dismissing the NWPT,' he said. With the Ban Treaty joining the Non-Proliferation Treaty as the "new global institutional reality", nuclear states, and particularly Russia and the US, will need to engage with each other, with the help of Europeans, Canada and Australia to push them towards mutual discussion and dialogue.

NATO allies should go even further, suggested [Leo Hoffmann-Axthelm](#), EU Representative of the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN). 'It would be entirely possible for NATO nations to have an opt-out from nuclear weapons and stop participating in nuclear planning ... making them eligible for signing the treaty on (prohibiting) nuclear weapons,' he said. 'When Trump and Kim threaten "fire and fury" and think they can increase their status by threatening to slaughter millions of innocent civilians – that's what nuclear weapons are designed to do, by the way – then we as the responsible members of the international community have the possibility to step in and send a signal, saying that we are appalled at this spectacle and that we condemn any threats of nuclear violence.'

For Hoffmann-Axthelm, the easiest and most powerful way to convey this message is by signing and ratifying the NWPT. 'This goes especially for NATO countries and other countries under the US nuclear umbrella (Australia, South Korea, Japan),' he said. 'While they have so far boycotted the prohibition of nukes, if they change their policy and politely decline the "protection" from US nuclear weapons, it will send an unmistakable signal and diminish the value and role of nuclear weapons.'

The June meeting between US President Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un in Singapore

received a cautious welcome from many participants as a first step to reducing nuclear friction. However, they stressed the need for a more detailed follow up that would include an agreement on international participation in a credible verification process. ‘What is required is a concerted joint mechanism that involves international partnerships with organisations dealing with nuclear test monitoring, nuclear material monitoring, and nuclear weapons dismantlement,’ posted [Lassina Zerbo](#), Executive Secretary of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organisation (CTBTO). ‘I would argue that this is just the beginning of a long process towards greater regional and global security. I’m hopeful this provides a basis for progress toward a verifiable denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula.’

Hoffmann-Axthelm said the technical questions of ensuring verification were easy to resolve if the political will existed to do it. ‘The commitments that were achieved were old and vague and are not of a binding nature. Even if they were, verification would be an issue, given that both the US and North Korea have a strong stake in making it look like a success, even if it may not (yet) be one,’ he stated. ‘The easiest and most trustworthy method would be to have the IAEA do the verification of arsenals and facilities and stocks of fissile materials in the DPRK (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea).’

Speakers also stressed the importance of engaging civil society in the debate on reducing the nuclear weapons threat and maintain pressure on politicians. ‘At least in Europe, there is a lot of attention on the role of nuclear weapons in security,’ said van Deelen. ‘This attention is helpful because if politicians dedicated their time and effort to a cause, there is a higher chance of a breakthrough, as we have seen in the past. They can set the conditions for substantive negotiations. However, it is very sad that we get to this only when the situation gets serious!’



“What is required is a concerted joint mechanism that involves international partnerships with organisations dealing with nuclear test monitoring, nuclear material monitoring, and nuclear weapons dismantlement”

Lassina Zerbo,
Executive Secretary of the
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban
Treaty Organisation (CTBTO)

10 TAKE THE COMMUNITY POLICING APPROACH AS A BENCHMARK PRACTICE

“Countries who have opted for a centralised bureaucratic approach, without a good link with the communities are paying the price”

Saad Amrani,
Chief Commissioner and
Policy Advisor of the Belgian
Federal Police

In a world of cybercrime, globalised hoodlums and high-tech terrorists, it may sound odd to ask law enforcement officers to devote more time to amateur dramatics, football matches and neighbourhood barbecues. Yet, a greater focus on community policing is increasingly seen as a key plank of crime-prevention strategies, especially when it comes to tackling risks of radicalisation and violent extremism.

‘Community policing is an answer,’ said [Saad Amrani](#), Chief Commissioner and Policy Advisor of the Belgian Federal Police. ‘By getting the security apparatus closer to communities, we believe, based on our experiences, that we definitely need the support and contribution of the communities to eradicate issues like radicalisation and the nexus with crime’. Amrani particularly encouraged building trust with communities over repression, thereby incentivising communities to partner with the police. Police forces need to “think global” by understanding the diverse cultures and geopolitical influences present in today’s cosmopolitan cities, Amrani said, while acting local by crafting tailor-made solutions for the specific communities they serve. ‘Countries who have opted for a centralised bureaucratic approach, without a good link with the communities are paying the price,’ he concluded.

Police can forge trust with communities through locally-based dialogues or advisory councils that bring police and community leaders together. ‘Even – in particularly



divided communities where trust is especially low – with more light-hearted and social gatherings, i.e. weekend football tournaments mixing police and youth groups; Iftar-dinners convening religious leaders and communities with police during the month of Ramadan; community theatre performance that bring together local military or police representatives with members of the communities they are supposed to protect,’ said [Shamil Idriss](#), Chief Executive Office of Search for Common Ground. Such events can enhance inter-personal bonding and relations to facilitate dialogue about the core issues and shared challenges. With the right space, cooperative projects or initiatives can be encouraged to in turn foster community policing efforts.

Several participants underlined the dangers of poor police practice enflaming resentment among youths and minority communities that can breed revolt, radicalisation and extremism. In the Netherlands for

“The security services are called on to do ever more and more with insufficient qualifications, resources or training. Too many police officers are expected to be social service workers, psychological counsellors, drug rehabilitation specialists, etc, etc. on top of being crime-stoppers”

Michael Becker,
 Doctoral Student Summer Researcher
 at the United Nations Interregional
 Crime and Justice Research Institute
 (UNICRI) and Guest Lecturer at the
 University of Maryland College Park

instance, a “stop and search culture” targeting non-Caucasian Dutch citizens instils a feeling of insecurity and resentment. Similarly, incidents of police brutality towards North African migrant communities following the terror attack in Barcelona were reported. ‘Police torture of political prisoners in Egypt has been questioned as being a possible factor in the further radicalisation of individuals involved in militant Islamic extremist groups, police brutality towards ethnic minorities in the United States as part of the War on Drugs has been linked to the formation of violent gangs in urban areas,’ said [Shahinaz Geneid](#) of Hedayah.

Possible solutions include developing community policing as a benchmark practice, based on extensive training of officers on how to build confidence and positively engage with communities, said [Cristina Mattei](#), Programme Manager for Capacity Building Programmes at Hedayah. One approach is to ensure a positive perception of the police amongst local communities, which can be obtained by enforcing a good policing culture underpinned by police accountability. From the other side, civil society should moderate their – at times – antagonistic approach to the security forces, said Idriss. This could be achieved by engaging former police officers or retired military in their teams. ‘Instead of taking an adversarial approach to changing the behaviour of the security sector, consider adopting an approach that reaches out to the police to seek dialogue about the shared challenges you and they face in creating safer and healthier communities for all,’ he said.

[Michael Becker](#), Doctoral Student Summer Researcher at the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI) and Guest Lecturer at the University of Maryland College Park, warned that police offices are frequently overburdened and forced into tasks for which they are not equipped. ‘The security services

are called on to do ever more and more with insufficient qualifications, resources or training. Too many police officers are expected to be social service workers, psychological counsellors, drug rehabilitation specialists, etc, etc. on top of being crime-stoppers,' he wrote. 'In too many communities, the unrealistic expectations of the police – often the result of failed policies elsewhere in the government – together with the very real and warranted fears of certain populations (particularly vulnerable minorities), combine to introduce a toxic level of distrust, fear and animosity into the relationship.'

Becker pointed to criminology research in the United States which has shown that the use of Community-Oriented Policing (COP) and police adoption of procedural justice practices focussing on treating people with dignity and respect and giving citizens a "voice" in encounters with officers, have created a more positive view of the police among the communities they serve. 'This strategy remains one that some departments have taken to heart and, when applied in earnest, has benefited all communities – not just those which are most disadvantaged,' he added.

Such practices should be extended in areas where countering violent extremism is a priority. 'Proximity in police-population relations is even more important, in order to promote a secure environment and cooperation in this fight against terror,' posted [Ana Teles](#), National Defence Auditor and Clinical Specialist at the Portuguese Psychologists Professional Board. 'Counter-narrative initiatives are of upmost importance, on the internet but also in schools, prisons, and in the streets.'

There should be a stronger focus on police, rather than military, responses to extremism, debaters said.



OVERARCHING THEMES

Running through this fifth edition of Debating Security Plus was a call for policymakers to think beyond their field of specialisation, recognise the interrelated nature of many of the challenges facing our societies and come up with holistic approaches to resolving them. These overarching themes are explained in more depth in this chapter.

The young ones

From the March for our Lives in the United States to the adolescent girls' clubs tackling child marriage across Bangladesh or to Shout Out UK which claims over 1m young readers for its online news platform in Britain, there are signs everywhere that a new generation of activists is fired up to push for political change. Yet too many millennials are not putting their vote where their mouth is. A YouGov poll this year found that 71% of 16-26-year-olds across five European countries would vote against leaving the EU if they were to vote in a referendum. However, in the UK's Brexit vote, 64% of registered voters aged 18-24 cast their ballots, compared to 90% of over-65s. Throughout all six sections of Debating Security Plus, contributors stressed the importance of reaching out to young people – to harness their energy and demands for progress, to overcome youth apathy and to counter the siren songs of political and religious extremism.

'We need to focus more efforts on young people,' said [Izumi Nakamitsu](#), United Nations Under Secretary-General and High Representative for Disarmament Affairs. She referred to UN Secretary-General António Guterres' recent "Disarmament Agenda" where he speaks about empowering the young generation as the "ultimate force for change". 'In this regard, I have made a commitment to provide more education, more training and to create a platform for youth involvement,' Nakamitsu said.

[Maria Gershuni](#), a student at the Johns Hopkins University Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), pointed out that the average age of the leaders of the world's nuclear powers is 65. 'What can organised, passionate, young people do in order to

build confidence and trust in multilevel nuclear security institutions when they are not leading their countries?’ she asked. [Lassina Zerbo](#), Executive Secretary of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organisation (CTBTO), had an answer. ‘Young, engaged, passionate, creative people such as yourself can lead the world in the quest for a lasting peace,’ he said. ‘You can contribute whatever you are able to do: write articles, spread the word on social media, organise meetings and events – create a global movement! To help finish what we started.’

However, RIAC Programme Manager [Natalia Viakhireva](#) was concerned that the younger generation may no longer share their elders’ awareness of nuclear dangers. ‘The perception of the scale of the danger posed by nuclear weapons differs substantially among the younger generation and the generation that witnessed the Cold War, Hiroshima, Nagasaki and the Cuban missile crisis,’ she contended. ‘There is a potential risk that the next generation of leaders will pay less attention to the issues of nuclear arms control, not to mention the newer generation of millennials, who have an even more abstract idea of what nuclear weapons actually mean.’

Education is essential for maintaining awareness of issues ranging from arms control, to building tolerance and countering radicalisation. ‘We need to start with the schools,’ said [Robert Muggah](#), Co-Founder and Research Director of the Igarapé Institute in Brazil. ‘The focus has to be on strengthening educational initiatives to counter hatred and prejudice,’ he said. ‘This must entail initiatives at the primary, secondary and tertiary levels. We have to get better at this – perhaps introduce VR/AR (Virtual Reality/Augmented Reality) strategies as well to enhance the learning experience.’ One successful example of education being used to break down barriers was highlighted by [Gilles De Kerchove](#), European Union



Counter-Terrorism Coordinator. 'I really commend the (European) Commission for expanding Erasmus so that it becomes also a virtual programme,' he said. 'If there is one programme in Europe which has contributed significantly to remove stereotypes it is Erasmus. By linking 250,000 young Europeans and young Arabs through the Internet (for instance, a class in Molenbeek and a class in Cairo would have the same geography or history teacher for a year), we will promote better mutual understanding and tolerance.'

The Erasmus+ Virtual Exchange programme also won praise from [Shamil Idriss](#), Chief Executive Officer of Search for Common Ground. 'Support the cross-cultural dialogue and engagement of Muslim communities in Europe with their fellow citizens in Europe as well as with their young peers in Muslim majority countries, including through the growing and very promising field of virtual exchange,' he urged. 'Anything that expands and widens the horizons of young people who may otherwise feel ignored, excluded, or stigmatised would help.'

[Irina Ionela Pop](#), Research Fellow in the Asia-Pacific Programme at the Centre for Geopolitics and Security in Realism Studies in London, said Europe should do even more to foster education in third countries. 'The European Union should try to invest more in talented young people and elites, who want to make a difference in their countries and build a sustainable future there,' she posted. 'Poverty, unemployment, lack of education, deteriorated judicial systems, tensions between groups and minorities, all are causes of instability, conflict and migration.'

Idriss also pointed to the need to bridge age divides within Muslim communities. 'Where Gulf or other states can be helpful is in providing support for religious leaders to deal with real challenges that are not particularly religious in nature: for instance, how to identify and reach out to alienated youth,' he said. 'This is a prevalent problem and often more about the generational and cultural gap between religious leaders who grew up in Muslim-majority societies seeking to connect with and support young people 30-50 years their junior who are growing up in modern-day France, Netherlands, Germany, etc.'

[Sasha Havlicek](#), Executive Officer of the Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD), explained how her organisation's digital education programme was reaching 75,000 young

people this year. ‘We have looked to develop programmes that can be utilised by parents and teachers in their engagement with young people. We have developed training and systems for local authorities, social workers and the police in their engagements. But we have also sought to develop peer-based engagements and interventions that directly engage, from upstream to downstream,’ she said. ‘We need to engage online in providing alternative messaging and engagement with young people in a way that resonates with them on a peer basis and competes with the mass of bad actors already very active there.’

Teachers can also play a role in developing attitudes on migration, argued [Sarah Bentz](#), Programme Manager at Friends of Europe. ‘Schools can and should play a crucial role in helping youth change the narrative on migration and make way for a more positive future,’ she said. ‘This should also apply to Europe.’ [John McClintock](#), of the NGO ACTION on Migration and Agriculture, urged more efforts to promote rural employment for young people in Africa. ‘If farming in Africa was profitable, many young Africans could be attracted to farming and they could make a living from it. That might give them a future in their own countries,’ he wrote. ‘We believe that Africans need jobs in Africa. Farming is one sector where many jobs can be created.’

“We need to engage online in providing alternative messaging and engagement with young people in a way that resonates with them on a peer basis and competes with the mass of bad actors already very active there”

Sasha Havlicek,
Executive Officer of the
Institute for Strategic
Dialogue (ISD)

Tech teamwork

Security cooperation between the public and private sectors was viewed throughout Debating Security Plus as a necessity for effective action in almost every field. ‘I think it has been a mistake not to include the private sector more directly from the outset, in the hope of making it more invested in a successful outcome,’ said [Khalid Koser](#), Executive Director of the Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund (GCERF). The role of the private sector extends beyond its role as a funder or donor of projects, but as bringing other attributes to the table, from scale, to expertise, to access. A holistic approach that includes the private sector – whether for changing perceptions on migration or strengthening cyber resilience – is crucial.

Others also called for a private sector role in development and migration issues that goes beyond mere funding. ‘You often feel, however, that development actors are reluctant to engage the private sector as a full partner that has valuable expertise to bring to the table, and not just as a chequebook,’ said [Clotilde Sipp](#), Senior Programme Manager at Friends of Europe & Member of the Steering Committee of WIIS Brussels. ‘The expertise of the private sector is immense and it must be actively sought by the states and international organisations working in the field,’ added Security Consultant [Sohail Mahmood](#).

Public-private cooperation is especially vital in the cyber sphere; private companies and government agencies should work together to agree common definitions, standards and responses. ‘The starting point is to make sure that, within democratic societies, we have a joined-up approach where governments, industry, civil society – and the key international organisations they belong to – all follow an agreed set of definitions and standards and work cooperatively together to spot

hybrid threats early, exchange the relevant info and accept their part of responsibility in dealing with these threats,' said [Jamie Shea](#), Senior Fellow at Friends of Europe and Deputy Assistant Secretary-General for Emerging Security Challenges at NATO (2010-2018). 'It is no good if the private sector sees as legitimate an activity that a government would regard as hostile. On the other hand, if these rules and understandings are to work, the private sector and civil society must have assurances that they will not be abused by governments to clamp down on individual freedoms in the guise of fighting hybrid warfare,' Shea added. 'There can be no data exchange without data protection.'

That theme was taken up by [Wayne C. Raabe](#), Director of the Interagency Partnering Directorate at the United States European Command (EUCOM). 'We must continue to seek an appropriate balance between public safety and individual privacy. Often this balance is situational, which can be unsatisfying, but necessary in order to seek the correct balance in a free and open society,' he said. Cooperative umbrellas should stretch across government agencies, international organisations, business and civil society, including organisations such as NATO, the EU, OSCE, the UN, the World Bank, ICRC as well as the private sector and civil society organisations to build defences against hybrid threats, Raabe said. That collaboration is particularly important in efforts to curb criminal funding. Money being the source of all criminal organisations – whether in human trafficking, illicit arms trafficking or the drugs trade – taking down that network requires coordination and collaboration between law enforcement and financial institutions.

One of the biggest cyber-security solutions is upskilling individuals to become more cyber-security aware, and industry can play a key role there, said Australian Ambassador for Cyber Affairs [Tobias Feakin](#). 'We need



“We must continue to seek an appropriate balance between public safety and individual privacy”

**Wayne C. Raabe,
Director of the Interagency Partnering
Directorate at the United States
European Command (EUCOM)**



“We need to work better with the private sector who reach out to their customer bases to increase their awareness of cyber threats, risks and responses”

Tobias Feakin,
Australian Ambassador
for Cyber Affairs

to work better with the private sector who reach out to their customer bases to increase their awareness of cyber threats, risks and responses,’ he said. In order to facilitate public-private teamwork, governments may have to grant more access to sensitive information. The Australian government for instance has created “Joint Cyber Security Centres” across the country in the aim of engaging academia with the private sector to address cybersecurity challenges. EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator [Gilles De Kerchove](#) also stressed the importance of public-private partnerships. ‘We must adopt both a whole-of-problem and a whole-of-society approach and we must do this together. This means greater confidence in upholding our values and educating our children. It means working in trust relationships with local communities and international partners. And it means the private sector, not least the internet companies, taking much greater responsibility for the online dimension of our societies,’ he insisted. ‘The private sector should be much more involved in our security policy ... Social Corporate Responsibility is also important: fight against discrimination in recruitment, affirmative action to promote minorities. Our civil service and companies should reflect more the diversity of our societies.’

While recognising the need to work with the private sector, a number of participants expressed concern about the power of tech companies and suggested tighter regulation was needed to ensure they are part of the security solution, rather than part of the problem. ‘We need laws that apply offline: political financing, political advertisement transparency, etc. to apply. We also need to work on algorithmic accountability,’ said [Marietje Schaake](#), Vice-Chair of the European Parliament Delegation for Relations with the US and Trustee of Friends of Europe, during the discussion on the need to secure fair and free elections in the digital

age. 'When you listen to social media companies, they promise the problems can be solved with self-regulation. But it is safe to say the big tech companies have failed the test of self-regulation. We need to double down on defending the public interest and defending liberal democracy. Facebook must get serious about the fact that with power comes responsibility. I have not seen the beginning of that.'

The European Commission's new communication on online disinformation proposes a new EU-wide code of practice to improve cooperation and coordination with media platforms, recalled [Giles Portman](#), Head of the East Stratcom Task Force at the European External Action Service. He said it would be: "ideally voluntary, but if results prove unsatisfactory then potentially of a regulatory nature". [John Bruni](#), CEO of SAGE International Australia, pointed to the difficulties of creating effective cooperation between tech companies and security agencies given the current nature of the internet in most parts of the world. 'If left to its own devices, the internet – the normal web and the dark web – will continue to perplex security operators, preventing them from effectively dealing with the high crimes and misdemeanours of individuals, groups and organisations seeking to do harm to the orderly function of national governments and the corporations that support them,' he posted. The alternative? 'The PRC (People's Republic of China) has created a parallel cyber environment that the government controls. It is orderly and serves the state,' Bruni said. 'Apart from human rights and civil libertarian agitators who are routinely identified and monitored – and as a consequence of their activities, arrested – perhaps this is the 21st Century way of taming the Wild West of the internet?'



“We must not fail in the human rights exam that the current refugee and migration flows has posed to us. If so, it will have dramatic consequences and undermine our solidarity, stability and security”

Christian Friis Bach,
Secretary-General of the Danish
Refugee Council (DRC)

Added Values

Mainstream politicians complain about populist parties, but often seem little concerned about populist policies. Instead, many are all too ready to ditch their ideals if they think they can pick up a few votes with feel-good fantasy economics or a xenophobic rant. Defending fundamental human rights and limiting opportunism was highlighted as crucial, as failure to do so could undermine the very foundations of a state. [Christian Friis Bach](#), Secretary-General of the Danish Refugee Council (DRC), reminded European countries and their politicians that ‘in Europe, we have built our entire civilisation on the core principles of dignity and rights.’ Undermining these principles will pose a greater threat to Europe than the current refugee and migration flows. ‘We must not fail in the human rights exam that the current refugee and migration flows has posed to us. If so, it will have dramatic consequences and undermine our solidarity, stability and security.’

Europe should not forget that its commitment to the values of tolerance, democracy and human rights are among its greatest soft-power weapons in world diplomacy. Politicians have to defend those values or diminish Europe’s voice in the world. ‘We cannot separate hermetically the inside from the outside. Our engagement abroad has to increase precisely because of our problems at home. It’s a difficult argument to win, as short-termism often prevails, but a necessary one to fight for,’ said [Nathalie Tocci](#), Special Advisor to the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Federica Mogherini and Director of the Istituto Affari Internazionali in Italy. ‘As for soft power ... the best thing that the EU can do now is to ensure it respects the values it preaches at home. Our handling of the so-called migration crisis (which is a crisis of values certainly not



of numbers) is such that our soft power on human rights is rapidly declining.’ Respect for values is also key in countering violent extremism, said EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator [Gilles De Kerchove](#). ‘It is therefore important to address all the factors. Which means improving social justice, integration, fighting discrimination, improving access to employment; promoting good governance and the rule of law; helping develop third countries, promoting peace and finding solutions to protracted conflicts,’ he said, adding the need to develop strategic communications which promote those values.

Some humility from the West about the failings of its moral stance would also help, suggested [Isaac Kfir](#), Director of the National Security Programme and Head of the Counterterrorism Policy Centre at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute. ‘One way to address the allure of al-Qaeda, Daesh and Salafi-jihadism in general is by



“If you have accountability and democratic control tools over your military, it actually provides a good defence bonus as the public is able to control military spending and ensure that there is no or little corruption. As a result, you have more effective armed forces”

Vaidotas Verba,
OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Ukraine

appreciating that it appeals to angry people, people that feel that they have been abused, mistreated, etc.,’ he said. ‘We, the West, need to recognise and acknowledge our hypocrisies and that we are also guilty of moral relativism (where have we been as Assad slaughtered hundreds of thousands of people). We should be honest and simply say, we are not going to get involved in another civil war.’

NATO’s [Jamie Shea](#) also cautioned that failure to protect standards and rights left the West vulnerable to a backlash. ‘We won’t have much influence on the rest of the world until we have shown that we have got the balance and the safeguards right in our own societies,’ he wrote. ‘Our adversaries always have an easy time accusing us of hypocrisy and double standards. So, as we strive to be more resilient we must not become less free.’ Upholding values is also good for efficiency, stressed [Vaidotas Verba](#), OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Ukraine, who reminded debaters of the work his organisation is doing on good governance, police reform and post-conflict rehabilitation. ‘If you have accountability and democratic control tools over your military, it actually provides a good defence bonus as, for example, the public is able to control military spending and ensure that there is no or little corruption. As a result, you have a more effective armed forces,’ Verba said.

Communication is also key in getting across a message on migration that upholds rights and values, wrote [Lamberto Zannier](#), OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities. ‘There has to be a sound strategy that reassures the population that migration is not out of control,’ he explained. ‘Key actors for this must include a) political leaders, who should outline the overall vision and drive the policies, b) civil society, who can build understanding from the ground up, c) the media, who frame the narrative and have an impact on public

opinion, but also d) multilateral actors who should not only remind countries of their human rights commitments but also contribute by sharing best practices and building capacity.’

However, current policies in Europe are sending the wrong message, complained [Jérôme Oberreit](#), Secretary-General at Médecins sans Frontières (MSF). ‘Unable or unwilling to uphold their international obligations, states are denying the most basic levels of protection and assistance,’ he said. ‘As long as current policies and practices deny safety to those in need of refuge, turn a blind eye to the high risks of passage, and strip away their remaining dignity and rights at borders, we will not arrive at an asylum system worthy of the word “asylum”.’ In particular, plans to “externalise” migration policy lay Europe open to accusations of hypocrisy by cosyng up to countries with poor records on human rights and corruption, said [Matina Stevis-Gridneff](#), Africa Correspondent for the Wall Street Journal and European Young Leader. ‘The EU contradicts itself by having the EEAS criticise these regimes while other parts of the Commission work with them ... it invariably leads to broken promises and diverted funds,’ she posted.

[Elliot Brennan](#), Non-Resident Research Fellow with the Institute for Security and Development Policy’s Asia Programme in Sweden, wondered how much the recent meeting between Donald Trump and Kim Jong-un served as another blow to values, as the US President appeared unwilling to challenge the North Korean leader on human rights. ‘How much does the manner in which these negotiations take place matter compared to their outcome?’ Brennan asked. ‘Do we risk destroying wider norms that have much wider and deeper impacts on global security to resolve one (albeit very significant) area of instability?’



“The type of policymaking that led to the “tackling-root-causes-of-migration” approach that promotes development spending and law-enforcement policies as central to migration management, was based on “realpolitik” but actually got it wrong”

Matina Stevis-Gridneff,
Africa Correspondent for
the Wall Street Journal;
European Young Leader

Un-realpolitik

Realpolitik is all very well, when it is based on reality. Too often, debaters contended, supposedly hard-headed policies are founded on erroneous perceptions. The need to challenge received knowledge on areas ranging from nuclear deterrence to the causes of migration, from the effectiveness of international sanctions to the motivations of terrorist supporters was a trans-sectorial theme that ran through the Debating Security Plus discussions.

One example came in the debate on migration, where journalist [Matina Stevis-Gridneff](#), of the Wall Street Journal, challenged the idea that development spending in Africa will help stem the movement of migrants into Europe. ‘The type of policymaking that led to the “tackling-root-causes-of-migration” approach that promotes development spending and law-enforcement policies as central to migration management, was based on “realpolitik” but actually got it wrong,’ she contended. ‘Moving away from these two types of policies is not a matter of political ideology or moralism, but rather effectiveness.’ Stevis-Gridneff cited studies showing the opposite: that the very poorest stay at home or migrate within their own region, country or continent rather than moving further afield. ‘For years, the EU had thought that “if we make these countries better, then their people won’t come here”,’ she said. ‘Migrating to Europe is expensive and often requires incomes just above poverty as well as family fundraising. These types of financial means are usually not available to extremely poor and displaced pastoralist or agricultural communities. They ... will most likely migrate to nearby areas or countries.’

Not everybody agreed fully on the lack of causal link between more development and less migration, but there was wide support for the idea that a “realistic”

immigration policy needs to be based on recognition that stopping migration is not possible.

‘Migration restrictions will only change the character of migration without lowering overall volumes of migration,’ said [Tsion Tadesse Abebe](#), Senior Researcher in the Migration Programme of the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) in Ethiopia. Instead, politicians need to get a positive migration message across to their electorates, seek to match migrant skills with gaps in the labour market and promote an idea of population mobility that makes it easier for migrants to come and go, contributors said. ‘When I see the number of job opportunities that can't be filled over here, I would advocate for training programmes to learn the skills that are necessary to fill in these positions. This can be organised by the private sector, in need of adequately trained people. Even governments can do this for their countries,’ said [Johan Debuf](#), Head of the Human Trafficking Unit in the Brussels Police. ‘When applicants know what they are studying for, where they will end up, and with the promise of a regular job, they will be motivated to make this effort. Once they come and work in the EU, they will be entitled to the same benefit system as the locals and are within their rights to re-unite their families here.’ Better communications are needed to inform potential migrants about the reality of life in countries of destination, Debuf added. ‘If migrants are well-informed about what they need to do to immigrate to another country, and not told fairy tales about how great it all is in the West, then they might consider doing it right instead of overpaying human traffickers for a life-threatening journey without any guarantee of success.’

Amid the doubts on the future of the Iran nuclear deal following President Trump's decision to pull out, [Negar Mortazavi](#), Iranian-American journalist and European Young Leader, urged a re-think of common perceptions

on the effectiveness of international sanctions. 'Blanket economic and financial sanctions on Iran have predominantly hurt the civilian population and in some cases even benefited the establishment or at least certain agents,' she said. 'The pre-deal sanctions era, combined with corruption and mismanagement inside Iran, created a black market which benefited certain groups within the government while contributing to inflation and shortages of everyday supplies for ordinary Iranians. Sanctions were said to be targeting the government and the nuclear programme, but they really hurt the population.' On the Korean nuclear issue, [David Andelman](#), award-winning columnist for CNN and USA Today, said the world also needed to get real on what's needed after the Trump-Kim meeting in Singapore. 'This is barely a first step ... follow-through is vital,' he said. 'Sadly, the world can do little at this point in the process. Eventually, of course, UN inspectors will need to become involved but only after both sides have agreed on all the parameters ... and that seems like a good distance in the future. For the moment we should be happy simply that both sides are talking and not escalating threats to each other!'

On the wider question of disarmament, the theory of nuclear deterrence came under question. 'The benefits of deterrence are vastly exaggerated,' argued [Ramesh Thakur](#), Director of the Centre for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament at the Australian National University. 'Was the long peace in Europe through the Cold War due to nuclear deterrence? We'll never know – you cannot prove a negative – but let us note that no evidence has been produced to show that either side was intending to attack the other side but held back for fear of nuclear retaliation.' Regardless of the effectiveness of deterrence back then, technological developments have delegitimised the theory, said [Leo Hoffmann-Axthelm](#), EU Representative of the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN). 'Nuclear weapons

largely rely on pre-digital technologies (many systems are about as reliable as a car from the 1970s or 1980s), lots of the associated systems – radar, horizon-scanning, communications between command posts, submarines, planes and other delivery vehicles, are of course digital and can therefore be hacked,’ he cautioned. ‘Needless to say, hackers will have a higher likelihood of setting off nuclear weapons, because it will be next to impossible to trace the origin of the attack, undercutting what little is left of the concept of deterrence.’

During the debate on crime and terrorism, [Renske van der Veer](#), Director of the International Centre for Counter Terrorism (ICCT) in the Netherlands, debunked the stereotype of women being merely victims of violent Islamist extremism. ‘It is a fact that women who have travelled to Syria or Iraq after 2014 have done so knowing very well that they would support a terrorist and violent organisation,’ she wrote. ‘They were aware and willing to play a part in that horrific narrative.’ She explained that women in ISIS-controlled areas are known to have learned urban-warfare skills such as weapons handling and use of explosives. Often, these women have been hardened through witnessing executions or other extreme violence or may even have played a part in inflicting corporal punishment on other women. In 2017, van der Veer recalled, ISIS called upon women to actively take part in the group’s campaign of violence. ‘These women really are potential threats, no less than their male counterparts,’ she said. ‘The threat that they potentially pose should be considered carefully and without gender bias.’ Despite that, van der Veer said such women could benefit from a soft approach after their capture and in some cases can prove useful in providing counter-narratives to jihadist propaganda through their first-hand knowledge of the realities of life in ISIS-controlled areas.



MODERATORS' CONCLUSIONS

Senior experts from leading think tanks and organisations from around the world, who moderated the five principal themes, have provided their contribution. This section presents their evaluation of the discussions.

THEME 1

COUNTERING HYBRID THREATS IN THE CYBER AGE

Once regarded as small and random acts with a mere nuisance value, hybrid threats have evolved from the actions of non-state actors to include transnational, organised criminal networks and, from 2014 onwards, to feature state-actors with well-planned and advanced operations that take advantage of the multiple vulnerabilities that have emerged in today's fluid security environment.

It has been argued that hybrid threats represent a "weaponisation of globalisation" that poses a direct threat to democratic states' decision-making processes while stopping short of the direct use of military force.

This was the second successive year in which hybrid threats were discussed in Debating Security Plus. The debate broadly focused on disinformation campaigns, threats to elections and democratic systems in the West, building national resilience and using military strategies against hybrid threats.

Although discussions on how to counter hybrid threats have risen to prominence in Europe, there is a clear necessity to raise understanding on the nature of the threat. Some debaters stressed that wars have always

Moderated by

Sameer Patil, Director of the Centre for International Security, and Utsav Gandhi, Marketing and Outreach Coordinator, Gateway House, India

Hanna Smith, Director of Strategic Planning and Responses and Päivi Tampere, Head of Communications, European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats (Hybrid CoE), Finland

contained hybrid elements because states used all the available tools to fight: military, non-military, kinetic and non-kinetic. Others disagreed, arguing that the increasing role of technology in people's lives and the vulnerabilities that it has entailed have brought out a new threat, which can be categorised as hybrid.

Debaters emphasised a greater need for international and multilateral institutions to define hybrid warfare more comprehensively, especially in international law and treaties. There were calls to work with the private sector to ensure that authorities can keep pace with technological change and prevent rogue actors from staying ahead of the game.

A better understanding of how today's social media networks work as opinion builders and news generators is required at all levels; in particular there needs to be a greater awareness of how digital social platforms are used to amplify radicalisation processes. Digital methods have changed the way interaction happens in today's world and the change is here to stay. There was also a wide consensus on how inequalities in global access to quality education are one of the most influential challenges in countering radicalisation. A comprehensive response is needed because there are no simple solutions or magic tricks to solve the problem.

Tackling hybrid threats requires a whole-of-society approach, debaters said, ensuring citizens become critical players by instilling a culture of cyber-hygiene and cyber-safety. In particular, there should be a focus on working with schools to improve media literacy in response to disinformation. Italy's work in this field – spearheaded by the Ministry of Education and the President of the Italian lower house of Parliament as an example of successful top-down leadership – was praised. Several other countries have also addressed

the problems relating to media literacy in the education system. In Finland, for example, it has been embedded into school curriculums.

Among the recommendations that emerged was the idea of developing private-public partnerships to find ways to quickly identify perpetrators of cyber-attacks, possibly using an open-source platform based on blockchain technology to securely distribute identity signatures. There were proposals to strengthen protection for electoral infrastructure to prevent results being slewed by hackers and calls for greater efforts to build up more trust among the public and between governments and international agencies, particularly to ensure better information sharing between EU member states and between NATO and the EU. Each country should see how the whole-of-society approach for countering hostile influence can be developed within their own specific context. Regulation efforts must focus on both the individual and collective side, maximising the level of media ownership transparency and building responsibility for what is published and said.



THEME 2

EUROPE AS A GLOBAL SECURITY ACTOR

The discussion under the theme “Europe as a global security actor” could be summarised under three overarching topics: solidarity as the key for safeguarding European interests abroad; ways to achieve greater European defence capabilities; and how to anchor the EU’s external relations on processes that emphasise coordination and synergy across sectors, levels of governance, member states, institutions and partners.

Many participants concurred that no European member state would be able to singlehandedly ensure its own security at home and interests abroad. While interests and threat perceptions among member states are diverse, participants pointed out that there needs to be more European solidarity and institutionalised cooperation. In practical terms, understanding each other’s priorities was identified as a pre-requisite for developing joint strategies under the EU umbrella. To maintain a visible footprint in today’s multipolar global order, Europeans have to be united.

The need to build consensus and solidarity at a European level has become more critical due to the complexity of the global order and the rise of Euroscepticism and populism. The line between “security at home” and “security abroad” is increasingly blurred as the world becomes more and more interconnected, participants

Moderated by

Lidet Tadesse, Policy Officer for Society and Resilience, European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM), The Netherlands

Alex Bush, Programme Manager, and Michael Nunziato, NSD-S KME Foreign Area Officer, NATO Strategic Direction Southern Hub, Italy

argued. As an example, the threat of violent extremism was highlighted as presenting both domestic and international security challenges.

There was a broad consensus that unilateral action by European member states or multilateral efforts with partners are not enough to keep Europe safe. However, there were diverging ideas on how to develop European defence capabilities, for example over the need for an “EU army” or how common EU defence units would relate to NATO structures. The feasibility, relevance and institutionalisation of EU “strategic autonomy” received considerable attention. The consensus suggests there is the necessary capacity potential and thinking to bring about strategic autonomy. However, it can only be achieved if national governments have the political will to push through what will be an arduous process requiring solidarity and understanding to bridge different threat perceptions and security challenges among member states.

As conflict prevention is more effective and less costly than military intervention, there is a requirement to improve early warning and response systems in conjunction with local actors in troubled regions. European early warning systems providing scenario building and foresight analyses must be effectively linked with senior decision-makers who are ready to act on the information provided. Civil society and the private sector have to be engaged in conflict prevention processes to improve early warning and response.

Information and intelligence sharing among EU member states and between the EU and its partners abroad has to be improved, in particular in regard to preventing violent extremism and managing irregular migration to Europe. Managing such challenges requires the EU to forge alliances with North African countries. When

establishing a strategic relationship doesn't make sense, the EU should build a "coalition of the willing" with other countries to defend shared security concerns.

Debaters stressed the need to balance hard and soft security approaches and to avoid tensions between the unilateral international actions of EU member states and broader interests of the Union.

Some contributors also acknowledged that many of Europe's current security threats are a result of the erosion of Europe's adherence to human rights principles abroad, exposing tensions between short- and long-term European interests. In this vein, participants also touched on the negative consequences of the EU's military-based counterterrorism efforts, the securitisation of migration and EU support to the hard-border management capacities of partner countries. These efforts have resulted in more dangerous routes for migration, the support for governments with poor human rights records and increased human displacement and death.

THEME 3

REGIONAL APPROACHES TO GLOBAL MIGRATION

Moderated by

Bouchra Benhdida, Senior Fellow,
Abdelhak Bassou, Senior Fellow,
and Amal El Ouassif, Research
Assistant,
OCP Policy Centre, Morocco

Tsion Tadesse Abebe, Senior
Research Fellow,
and Aimée-Nöel Mbiyozo, Senior
Research Consultant

Institute for Security Studies (ISS),
Ethiopia & South Africa

Central to this theme, debates included the importance of fighting negative narratives on migration; the need for interaction between states and non-state actors in the field of migration; and preparations of the upcoming Global Compact on Refugees.

It was repeatedly stressed that, contrary to widespread perceptions in Europe, most migration is South to South, with Africans making up only 8% of migrants arriving in Europe. It must be accepted that human mobility is inevitable and unstoppable. It also has clear positive aspects, especially in Europe and other regions with a shortage of young people. Immigration is an opportunity to overcome the demographic challenges that many Western countries are facing. Highlighting those benefits can delegitimise populist narratives.

There were calls to take a fresh look at the whole concept of migration. Rather than seeking to eradicate it, we should address the causes that drive people to migrate, for example through conflict prevention and resolution, better targeted development assistance and international and regional sanctions against oppressive regimes. Too much focus on border control and other restrictive measures will not stop the movement of people, but merely change the character and composition of those moving.



The terminology used in debates on “migration” was challenged, with some recommending “mobility” as a more appropriate word. Rich country “expatriates” are often seen as having a right to move, whereas “migrants” are viewed as phenomenon that must be “stopped” or “prevented”. Words like “irregular” or “illegal” are misnomers in describing migrants but are frequently used in the politicisation of the debates. Similarly, migration discussions in the West are often viewed through a security lens, pointing to migrants and refugees as security risks although there is little or no evidence that this is the case.

There should be a greater involvement of non-state actors in the area of migration. NGOs are key players in enhancing conditions for migrants, yet their role is often jeopardised by state entities which sometimes bypass human rights concerns.

It is important to facilitate regional and cross-regional labour mobility through international and bilateral cooperation arrangements, such as free-movement regimes, visa liberalisation or multiple country visas. Greater focus should be placed on creating employment opportunities for refugees, the benefits of which can be seen through the example of Jordan and other countries. Many people in the debate hoped to see a positive impact from initiatives to facilitate job opportunities and local integration in countries of first asylum, such as in those in Africa, so the aspirations of migrants/refugees to move on to Europe and other Western countries decreases.

Many experts in the debate disputed the concept of border externalisation as a viable migration management option, arguing that it has never been implemented well. Urgent work is needed to prepare for the growing impact of climate change on mass displacement.

Much of the debate focused on the prospects for the Global Migration Compact (GCM) and Global Refugee Compact (GCR). Some felt that the compacts further solidify distinctions and that it would be better to have one over-arching compact instead. There was some scepticism over the compacts' ability to achieve genuine "responsibility-sharing" that would alleviate economic and environmental pressures on poorer countries. Some participants further argued that the Global Compacts must focus more on private sector involvement as well as inputs from both migrants and host communities. Given that more than 80% of African migration remains within the borders of the continent, African countries have the potential and legitimacy to play a greater role in debate on the compacts.

THEME 4

FRAYING ARMS CONTROL REGIMES

The global nuclear order has been changing in recent years. Energy security concerns, fluctuating oil prices and climate change uncertainties have contributed to a renewed interest in nuclear power as an energy source for the future. At the same time, nuclear-weapons states are modernising their strategic arsenals, arms control agreements appear inadequate and more countries are seeking to acquire nuclear capabilities.

Contributors to the discussion “Fraying Arms Control Regimes” argued that every state has a role to play in promoting arms-control regimes and in curbing nuclear threats – from the nuclear powerhouses of the United States and Russia, to the non-nuclear NATO allies and potential spoiler states such as Iran and North Korea.

The discussion orbited around two current topics: the Trump-Kim declaration in Singapore and the US withdrawal from the JCPOA. Discussants agreed the Singapore summit was a welcome change from the trend of escalation and increasing tensions. However, the meeting was only a first step toward tangible denuclearisation. The lack of clear guarantees from North Korea could spell trouble. Pressure should be kept on North Korea to show commitment to denuclearisation by joining the non-proliferation regime and signing up to the CTBT and the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons.

Moderated by
Natalia Viakhireva, Programme
Manager, and Roman Maika,
Programme Assistant,
Russian International Affairs
Council (RIAC), Russia

Dharmendra Kanani,
Director of Strategy,
Friends of Europe

Debating Security Plus participants recommended the United States and Russia undertake further rounds of denuclearisation talks. Non-nuclear European states, along with Canada and Australia, can have an important role by lobbying the big powers to discuss and preserve arms control regimes. Non-nuclear countries should take an active role in negotiating denuclearisation processes as intermediaries and as agents of verification.

There was wide consensus that the US decision to leave the JCPOA was a setback for the global non-proliferation regime. Other parties should continue to back the deal in the hope Iran will do likewise. Most economic planning in Iran following the lifting of sanctions is geared toward Europe, so the agreement could remain viable if Europe remains committed. That may be difficult, however, if the prospect of US sanctions forces European companies to choose between doing business with Iran or the US.



Discussions looked at the importance of the new Nuclear Weapon Prohibition Treaty (NPWT) and the need for compliance and extension of existing treaties such as the INF and New Start. Such treaties form a foundation for stability and security in Europe, so it is important that obligations are complied with. Despite their limitations, the INF and New Start could be the basis for developing a new system of nuclear arms agreements.

The role of civil society in arms control should be enhanced. Civil society should get behind ICAN efforts to lobby more countries to sign and ratify the Ban Treaty. In particular, the CTBTO Youth Group was singled out for organising young people to lobby governments to ratify the CTBT. Such efforts underscore the importance of raising public awareness of the nuclear arms threat.

There has been progress in less “hot button” issues: the NPT was extended indefinitely by state parties in 2000 and the IAEA safeguards system continues to be improved. Science diplomacy thrives and continues to strengthen cooperation between scientists and policymakers, especially in multilateral settings.

Future challenges remain. With the development of Artificial Intelligence and the spread of sophisticated software, nuclear weapons are more vulnerable to hacking and technological failures. Emerging powers such as Saudi Arabia are also predicted to seek nuclear capability in the near future. Furthermore, gridlock on the United Nations Security Council can prevent further progress on global denuclearisation if parties do not come to an agreement.

THEME 5

REALIGNING THE CRIME-TERROR NEXUS

Moderated by

Cristina Mattei, Programme Manager for Capacity Building Programmes, Farangiz Atamuradova, Junior Research Associate and Nada Al Mazrouei, Junior Programme Consultant, Hedayah, United Arab Emirates

Julio Hang, Director of the Institute of International Security and Strategic Affairs, and Andres Schelp, Academic Assistant, Consejo Argentino para las Relaciones Internacionales (CARI), Argentina

Despite an evident difference in nature, there are links and similarities between organised crime and violent extremism. Major overlaps highlighted during the debate were the funding streams, organisational tactics, group dynamics and recruitment tactics of both types of group.

Because of such similarities, it was deemed beneficial to look into applying standard law-enforcement tactics to both groups and borrow prevention and counter-strategies used against organised crime for efforts to prevent and counter the radicalisation leading to violent extremism.

However, although crime and terrorism are indirectly linked, the interdependent nature between the two varies. As a result, there is no effective universal approach to dealing with these matters. Governments must “act local” and implement country and sometimes region-specific policies to combat the nexus.

Terrorism is an even more complex matter in comparison to organised crime because of its ideological nature, in addition to its violent manifestations. One key difference that was frequently highlighted was that violent extremist

groups often use ideology and “appealing narratives” as a recruiting tool whereas organised crime groups may not necessarily be ideological and focus more on economic and practical incentives.

The most effective prevention and counter-radicalisation strategies undoubtedly require a community-led approach. Countries that have opted for centralised, bureaucratic approaches have experienced several drawbacks, as they are fundamentally removed from the immediacy of local communities. Community policing is one of the approaches that can be taken as a benchmark practice, based on extensive training for law enforcement agencies to establish “trust” and positively engage with communities.

Policy solutions should focus on the root causes of radicalisation to interject and disable the process before it reaches trigger point. In this sense, the most effective prevention and counter-radicalisation strategy is a bottom-up approach. Key to devising these strategies is building inter- and intra-community networks, engaging people in common activities, increasing social contact and creating community-based dialogues. While governments must “act local”, the police must “think globally”, which requires understanding the influence of cultures and geopolitics on the communities they are responsible for.

There is no “one-size-fits-all” approach to counter radicalisation. It is important that the international community investigates the problem and agrees on certain principles, but standardisation should not be adopted at the expense of what works as good practice in a certain cultural context. Thus, while information sharing is welcomed, strategies and efforts to tackle criminal behaviour and radicalisation should be tailored according to local conditions. Governments should be encouraged to share good practices and

information across their region of reference. The EU must step up as a global security actor and promote intelligence sharing through international task forces, cultural intelligence and development programmes in neighbouring countries, and foster educational and critical thinking inside and outside its borders.

Multi-agency approaches to tackle radicalisation should be based on a culture of information-sharing and include the private sector, intergovernmental and international organisations, local communities and governments, NGOs and the security sector. Trust requires strong leadership, clear laws and guidelines, transparency, and advanced technologies to ensure that information-sharing serves important purposes and operates consistently with national values.

It is crucial to advocate for reform in both the judiciary and penitentiary systems. These reforms require issue-specific funds, training and political endorsement. Special programmes both in and outside of formal penitentiaries are also needed to pull away both young, low-range terrorists, and senior criminals. Although the parameters to be used to set apart prisoners must be carefully deliberated, classification of inmates remains an important preventive measure. One of the major challenges to be analysed is the rehabilitation and reintegration of prisoners – regardless of the reason for imprisonment – back into society.







BEHIND THE SCENES: NUMBERS & DEBATERS

This section highlights the most interesting data from this year's global online brainstorm including the diverse scope of participation from various affiliations and countries.


1. MOST POPULAR TOPICS




2. TOP PARTICIPATING COUNTRIES




3. GENDER AND PARTICIPATION




4. MOST POPULAR TOPICS BY GENDER




5. COUNTRIES WITH THE HIGHEST WOMEN'S PARTICIPATION



6. AGE CATEGORIES



7. AFFILIATION



VIP DEBATERS



MAUREEN ACHIENG

Chief of the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) Mission to Ethiopia and Representative to the African Union



FRANZISKA BRANTNER

Member of the German Bundestag, Chairwoman of the Subcommittee on Civil Crisis Prevention, Conflict Resolution and Networked Action and Trustee of Friends of Europe



SAAD AMRANI

Chief Commissioner and Policy Advisor of the Belgian Federal Police



GILLES DE KERCHOVE

European Union Counter-Terrorism Coordinator



DAVID ANELMAN

Award-winning columnist for CNN and USA Today & Visiting Fellow at the Center on National Security, Fordham Law School, United States



FRANÇOIS DE KERCHOVE D'EXAERDE

Permanent Representative of Belgium to NATO



DIRK ASSMANN

Director-General at the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ)



TOBIAS FEAKIN

Australian Ambassador for Cyber Affairs



STEFANIE BABST

Head of Strategic Analysis Capability at NATO



SASHA HAVLICEK

Chief Executive Officer of the Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD)



CHRISTIAN FRIIS BACH

Secretary-General of the Danish Refugee Council (DRC)



LEO HOFFMANN-AXTHELM

EU Representative of the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN)



SHAMIL IDRIS

Chief Executive Officer of Search for Common Ground



IZUMI NAKAMITSU

United Nations Under Secretary-General and High Representative for Disarmament Affairs



BJØRN IHLER

Founder of Khalifa-Ihler Institute and Kofi Annan Extremely Together Young Leader



JÉRÔME OBERREIT

Secretary-General at Médecins sans Frontières (MSF)



EDVINAS KERZA

Lithuanian Vice-Minister of Defence



ANNALISA PIRAS

Director of the award-winning documentary 'Europe at Sea'



KHALID KOSER

Executive Director of the Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund (GCERF), Switzerland



MACIEJ POPOWSKI

European Commission Deputy Director-General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations



MAQSOU D KRUSE

Executive Director of Hedayah, The International Center of Excellence for Countering Violent Extremism, UAE



GILES PORTMAN

Head of the East Stratcom Task Force at the European External Action Service



NEGAR MORTAZAVI

Iranian-American Journalist and European Young Leader (EYL40)



WAYNE C. RAABE

Director of the Interagency Partnering Directorate for the United States European Command (EUCOM)



ROBERT MUGGAH

Co-Founder and Research Director of the Igarapé Institute, Brazil



PHILIPPE RIO

Head of the EUCAP SAHEL Mali Mission



MARIETJE SCHAAKE

Vice-Chair of the European Parliament Delegation for Relations with the United States, Founding Member of the Intergroup on the Digital Agenda and Trustee of Friends of Europe



RENSE VAN DER VEER

Director of the International Centre for Counter Terrorism (ICCT), The Netherlands



JAMIE SHEA

Senior Fellow at Friends of Europe and Deputy Assistant Secretary-General for Emerging Security Challenges at NATO (2010-2018)



VAIDOTAS VERBA

OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Ukraine



MATINA STEVIS-GRIDNEFF

Africa Correspondent for the Wall Street Journal; European Young Leader



LAMBERTO ZANNIER

High Commissioner on National Minorities of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)



ANNA TERRÓN CUSÍ

Spanish Secretary of State for Migration (2009-2011); President and Co-Founder of InStrategies; Trustee of Friends of Europe



LASSINA ZERBO

Executive Secretary of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO)




RAMESH THAKUR

Director of the Centre for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament at the Australian National University




NATHALIE TOCCI

Special Advisor to the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Federica Mogherini and Director of Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI), Italy



MARJOLIJN VAN DEELEN

Head of Non-Proliferation, Arms Control and Disarmament at the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs



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- Centre for Geopolitics & Security in Realism Studies
- European Organisation of Military Associations (EUROMIL)
- Hellenic Foundation for European & Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
- Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI)
- Research Institute for European and American Studies (RIEAS)
- Search for Common Ground
- The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies (HCSS)
- The WANA Institute
- World Youth Academy
- Young Professionals in Foreign Policy (YPPF)

JUNIOR MODERATORS

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Agnese Cigliano, University of Naples "Federico II", Italy

Amal El Ouassif, Research Assistant, OCP Policy Center, Morocco

Andres Schelp, Academic Assistant, Consejo Argentino para las Relaciones Internacionales (CARI), Argentina

Carolina Brito Cecílio, Blue Book Trainee, European Commission

Carrisa Tehputri, Intern, Permanent Mission of Indonesia to the United Nations, USA

Elisa Abrantes, Programme Assistant, Friends of Europe

Farangiz Atamuradova, Junior Research Associate, Hedayah, UAE

Gloria Mkushi, Eastern & Southern African Trade and Development Bank (TDB), Kenya

Grégoire Roos, Project Manager, Allianz, Germany

Iveta Hlouchova, Private instructor on security matters, Czech Republic

Jonathan Hall, Research Intern, International Centre for Policy Studies, USA

Kieran Davey, University of British Columbia, Canada

Leo Ziji Lin, Waseda University, Japan

Marzio Di Feo, University of Florence, Italy

Michael R. G. Lyons, Diplomatic Academy of Vienna, Austria

Nada Al Mazrouei, Junior Programme Consultant, Hedayah, UAE

Nira Abada, Advisor, Strategic Swiss Partners, Switzerland

Rafaela Miranda, Permanent Mission of Portugal to the United Nations in Geneva, Switzerland

Raynold Wonder Alorse, Senior Policy Analyst, Public Governance International, Canada

Roman Maika, Programme Assistant, Russian International Affairs Council, Russia

Rosalie Clarke, PhD, Nottingham Trent University, UK

Tania Latici, Information Specialist - External Policies of the Union, European Parliament

Utsav Gandhi, Marketing and Outreach Coordinator, Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations, India

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Square de Meeûs 5-6,
1000 Brussels, Belgium
Tel: +32 2 893 98 20
Fax: +32 2 893 98 29
info@friendsofeurope.org
friendsofeurope.org