

NOVEMBER 2017

# DEBATING SECURITY PLUS

*CROWDSOURCING SOLUTIONS  
TO THE WORLD'S SECURITY ISSUES*

5TH EDITION

 **friends**  
of europe



Moderating partners



Rapid fire chat partners



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TO THE WORLD'S SECURITY ISSUES

5TH EDITION

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Debating Security Plus is supported by the United States European Command (EUCOM), NATO and the European External Action Service (EEAS).

This is part of Friends of Europe's Peace, Security and Defence programme, which spans international security architectures, cybersecurity, crisis management, peacekeeping, EU-NATO relations, defence capabilities, human security, home affairs & violent extremism.

Unless otherwise indicated, this report reflects the rapporteur's understanding of the views expressed by participants. These views are not necessarily those of the partner organisations, nor of Friends of Europe, its Board of Trustees, members or partners.

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# FOREWORD

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Friends of Europe has, for the fifth time since 2010, brought together a unique coalition of stakeholders including national governments, international organisations including NATO, the EEAS and other EU bodies and agencies, think tanks, media, businesses and key civil society organisations for a global brainstorm on providing innovative solutions to the world's security threats. A thread running throughout this year's brainstorm was a call for policymakers to break out of their silos, and recognise the interrelated nature of today's changing security landscape and threats. Current leadership and management approaches will not be fit for purpose into the future as there will be an increasing need for balancing prevention and foresight with real time threats.

Debating Security Plus is the only platform that permits a truly global whole-of-society consultation on issues as diverse as how to counter and prevent violent extremism, defuse nuclear tensions, manage hybrid and cyber security threats, address the impact of climate change on conflict and migration and align the security and development nexus. Some 1,700 participants took part from 122 countries, and were joined by 40 VIP speakers. This report brings together our top 10 recommendations addressing practical policy goals and shifts in security thinking. These are underpinned by a realistic roadmap for security. These recommendations aim to inform the implementation of the EU Global Strategy, as well as the policies of national governments and other international institutions as they shape their approaches to peace, security and defence challenges.

We would like to offer our warm gratitude and thanks to our partners who made this exercise possible: the U.S. European Command, the European External Action Service, NATO, Civocracy, American Security Project, Information Aid Network (IFANet), Hedayah, Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, Global Cyber Alliance, Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations, Argentine Council for International Relations, Casimir Pulaski Foundation, Clingendael Institute, COMEXI, Dialogue of Civilisations, EUROMIL, Independent Diplomat, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Women in International Security, Young Professionals in Foreign Policy, the Institute for International Political Studies, Centre for Geopolitics & Security in Realism Studies. Our thanks must also go to the coalition partners who gave Debating Security Plus its truly global and multidisciplinary nature.

Friends of Europe looks forward to placing these recommendations at the heart of our work.



**Giles Merrit**

Founder and Chairman  
of Friends of Europe



**Geert Cami**

Co-founder and Managing  
director of Friends of Europe



**Dharmendra Kanani**

Director of Strategy  
of Friends of Europe

# EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

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It was against a backdrop of global uncertainty - fuelled by events ranging from nuclear grandstanding in East Asia, to more revelations of Russian meddling in Western elections or Caribbean storms linked to global warming - that Friends of Europe hosted its fifth worldwide online security brainstorm, this year rebranded as Debating Security Plus. For 48 hours, thousands of participants (including policymakers and experts) from 122 countries and territories joined this unique open forum to seek solutions to some of our planet's most pressing security issues.

'The security environment today is characterised by complexity and unpredictability,' cautioned [Gen. Denis Mercier](#), Supreme Allied Commander Transformation (SACT) at the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), in his opening comments to the debate. 'Nations and international organisations like NATO are confronted with the interrelation of crises and threats, with hybrid challenges intermingling state and non-state actors, at a time when technological evolutions happen at an increasing pace.'

Ten top recommendations produced by the debate will feed into efforts underway in Europe to upgrade security policy in line with the array of contemporary threats. Notably these recommendations will be promoted and developed with all relevant international bodies including the European Commission, the European Parliament, the European Council, the European External Action Service, NATO and its various national delegations, Ministries of Defence in key and strategic Member States (including but not exclusively France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States) and key EU agencies.

The urgency of that debate was reflected in the week of Debating Security Plus by French President Emmanuel Macron's landmark September 26 speech at the Sorbonne University in Paris to a group of European students, which included ideas such as a European "CIA", joint intervention force and a common defence budget; Prime Minister Theresa May's commitment to a renewed post-Brexit security relationship between Britain and the European



Union; and the EU leaders' September 28 pledge in Tallinn to "make Europe a global leader in cybersecurity by 2025".

Yet Debating Security Plus this year looked well beyond Europe. Contributors from every continent ensured there was a global outlook as they wrestled with diverse but often interconnected threats - from climate change to nuclear proliferation and terrorism – that know no borders.

'Today we can say with certainty that terrorism is a global challenge,' said [Amina C. Mohamed](#), Kenyan Minister of Foreign Affairs. 'No region or part of the globe is immune. Attacks have happened in places and countries where just a few years ago they would have been unthinkable.'

The online brainstorm was organised across six topics: countering radicalisation and global terrorism; from hybrid to asymmetric warfare; nuclear proliferation and other nuclear threats; cyber defence and deterrence; realigning security and development; and climate change, conflict and mass migration.

Running through all the themes was a call for policymakers to think beyond their field of specialisation, recognise the interrelated nature of many of the challenges facing our societies and come up with holistic approaches to resolving them.

'We have to see foreign policy, security policy, defence policy, trade and development in a connected way,' said [Elmar Brok](#), Chairman of the European Parliament Committee on Foreign Affairs. 'We have too much thinking in foreign and security policy where everyone has his own place and things are not connected, and here there must be a dramatic change.'

There is a pressing need to balance prevention, foresight and real time threats. It is evident that this is a new and evolving leadership and management capacity that will need to be established.

For further reading on Friends of Europe's defence policy analysis within the Peace, Security and Defence Programme, please look at our reports "Crunch Time: France and the future of European defence", and "Jumping over its Shadow: Germany and the future of European defence"

DEBATING SECURITY PLUS IN NUMBERS



**1,700**  
registered participants



**Over 4,500**  
visits

FROM 122 COUNTRIES



**Over 1,700**  
posts




**50+**  
sessions



**48 hours**  
of debating




**40 VIP**  
speakers



## Over 40 global partnerships

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# THE TOP 10 RECOMMENDATIONS

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## ADDRESSING PRACTICAL POLICY GOALS

### 1. COMPLETE THE GLOBAL CONVENTION ON TERRORISM

Terrorism knows no borders and Member States need to cut across the traditional boundaries that block the military, the army and the police in their information and tactical activities. A global convention on terrorism would set standards for fighting the threat and boost international cooperation, while acknowledging that radicalization is locally-driven and that a one-size-fits all approach will not be effective. Collaboration could be based on models used in tackling organised crime, drug smuggling and money laundering. Within Europe, intelligence cooperation could be further

enhanced by boosting bilateral information exchanges; by forging a “common culture” on counterterrorism and intelligence, through for example the establishment of a “European intelligence academy” as President Macron has proposed; the building of a “European intelligence system”, as has been suggested by European Commissioner for Home Affairs Dimitris Avramopoulos. Such moves could be stepping stones to the formation of a “European Intelligence Agency” which would allow better sharing of information and good practices.

#### THE ROADMAP

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**Short  
term**

The EU and in particular the European External Action Service (EEAS) and the European Defence Agency (EDA) should draft a Memorandum setting out the principles and modalities underpinning the convention and to use this as an opportunity for Europe to lead in overcoming the stalemate on these discussions through its bilateral and global interfaces.



**Medium  
term**

Push ahead with international anti-terrorism cooperation among customs, migration and law enforcement services, boost cooperation to increase economic opportunities for vulnerable groups targeted by terrorist recruiters. Pending wider international agreement, Europe should seek to develop a “common culture” on counterterrorism and intelligence, through for example the establishment of a “European intelligence academy”.



**Long  
term**

Conclude the long-stalled talks at the United Nations on the Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism that can serve as a basis for broader international cooperation and information sharing.

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## 2. CREATE A GLOBAL CYBER CONVENTION TO SET INTERNATIONAL DEFINITIONS AND RULES

International rules of behaviour in the cyber domain could set down definitions on what constitutes an attack, and establish norms on transparency and accountability. Supranational regulation would set standards on prosecuting offences and legalising responses. They would also enable security bodies and the industry to better prepare solutions and coordinate defences. Such a convention could be based on existing UN conventions, such as those governing on arms-control or non-proliferation.

Meanwhile, European and NATO allies should build on their own rules, definitions and competitive approaches. The EU should speed up implementation of the Security of Network and Information Systems (NIS) Directive, to enhance their own cyber defences and build tighter cooperation. Governments should build scenario planning into policy development and involve private sector actors including developers and socially responsible hackers more creatively.

### THE ROADMAP



#### Short term

Better integrate cyber capabilities into defence ministries and all sections of the military, especially measures to detect and attribute the source of attacks.



#### Medium term

Define what constitutes an attack, establish norms on transparency and accountability; set clear definitions across the EU and NATO allies on cyber issues. Increase cooperation among allies by identifying issues on which to share information; evaluate these to understand where gaps lie and to improve trust through joint exercises.



#### Long term

Build confidence among rival powers at a global level through international conferences, expert exchanges to reduce tensions and find areas of common interest. Agree on an international treaty to govern rules of behaviour in the cyber domain, using existing UN conventions as a template.

### 3. DEVELOP AND STRENGTHEN THE EUROPEAN DEFENCE CAPABILITIES TOOLKIT

With Trump in the White House and the United Kingdom on its way out of the EU, there is a pressing demand for Europe to do more for its own security – especially given the threats on its eastern and southern flanks. Europe has already strengthened its Common Security and Defence Policy through its most recent signing by 23 Member States a joint notification on the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO). A flurry of other initiatives are also taking shape through the Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC), the European Defence

Fund and the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD). Legal and logistical roadblocks to moving troops and equipment across borders quickly must be overcome through infrastructure spending and what some are calling a “military Schengen” to ease military movement restrictions within Europe. Other practical steps could involve modifying the EU’s Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) from the next round starting in 2021, to reflect the new defence cooperation, with funding for research, logistics and infrastructure.

#### THE ROADMAP

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**Short  
term**

Follow through on recently adopted measures, particularly the European Defence Fund (EDF) to cut waste and better coordinate defence spending. Assess and evaluate the feasibility of a “military Schengen” to ease legal and bureaucratic obstacles to the movement of troops and kit. Work quickly to draw up a White Paper pointing the way ahead for a European Defence Union.

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**Medium  
term**

Improve cooperation between the EU and NATO to maximise the security potential of both organisations to follow through on agreed joint declarations. Use EU funds to address research and logistics shortfalls, for example transport bottlenecks that hamper rapid military deployment within Europe. Greater government efforts to meet NATO’s 2% defence spending target.

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**Long  
term**

Work towards the formation of a common security culture, through military exchanges and new shared institutions.

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## 4. OPEN LEGAL, REGULATED MIGRATION ROUTES AND RECOGNISE THE LINKS BETWEEN CLIMATE CHANGE AND MASS MIGRATION

Europe needs to rethink its migration policies. Legal, regulated migration routes would meet European labour needs while reducing the power of criminal trafficking gangs, the risk of extremist infiltration, and the tragedy of migrant deaths in the Mediterranean. At the same time, work is needed to support refugees to return

once peaceful conditions are re-established in home countries. Pro-active development policies should reduce the “push” factors behind migration. Greater efforts should be focused on addressing the links between climate change and mass migration.

### THE ROADMAP

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**Short  
term**

Recognise the causal links between climate change and mass migration to better plan development and migration policies. The European Commission should expand its recent proposal to offer legal pathways to 50,000 vulnerable people through a resettlement scheme and set up more pilot projects for private sponsorship of legal migrants.

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**Medium  
term**

Instigate better dialogue between the EU and Member States on the urgent need for legal migration pathways. Governments should enlist the help of business to develop a positive narrative on migration, notably by explaining the need to fill gaps in the workforce which will grow worse as Europe’s population ages.

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**Long  
term**

The EU should develop a proposal setting out the economic impact and benefit of circular migration and facilitate pan-regional discussion amongst Member States on easing both regular seasonal migration and the return of refugees and economic migrants once conditions in their homelands improve.

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## 5. DEVELOP COORDINATED FORESIGHT CAPABILITIES IN CLIMATE SECURITY

Greater preparation is needed to face up to the security implications of climate change. Across the world, military forces will see their objectives hampered by extreme weather-related events. They will increasingly be involved in humanitarian operations. Military planning, training and budgeting at national, NATO and EU level needs to be adapted to take account of those changes. At a strategic level, climate change and other factors are shifting the value of energy sources and routes – Western governments need to look, for example, at the security implications of declining demand for Middle Eastern oil; the

increasing strategic value of Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) infrastructure; the growing importance of trade routes and, potentially, energy sources in the Arctic as it becomes increasingly ice-free. Climate change will increase competition for resources, raising the risk of conflict and accentuating migratory pressures. We need to combine foresight capabilities to have a better sense of the crises and problems on the horizon and better prepare for them. In addition we need to mainstream climate change adaptation into all policy areas of the EU while enhancing national adaptation strategies.

### THE ROADMAP

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#### Short term

Produce a thorough Europe-wide national risk assessment of the security implications of climate change, including on food security, water supplies, rising sea levels etc.

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#### Medium term

Integrate climate change impacts into the security planning of national governments and key international organisations as well as linking the science of climate change adaptation with disaster risk reduction. We will also need to develop different approaches and products in terms of insurance that combine the interests of private and public sectors to manage the cost of climate and security risk. Adapt military planning to the demands of climate change, from the shifting strategic importance of different energy sources to the need for security force responses to extreme weather events and humanitarian crises.

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#### Long term

Work towards an international agreement to regulate access and resource rights in the High North as a way to head off tensions over Arctic energy sources and transport routes.

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## ADDRESSING SHIFTS IN SECURITY THINKING

### 6. THINK SMALL TO PREVENT AND COUNTER RADICALISATION STRATEGIES

Security is best ensured through a bottom up approach. The most effective prevention and counter-radicalisation strategies involve communities, schools and families. Grassroots-level organisations and community members should enhance their understanding of the local drivers of radicalisation and build their interventions accordingly. They should work with the private sector, local and central authorities. Some of the categories of practitioners that

should be empowered in preventing violent extremism include teachers, religious leaders, doctors, psychologists, community influencers and social workers. Education has a paramount importance and preventative approaches should be embedded in school curricula. Public authorities need to build effective counter narratives on social media and should work with internet companies to tighten restrictions on hate speech and radicalisation.

#### THE ROADMAP



##### Short term

Local entities should work with relevant national departments supported by government funding focusing on small-scale community driven projects. Grassroots organisations should take the lead in addressing the local drivers of radicalisation and build their interventions accordingly. Government should work with the authorities such as community police and local governments to develop and improve the use of “big data” to evaluate at risk people and areas. The EU should support development of this type of approach by sharing successful case studies.



##### Medium term

Empower young people, families and educators to respond to radicalisation attempts by bridging gaps in the relationship between the police and communities. Work with the local communities and public and private sectors to establish counter narratives on social media. Work with internet companies to restrict hate speech and radical propaganda. Municipalities and schools should enhance the capacity of people and communities to improve responses to terrorist threats through awareness raising.



##### Long term

The private sector, local and central public authorities should collaborate on target areas with high levels of unemployment, poor housing and low levels of inter-community dialogue to boost efforts at social inclusion to overcome the poverty, discrimination and alienation that breed extremism.

## 7. BUILD NATIONAL, INSTITUTIONAL AND COMMUNITY RESILIENCE TO BETTER WITHSTAND HYBRID THREATS

More efforts are needed on capacity building and developing forensic capabilities, particularly in those countries which are on the receiving end of hybrid-warfare tactics. The EU should do more to provide financial support to its vulnerable members, helping them build resilience, both in terms of technical abilities to counter hybrid attacks and though efforts to forge greater social unity. Greater unity among Western allies should be used to build up deterrence against hybrid attacks. NATO should consider

more troop deployments to exposed Member States in the eastern neighbourhood to provide greater reassurance to citizens there. Clear identification of non-state actors operating as proxies for governments, will help define rules of engagement for hybrid warfare. The EU and NATO should revitalise their open-door policies, promoting the possibility of membership as an element of stability in neighbouring countries that also provides an incentive for resistance to Russian hybrid activity.

### THE ROADMAP



#### Short term

National governments should develop education programmes supported by the EU that inform the public about the dangers of hybrid warfare, using models based on the recently launched European Hybrid Centre of Excellence. European nations should maintain and expand their successful efforts to reduce dependency on Russian energy exports. Western political parties should take a united stance against Russian interference in electoral processes, pledging to reject assistance.



#### Medium term

Boost NATO and EU unity and cooperation, particularly by developing forensic capabilities to detect hybrid incursions. The EU should direct funding to vulnerable members to help them build resistance. NATO should station more troops to reassure eastern allies. Both organisations should use the prospect of membership as an incentive for building stable democracies in neighbouring nations. Better define mutual defence clauses in the EU and NATO treaties to provide support in the case of hybrid attacks.



#### Long term

Strengthen deterrence against hybrid warfare by using financial laws to target front companies and proxies that use businesses or media groups to undermine democratic societies.

## 8. DEVELOP PROACTIVE AND COORDINATED RESPONSES TO COUNTERING DISINFORMATION CAMPAIGNS

Such a response should include more aggressive debunking; support to free media; better monitoring of fake news; work with social media platforms; and forms of deterrence that raise the costs of hostile interference. Propaganda should be countered quickly with facts: efforts have to be made to enable citizens to make informed choices about the information they consume. Educational programmes should help society understand disinformation campaigns. The private sector should be brought on board as

much as possible, including in the development of legal and technical means to block trolls, bots, etc. that spread fake news. Market regulation should be used to provide transparency on the origin of news and advertising, unmasking covert funding by hostile powers. Western governments should consider investing more money in multi-language state media operations to counter hostile propaganda with the objective of truth-based reporting, similar to the well-funded operations during the Cold War.

### THE ROADMAP



**Short  
term**

Move more quickly to debunk fake news before it spreads and festers. The EU should trial approaches to this issue among Member States by developing a policy tool kit and know-how. Legal and technical defences against trolls, bots etc. should be strengthened, including by introducing clarity on the application of libel and hate-speech laws on social media.



**Medium  
term**

Support independent media to provide real news that the public can trust. The EU should bring together key online platform providers and media in the form of a summit to discuss how this might be addressed balancing protocols with regulation. Regulation should be developed in conjunction with the private sector to ensure transparency on the origin of news reports and advertising to unmask propaganda by hostile powers.



**Long  
term**

Inform the public on the nature of fake news, its origins and aims, enabling citizens to make valid choices on the information they consume. Greater funding should be directed at international, multi-language media that can counter fake news with fact-based reporting.

## 9. ENGAGE REGIONAL POWERS TO DE-ESCALATE NUCLEAR TENSIONS

Faced with the nuclear standoff between the United States and North Korea, Europe cannot stand on the side-lines because its interests are directly at stake. The EU should promote a greater role for regional players to de-escalate tensions, working with China, Japan, South Korea and other Asia-Pacific players. Europe has an opportunity to boost its standing in the region, given the U.S. withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific

Partnership pact on trade (TPP) and retreat from the Paris Climate Change agreements. The EU should use that opportunity to boost economic and political ties with the Asia-Pacific region, and use its influence to push for multilateral solutions to the North Korea nuclear crisis. The EU also needs to consider nuclear questions closer to home given concerns over the Iran deal and Russia's return to nuclear sabre-rattling.

### THE ROADMAP



#### Short term

The international community should stop trading insults with the North Korean leadership and develop a strategy to bring Pyongyang to the negotiating table. Europe should emphasise its position as a champion of the rules-based international order to push for a multi-lateral forum to defuse the crisis.



#### Medium term

Europe should engage with China and other regional powers in Asia, including Japan and South Korea to stabilise the peninsula to seek ways to defuse the Korean nuclear crisis. The EU should grasp the current opportunity to boost its economic and diplomatic ties in the Asia-Pacific region. Pan-regional leadership should be supported to devise alternative and locally owned solutions to the current and potential future disputes.



#### Long term

Nuclear disarmament debates within multilateral fora in New York and Geneva should reflect strategic realities, including better foresight analysis. NATO, the UN and the wider international community should delegate and improve the capacity of regional players to manage, respond and prevent nuclear proliferation.

## 10. CREATE AN ALL-INCLUSIVE APPROACH TO DEVELOPMENT, DEFENCE AND SECURITY ISSUES

In today's interconnected world, it no longer makes sense for foreign, defence, development and domestic security departments to work in their own silos. An inclusive approach is needed that gets departments talking and working together. Even the so-called 3D Security approach bringing in defence, diplomacy and development, may be too limited as environmental, health and home-affairs issues increasingly impact on national defence. Inter-ministerial and inter-agency contact points, coordination meetings, joint exercises all need to be advanced. It could be time for combined security budgets that go beyond purely military

spending. Some suggest targets among EU nations on development or homeland security spending, similar to NATO's 2% of GDP goal for defence spending and stronger than the UN's 0.7% development aid target. The EU could take a lead with developing its own 3D budget facility in the next Multiannual Financial Framework. The all-round approach also means promoting greater diversity in security, including mainstreaming gender issues, recognising the positive role of women in peacekeeping and conflict management, counter radicalisation mediation and development.

### THE ROADMAP



**Short  
term**

Governments should work on silo busting to ensure maximum interplay between defence, foreign, interior, development and other relevant ministries to be able to respond more effectively to today's diverse nature of security threats.



**Medium  
term**

European governments should build on the EEAS Global Strategy to build a holistic approach to military spending. The EU should consider proposals for a combined "security budget" that takes into account development and other non-military security related spending. This could include a single budget for police, intelligence services, border guards and counter terrorism operations as well as parts of development budgets and humanitarian assistance. The EU and NATO should increase cooperation with military and non-military actors to address emerging security threats.



**Long  
term**

Governments should maintain spending on diplomatic efforts and direct these in ways in which cross sector activity and collaboration can be enhanced and improved. There should be a focus on connecting diplomats with development agencies to co-design early warning and foresight capabilities and systems. The EEAS should trial and develop this approach to support its wider use.

# IN DEPTH: THE TOP 10 RECOMMENDATIONS



## RECOMMENDATIONS ADDRESSING PRACTICAL POLICY GOALS

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### 1 COMPLETE A GLOBAL CONVENTION ON TERRORISM

Kenya's Foreign Minister [Amina C. Mohamed](#) was clear that the lack of well-defined international norms was holding back global cooperation in the fight against terrorism.

'In the absence of cooperation, terrorists are emboldened and attack indiscriminately,' she wrote. 'What would constitute a real turning point would be a resumption of global negotiations on a convention against terrorism.'

In the meantime, Mohamed said the international community could already move forward to build on strategies that bring in a wide range of stakeholders on both development and security. Other moves could include harmonising customs and migration, and cooperation to increase economic opportunities for vulnerable groups that are often targeted by terrorist recruiters.

Talks on a Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism opened at the United Nations in 1996, but long been bogged down over how to define terrorism. Contributors to Debating Security Plus argued that unblocking them could boost international efforts to tackle terrorism by helping set standards, facilitate cooperation by using models used against organised crime, drug smuggling and money laundering.



“What would constitute a real turning point would be a resumption of global negotiations on a convention against terrorism”

Amina C. Mohamed,  
Kenyan Minister of Foreign Affairs

From NATO, [Jamie Shea](#), Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Emerging Security Challenges Division and Trustee of Friends of Europe, said the Alliance was not letting the lack of common definitions hold it back from tackling the terrorist danger.

‘NATO has not come up with a single agreed definition of terrorism as this debate continues to reverberate within the UN,’ he wrote. ‘As you would expect from an action-focused organisation like NATO, the focus has been less on defining the problem and more on what we can do about it.’

Despite wrangling over the definition, the UN has adopted anti-terrorist protocols such as the 1997 International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings and the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism approved two years later. UN anti-crime bodies are actively involved in the struggle against terrorism.

‘Methods used to address organised crime are often very useful in preventing terrorism and terrorist organisations,’ wrote [Dolgor Solongo](#), Officer in Charge for Terrorism Prevention at the UN Office for Drugs and Crime. ‘Terrorism presents a set of complex challenges, with a threat that is becoming increasingly de-centralised and diffuse. New and evolving methods by terrorists, demand a holistic approach.’

[Hedayah](#), the Abu Dhabi-based international centre and operational platform for expertise and experience to counter violent extremism, said the international community should develop a comprehensive response on the rehabilitation and reintegration of former radicals, home-grown terrorists and returning foreign terrorist fighters. Special attention should be given to children who were exposed to radicalisation.



Within Europe, questions about gaps in coordination between national agencies may have let attackers slip through the net, prompting calls for the creation of a European intelligence agency inspired by America's FBI. However, that is a sensitive question for many EU capitals.

'Terrorism is a European rather than a national concern, nevertheless national authorities are still unwilling to cooperate and policy-makers seem reluctant to further harmonise this policy,' [Christine Andreeva](#), a PhD Candidate in EU counterterrorism at Dublin City University. 'The notion of a European intelligence agency seems far-fetched and is unlikely to gather sufficient support from policy-makers.'

Opinion is divided over the creation of an EU intelligence agency based on the U.S. FBI or CIA models. The heads of Germany's foreign and domestic intelligence agencies recently spoke against the idea in the Bundestag, warning it could bring added bureaucracy and hinder more effective bilateral cooperation between national agencies within Europe.

In response to the pressure for greater cross-border cooperation, President Macron has suggested a common culture on counterterrorism could be developed through a European intelligence academy.

That idea was welcomed by [Rob Wainwright](#), Executive Director of the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol). 'Such an academy would likely help develop a common European intelligence culture, which would have a positive effect in bringing the community closer together,' he told Debating Security Plus. 'That doesn't mean, of course, that we should also have a single European intelligence agency, which is a much more challenging and ambitious concept. We are



**“That doesn't mean, of course, that we should also have a single European intelligence agency”**

**Rob Wainwright,  
Executive Director of the  
European Union Agency for  
Law Enforcement Cooperation  
(Europol)**

dealing with issues that go to the very heart of national security and, therefore, are highly sensitive to national governments and their citizens.'

[Julian King](#), European Commissioner for the Security Union, also pressed for greater cooperation in information exchange, stronger external borders and counter-radicalisation. King's colleague, European Commissioner for Home Affairs Dimitris Avramopoulos, has suggested a "European intelligence system" could be set up to boost information sharing and cooperation in response to terrorist threats in Europe.

'The terrorists don't stand still; the threat continues to evolve. We need to evolve ourselves with our response, working with member states and with their support,' King told the debate. 'Terrorism and the radicalisation that underpins it remain a clear and present danger ... we're never going to be able to completely eliminate the risk of attack, zero risk doesn't exist, but we can make it harder and harder for those who are seeking to perpetrate atrocities.'

[Niccolo Beduschi](#), of the Centre for Geopolitics & Security in Realism Studies (CGSRS), cautioned against giving terrorists special status beyond that of common criminals. 'What is the merit in having specific criminal offences for terrorism? Couldn't the ones for organised crime apply? And wouldn't that be better, both on an operative and "moral" standpoint?' he asked. 'Doesn't the duplication of prosecution items create inefficiency and even "elevate" the importance of terrorists above criminality?'

## 2 CREATE A GLOBAL CYBER CONVENTION TO SET INTERNATIONAL DEFINITIONS AND RULES

Hours before Russia began its huge Zapad 2017 military exercises in September, Latvia's emergency phone service experienced a mysterious outage. For 16 hours, citizens were denied access to the 112 number to call police, ambulance and fire services. Western officials suspect the incident was another example of Russia testing the sophisticated offensive cyber and electronic warfare and jamming capabilities which it has developed in recent years.

The fact that emergency services may have been targeted, putting civilians at risk, increases the need for international rules to govern behaviour in the cyber domain.

'To the extent that the Internet has global coverage and cyberattacks do not stop at national borders, regional or bilateral agreements are insufficient,' said [Solange Ghernaouti](#), Professor at the University of Lausanne, Switzerland, and Director at the Swiss Cybersecurity Advisory and Research Group. 'Cyberspace requires effective coordination, cooperation and legislation at the local level, while being compatible at the international level.'

In her contribution to Debating Security Plus, Ghernaouti said a multi-governmental agreement was needed within the framework of the United Nations to put in place supranational regulation instruments. If not, she warned "anarchy or the law of the strongest" risked being imposed in cyberspace.

“Cyberspace requires effective coordination, cooperation and legislation at the local level, while being compatible at the international level”

Solange Ghermaouti,  
Professor at the University of  
Lausanne, Switzerland, and  
Director at the Swiss Cybersecurity  
Advisory and Research Group

Today's situation is not far from that scenario, warned [Philip Reitingner](#), President and CEO of Global Cyber Alliance. ‘It seems to me that we already have strategic chaos, or are teetering on the brink of it,’ he said. ‘Lack of clear concepts and historical context combined with weaker attribution, confusion among state and non-state actors, and the diversity of possible and actual action lead us there.’

The call for global rules were endorsed by [Gen. Denis Mercier](#), Supreme Allied Commander Transformation (SACT) at the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). ‘If I had recommendations to issue, the first one would be to ensure that information is appropriately shared among nations. The second one would be to agree on international rules of behaviour in the cyber domain. Two big challenges.’

Ghermaouti said a first step toward an international dialogue could be to set up a non-binding instrument such as a Cyberspace Geneva Declaration, inspired by the 1924 Geneva Declaration on the Rights of the Child. That could serve as a basis for a future International Treaty on Cyberspace, which would constitute the legal instrument for prosecuting offenses, regardless of their place of origin or where they were realised, she said. Such a treaty could be broadly based on existing UN conventions, such as those governing arms-control or non-proliferation.

Given the difficulties in reaching consensus at UN level – particular where competing or rival powers are concerned – confidence-building measures through international conferences, expert exchanges and communication points among major cyber powers should be set up to reduce tension.

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“In cyber as in other domains, everything starts from a common threat assessment. That allows us to define the capabilities we collectively need in order to counter them”

Sven Mikser,  
Estonian Minister of Foreign Affairs

Cyber is already regarded by NATO allies as a potential area of confrontation like land, sea, air and space, but it is also a cross-functional domain, Mercier explained. That means that, rather than seek to create “cyber armies” to operate specifically in the domain, NATO has to ensure there is adequate cyber awareness in all departments.

“We must also integrate cyber issues from the very first step of our capability development process, in every operational domain,” the general said.

Among the current problems facing cyber defenders, the question of attribution looms large. Cyber-attackers often cover their tracks and states hide behind proxies to gain deniability. An international convention should define rules on the use of proxies, as well as setting out transparency norms to facilitate attribution and providing guidelines for defence, deterrence and counter-attack.

Gadi Evron, Founder and CEO at the American cyber security company Cymmetria, said states were wary of openly showing their cyber capabilities. ‘Launching a cyber-attack on a large scale has implications on international relations, as well as risks of the capability being shown openly,’ he said. ‘By exposing the capability countries would work to better their security, potentially reducing the possible impact of such an attack in the future.’

As a precursor to a global cyber security convention, European and NATO allies could build on their own rules, definitions and competitive approaches. EU nations should speed up implementation of the Security of Network and Information Systems (NIS) Directive,

to enhance national cyber defences and build tighter cooperation. More joint exercises should be held at NATO and EU level, bringing in partners from elsewhere. More effort and greater urgency should be injected into building private-public partnerships in cyber security.

Participants underlined the need to better integrate cyber capabilities into defence ministries and to ensure better synergies between the military and the private sector.

Even in the absence of an overarching global convention, Gen. Mercier stated that NATO follows international rules in its responses to cyber-attacks. 'Cyber is not different from the other domains of warfare, where our combatants never engage any target without following strict rules of engagement that include a strict identification of any target and the assessment of potential collateral damage. Cyber follows the same rules,' he said.

NATO acknowledges that cyber-attacks, such as those that target critical infrastructure could be considered as the equivalent of an armed attack under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty that states that an attack on one ally is an attack on all 29, and that the Alliance's response would not need to be limited to the cyber domain.

Estonian Foreign Minister [Sven Mikser](#) said the NATO allies need to agree on the nature and scale of the challenge in order to build adequate defences against cyber threats. 'In cyber as in other domains, everything starts from a common threat assessment. That allows us to define the capabilities we collectively need in order to counter them,' he said.

### 3 DEVELOP AND STRENGTHEN THE EUROPEAN DEFENCE CAPABILITIES TOOLKIT



“Although the transatlantic Alliance is still vital for our security, it is undoubtedly the case that we will have to rely more on our own capacities and enlarge them in order to defend our common interest, values and norms”

Bert Koenders,  
Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs

European security and defence cooperation has gained fresh momentum.

President Donald Trump has shaken many Europeans’ reliance on the trans-Atlantic security bond. Brexit will see one of the European Union’s most potent military power exit the Union, perhaps under acrimonious terms. Turkey, a key NATO ally, now has truculent relations with the West. Russia is menacing. The southern neighbourhood is rocked with conflict and instability with overspill in the form of terrorism and the refugee flow to Europe.

Against such a backdrop, Europe is obliged to consider its own defence capabilities.

‘Although the transatlantic Alliance is still vital for our security, it is undoubtedly the case that we will have to rely more on our own capacities and enlarge them in order to defend our common interest, values and norms,’ posted [Bert Koenders](#), Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs. ‘It is crucial that we develop, both in EU and NATO, a cooperative approach.’

He said new measures could include a so-called ‘military Schengen’ removing barriers to military forces moving across frontiers within the EU and NATO. Although some governments are unhappy with the allusion to Schengen, the idea is picking up traction, particularly after border and other bureaucratic delays during recent exercises designed to demonstrate NATO’s ability to reinforce its eastern borders in the event of conflict.





To match the lifting of legal and bureaucratic obstacles, physical hindrances to rapid deployments of troops and equipment within Europe could be eased through. Some are suggesting that could be boosted by changes to the EU's Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) from the next round starting in 2021. The MFF could reflect increased EU defence cooperation, with funding for research, logistics and infrastructure to remove bottlenecks in military transport, that have been revealed by recent exercises in Eastern Europe.

The broader calls for Europe to beef up defences, become more cooperative and more self-reliant are moving forward.

Romania is set this year to become the fifth European ally to meet NATO's target to spend at least 2% of gross domestic product (GDP) on defence.

'The pressure on Europe to take more responsibility for its own security is rising,' said a post from the Clingendael

“Success lies in better coordinating NATO and EU activities, particularly when it comes to capacity building in North Africa and Middle East, where NATO has expertise in military training and education and the EU is more experienced in border security, police, judiciary”

Jamie Shea,  
NATO Deputy Assistant  
Secretary General

Institute, a think tank based in the Netherlands. ‘This realisation has started to sink in in the hearts and minds of European policymakers, and a number of initiatives have been tabled to step up European defence efforts. The EU Global Strategy served as a catalyst in this regard.’

French President Macron wants to go further. In his September speech laying out a vision for Europe, he recognised that Europe needs to respond to a “gradual and inevitable disengagement by the United States”. His ideas to forge a common security culture included a common intervention force, a common defence budget and a common doctrine for action.

The EU is being urged to advance rapidly with a “White Book on Security and Defence” to lay down a roadmap towards the establishment of a genuine European Defence Union.

‘Trump has been a wake-up call for European defence,’ [Anne Bakker](#), Research Fellow at The Clingendael Institute, told the debate. ‘Together with Brexit and the deteriorating security environment there is a real window of opportunity.’

She insisted there is no contradiction in strengthening the EU’s defence capabilities and reinforcing NATO. ‘We should not think of EU and NATO in terms of competition. When European countries cooperate within the EU framework, the capabilities that they will develop will also benefit NATO. A stronger EU strengthens NATO as well!’

Protection of national defence interests continues to stand in the way of increased defence integration among European nations. European defence markets remain highly fragmented and for long were exempt from EU single market rules. That increases costs for European governments already faced with crimped defence

budgets – in contrast with the economies of scale enjoyed by the United States.

The 28 EU nations have 20 different types of fighter plane, compared to just six in the United States. Europe has 17 varieties of main-battle tank; the U.S. has one. EU navies run 29 models of frigate and destroyer, the U.S. Navy just four. The European Commission has estimated the annual cost of duplication and poor coordination in defence planning and procurement at around €24.6 bn.

‘National defence industrial interests still stand in the way of common planning,’ said Bakker. ‘We need to move away from defining our interests first at a national level and only then looking for international partners to cooperate. Synchronisation of defence planning is necessary for this.’

The new European Defence Fund (EDF) could be a “step-change in common procurement”, she added.

NATO Deputy Assistant Secretary General [Jamie Shea](#) was among the many debaters who talked up the importance of collaboration playing to the strengths of the EU and the North Atlantic Alliance.

‘The problem also is that institutions often have a slice of the action but because they act independently and do not sufficiently coordinate, we do not achieve the results we expect,’ he wrote. ‘For instance, you can have military missions without a clear civilian and political strategy, which has been an issue for NATO in Afghanistan. Or you can have a civilian mission which cannot get on with its development work properly because of a lack of military security. Here in Brussels we are aware that success lies in better coordinating NATO and EU activities, particularly when it comes to capacity building in North Africa and Middle East, where NATO has expertise in military training and education and the EU is more experienced in border security, police, judiciary.’

# Delivering on stronger European Security cooperation in a more dangerous strategic environment

## A EUROPEAN EXTERNAL ACTION SERVICE (EEAS) PERSPECTIVE

The EU Global Strategy for foreign and security policy calls for a more credible European defence an essential pillar for our internal and external security. To face an increasingly adverse strategic environment, the EU and its Member States have defined a new level of ambition for EU security and defence policy. They are also increasingly coordinating internal and external tools through the integrated approach to better address the growing links between internal and external security. At the same time as stepping up cooperation between Member States, the Global Strategy calls for deepening cooperation with international partners. Today more than ever, no single player can successfully tackle today's security challenges on its own

As a result of this new impetus behind EU security and defence policy, the last 12 months have seen momentous developments in the area of security and defence:

### ASSISTING MEMBER STATES' COOPERATION IN DEVELOPING DEFENCE CAPABILITIES

Member States need to cooperate in developing and maintaining key defence capabilities, as well as preserving a technological edge that will guarantee their long term security. Three main initiatives have been launched to promote this: the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD), the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) and the European

Defence Fund (EDF). These are all self-standing initiatives but most effective when they are coordinated. Through CARD, the voluntary review of respective national defence plans, Member States will be better able to identify shortcomings and duplications in their military planning. This will help them identify cooperation projects through PESCO and/or financed through the EDF. Overall this will lead to a more effective and efficient security and defence policy focused on tackling the security challenges of today.

### DEVELOPMENT OF EU CRISIS RESPONSE MECHANISMS AND STRUCTURES

We have also improved the effectiveness of our Common Security and Defence Policy. A few months ago the Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC) was created as part of the EU Military Staff to give support and direction to non-executive military missions, such as those currently deployed in Mali, Central Africa Republic and Somalia. A joint civil-military support coordination cell has also been established to enhance synergies and cooperation between civilian and military structures and missions/operations. We are also stepping up our situational awareness and crisis response within the EU and together with Member States.

### A GREATER FOCUS ON EARLY WARNING, PREVENTION AND RESILIENCE BY TAKING AN INTEGRATED APPROACH

In order to tackle insecurity at its root, the Global Strategy identifies resilience as a central security concept, both internally and externally. This builds on an improved integrated approach, as can be seen in the stabilisation efforts pursued by the EU in a number of scenarios such as Sahel and Somalia. A new EEAS division for Prevention of Conflict, Rule of Law/Security Sector Reform, Integrated Approach, Stabilisation and Mediation (PRISM) has been established to help focus attention on these various matters. It will serve as a hub to facilitate the implementation of the integrated approach.

### A JOINED UP RESPONSE TO INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL SECURITY

To counter terrorism and organised crime, we are working with key partners, notably in the MENA region and in the Balkans as well as with Justice and Home Affairs agencies, such as EUROPOL, FRONTEX and EUROJUST. In parallel, work on enhancing resilience and EU capacity to identify and respond to hybrid threats is advancing,

for example through the establishment of the new Centre of Excellence on Hybrid threat that was established in Helsinki in October 2017.

### DEVELOPING A MORE STRATEGIC DEPLOYMENT OF CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS

To enhance our security we are also taking a more strategic approach to where we deploy CSDP missions. In the South, given the threats to the EU from terrorism and organised crime, missions in Libya and the belt from the Sahel region to Somalia as well as the two naval operations - operations SOPHIA and ATALANTA –retain key strategic relevance. Efforts are equally pursued in Eastern Europe, where missions in Ukraine and Georgia signify clear EU security engagement, and in the Western Balkans. A new CSDP action has been launched in Iraq, in addition to existing CSDP missions in Palestine.

### WORKING WITH PARTNERS

No single international player can face security challenges on its own. That is why the EU's missions and operations support EU partners in many regions, assisting them to enhance their own security and stability. Beyond this the EU cooperates with a number of states and international organisations, notably NATO, the UN and the African Union, in working towards international peace and security. Through these actions the European Union makes clear that in an increasingly challenging strategic environment it is committed to being a global security provider.

## 4 OPEN LEGAL, REGULATED MIGRATION ROUTES, AND RECOGNISE THE LINKS BETWEEN CLIMATE CHANGE AND MASS MIGRATION

Europe needs to rethink its migration policies. By opening regulated legal migration, Europe could meet its labour needs while ending the current chaotic situation that enables criminal trafficking gangs to exploit illegal immigrants. More legal migration would stop the tragedy of migrant deaths in the Mediterranean and reduce the risk of extremist infiltration.

‘Expanding regular migration channels, so that fewer people risk their lives to make these journeys, is an important step,’ said [Peggy Hicks](#), of the UN Human Rights Office. ‘We should also invest more in addressing the “supply” side – if we worked harder on the human rights abuses that drive irregular migration, it would benefit all. I am convinced that we can, and in fact do, have a system that minimises the risks from people who would exploit migration for purposes of violent extremism.’

The European Commission has been urged to widen its recently proposed plan to offer legal pathways to 50,000 vulnerable people through resettlement. It has also been told to boost funding for Member States who agree to resettle refugees and to support more pilot projects for sponsorship of legal migrants by non-government organisations and other private groups. Governments should also seek help from business to build up a positive narrative on migration. In Germany, for example, firms are actively seeking migrants to fill gaps in the labour force that have left Europe’s most successful economy with 600,000 unfilled job vacancies



“Expanding regular migration channels, so that fewer people risk their lives to make these journeys, is an important step”

Peggy Hicks,  
Director at the UN  
Human Rights Office





and companies short of 40,000 apprentices. Without migration those numbers are set to get much worse as Europe's population ages. More visible support from the private sector could counter the rise in xenophobic populism by presenting a positive immigration message, that highlights benefits of movement.

[Vincent Cochetel](#), United Nations Special Envoy for the Central Mediterranean Route, said previous European agreements to open legal pathways for migrants heading north from Africa had not been implemented.

'We need some regulated migration programmes, including circular migration for migrants from countries of origin and resettlement for refugees from countries of first asylum along the routes leading to Libya,' he posted.

Due to the lack of legal routes, human trafficking has developed into a significant source of revenue, not just for individuals, but for whole communities, Cochetel pointed out. People smuggling was estimated to generate up to \$1.5 bn in Libya last year. Greater transnational cooperation is needed to fight trafficking and to "demobilise" those involved, Cochetel added.

'So, we need some political courage to design these circular migration schemes as they exist in Canada for instance. It is a win-win,' he said.

Border control can play an important part in regulating who gets in. 'The EU's external border needs to be used as a filter, ensuring that millions of bona fide travellers can smoothly cross the EU's borders, while security threats are detected in time,' said [Fabrice Leggeri](#), Executive Director of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (FRONTEX).

"Returning refugees can play an important role in post-conflict rehabilitation, but for that the work to prepare the ground within the refugee communities has to start early"

Patrick Costello,  
Head of Division for Egypt, Syria,  
Lebanon and Jordan at the  
European External Action Service  
(EEAS)

He also pointed to the importance of combining border management with effective development policies.

‘Europe will remain under migratory pressure because of economic and demographic reasons. There will always be people looking for a better life and those escaping conflicts and people in need of international protection,’ Leggeri stated. ‘Border control is only one element of effective migration management which has to be complemented by development in countries of origin and hopefully peace processes in conflict zones.’

That need for effective development policies to reduce the push pressure for migration was also picked up by [Pekka Haavisto](#), Member of the Finnish Parliament, the Foreign Minister’s Special Representative on Mediation and President of the European Institute of Peace.

‘We are not really looking in the long term at what kind of investments are needed to create jobs in these areas, what hope can we address to the young people in Africa and the Middle East, how to bring really sustainable development to these areas,’ he wrote.

In particular, participants urged governments and NGOs to fully address the migration impact of climate change. ‘The international community should do more to clearly identify those migrants who move due to environmental concerns,’ said the [American Security Project](#), a Washington-based public policy and research organisation.

The [Stockholm International Peace Research Institute \(SIPRI\)](#), pointed to the “strong overlap between countries that are vulnerable to climate change, and fragile and conflict-affected states”. It referred to the Lake Chad region and drought-stricken areas in the Horn of Africa. ‘These are just a few pieces of the mounting evidence that climate change causes insecurity and exacerbates the suffering primarily in already fragile and conflict-affected areas,’ SIPRI said.

Regulated migration could also tie in with support to help migrants, and in particular refugees, return to their homelands once the political or economic situation has improved.

‘Returning refugees can play an important role in post-conflict rehabilitation, but for that the work to prepare the ground within the refugee communities has to start early,’ said [Patrick Costello](#), Head of Division for Egypt, Syria, Lebanon and Jordan at the European External Action Service (EEAS).

Whether migrants stay or return, they should be empowered to make the right decisions enabling them to play a positive role. ‘Empowering migrants by making them aware of their rights and offering support to integrate, or to return to their home country, can help prevent such challenges,’ said [Annette Idler](#), Director of Studies at the Changing Character of War Programme, University of Oxford.



## 5 DEVELOP COORDINATED FORESIGHT CAPABILITIES IN CLIMATE SECURITY

Security operators around the world are fast waking up to the necessity of adapting planning to the pressures of climate change.

To meet the changing needs, greater foresight capabilities are needed to predict and prepare for the diverse impacts that climate change will have on security, from triggering conflict over resources and migration flows in Africa and the Middle East, to opening up competition between the major powers over minerals and trade routes in the Arctic, or extreme weather-related events increasingly involving the military in humanitarian operations.

‘The fight against climate change is not the main purpose of NATO, but NATO countries and entities like the European Union have to put climate change more on their economic and environmental priority list,’ said [Elmar Brok](#), Chairman of the European Parliament Committee on Foreign Affairs.

NATO is certainly aware of the challenge. A report released in October by the NATO Parliamentary Assembly warned: ‘the hard security implications of climate change need to be considered by the defence and security establishments of all NATO countries and should be a subject more closely taken up within the Alliance. The challenges here are myriad and include everything from the future of coastal bases, to emergency response, to the prospects of long-term instability in the Middle East as a result of drought.’

The Alliance needs to look at issues ranging from the fate of coastal bases, to building emergency responses

to extreme weather events and the long-term prospects of instability in parts of Africa, Asia and the Middle East that will become more susceptible to drought, flooding and other climate-related challenges.

Military planning, training and budgeting all need to be adapted to prepare for the shifting security landscape in the wake of climate change and energy developments. Western governments need to consider the security implications of the relative decline in the strategic importance of Middle Eastern oil and the growing strategic value of Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) infrastructure.

Participants in Debating Security Plus looked at the connection between climate change and national security across nations and regions, and discussed the likely impacts of climate change on overall military



operations, training and force-structure considerations. Many pointed out that Western governments were slow to respond to approaching climate-related problems, such as threats to food supply. Greater attention should be paid to non-state actors, particularly in the private sector, who are often better attuned to local conditions and able to spot approaching trouble.

‘All policies need to integrate risk analysis to better understand the links between climate change, displacement and security,’ posted [Monique Pariat](#), European Commission Director General for Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection (ECHO).

She too stressed the importance of early warning in preparing the response to climate related conditions. ‘The EU cannot prevent natural hazards, such as hurricanes, earthquakes, etc. from happening,’ Pariat said. ‘But by better bridging of humanitarian relief and longer-term development efforts, countries most vulnerable to these hazards can be better protected (for example by building better, improving water and sanitation systems, etc.) and can be better prepared to cope with and reduce the impact of those hazards (early warning systems, shelter, protection, etc.).’

[Sigrid Kaag](#), United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon, stressed that early warning had to be followed up by early action, as organisations plan responses to climate change.

‘The same applies to the UN and the African Union for that matter. Investing in development but also in peace-keeping, peace-building and humanitarian efforts and response to climate change is a way to strengthen shared resilience and shared security,’ she said. ‘Early warning requires also early action, including the political will and decision making.’

Writing from Skopje, [Marija Cavkova](#), warned that failure to adequately prepare for the security impact of climate change could have grave consequences. ‘Climate change alone will not cause wars, but it serves as an accelerant of instability that makes already existing threats worse. The threat of global warming for security will manifest through a range of effects: resource scarcity, extreme weather, food scarcity, water insecurity, and sea level rise will all threaten societies around the world,’ she posted. ‘Too many governments are not prepared for these threats, either because they do not have the resources or because they have not planned ahead. How societies and governments respond to the increase in instability will determine whether climate change will lead to war.’

The impact of climate change in the Arctic was also a key theme of the debate, as the melting ice cap eases access to mineral resources and opens up new sea routes across the High North. NATO is already concerned about the potential for increased tensions with Russia in the Arctic and about China’s growing interest in the region.

‘The Arctic in particular seems to be a potential flash point for such conflict, with multiple nations envisioning ice-free passages from Europe to Asian markets that will save many days and millions of dollars compared to current navigation,’ wrote the [American Security Project \(ASP\)](#). ‘Will the Arctic become the next “Checkpoint Charlie” in terms of military tensions?’

There are growing calls for an international agreement to manage the High North and prevent conflict as the ice melts. [Raphael Danglade](#), Programme Assistant on Energy and Climate at Friends of Europe, suggested “the creation and implementation of robust international laws” was needed to restrict the extraction of resources from the region and reduce the risk of conflict.



“NATO countries and entities like the European Union have to put climate change more on their economic and environmental priority list”

Elmar Brok,  
Chairman of the European  
Parliament Committee  
on Foreign Affairs  
and Friends of Europe Trustee





## RECOMMENDATIONS ADDRESSING **SHIFTS IN SECURITY THINKING**

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### **6** THINK SMALL FOR EFFECTIVE PREVENTION AND COUNTER-RADICALISATION STRATEGIES

Heavy handed, top-down approaches to prevent and counter radicalisation can be counterproductive, increasing alienation among communities that feel victimised and unfairly targeted.

Instead, there should be a focus on communities, schools and families, with programmes that work alongside the private sector and local authorities, bringing in teachers, religious leaders, doctors, psychologists and social workers.

‘I would like to highlight the instrumental role of local authorities, that is municipalities. They are the ones who implement the projects and develop plans to fight against radicalisation. They are key in all prevention programs. They are key to the creation of inclusive societies. They are those who have the capacity to involve the different groups that make up our societies,’ posted [Beatriz Becerra Basterrechea](#), Member of the European Parliament Subcommittee on Human Rights. ‘The municipalities have the capacity to create non-discriminatory environments where the second generations of immigrants are not radicalised.’



“I would like to highlight the instrumental role of local authorities, that is municipalities. They are the ones who implement the projects and develop plans to fight against radicalisation”

Beatriz Becerra Basterrechea,  
Member of the European  
Parliament Subcommittee  
on Human Rights

National governments and the European institutions should work to coordinate policies run at local level and to provide financing for ground-level initiatives, she added.

Debating Security Plus participants said young people in particular should be empowered to lead the way in the fight against radicalisation both online and offline as they are the most credible voices to fight a phenomenon that mainly affects youth. Tighter controls are needed against hate speech. There should be greater support to promote moderate Muslim voices and heightened efforts to present positive role models for disaffected youth. More work should be put into using “big data” to identify patterns and improve risk forecasting. Societal resistance to terrorism should be built up by awareness teaching that helps citizens spot danger signs and react quickly to attacks, including through more first-aid training.

There should be more inclusion of medical, psychological and social practices within prevention efforts, such as the setting up of radicalisation help lines for young people. “Non-branded” preventative approaches should be developed in schools and universities, through which teachers and family members can be trained to identify early signs of radicalisation and constructively intervene.

‘Absolutely, education is a key for preventing radicalisation and extremism that leads to terrorism,’ said [Nina Suomalainen](#), Head of the OSCE Mission to Skopje. ‘We work with safe school structures, mediation clubs and youth councils to streamline countering violent extremism activities and inform young people and raise their awareness on these issues.’

[Gilles De Kerchove](#), EU Counter-Terrorism-Coordinator, said a comprehensive approach across society offered the best hope of dealing with radicalisation. ‘Real success in this field will come when the whole of society at national and international level moves together to tackle this,’

he said. ‘This requires considerable effort from the EU Institutions, the Member States, local communities, schools, churches, civil society groups and of course the internet companies. Moving together we stand the greatest chance of success and I think that is the direction in which we are heading.’

Contributors pointed out that extremists seek to lure young recruits by offering a sense of identity, purpose and belonging. Preventive policies should, therefore, focus on providing attractive alternatives within innovative youth development options.

The bottom-up approach should be applied not only within communities in Europe, but also in post-conflict or terror-affected zones to engage communities and develop reintegration efforts. That should be done by working with local actors, community leaders and the private sector to build legitimacy for such programmes.

**Ana Gomes**, Vice-Chair of the European Parliament Committee on Money Laundering, Tax Avoidance and Tax Evasion, and Trustee of Friends of Europe, said Europe needed to do more to promote social inclusion as a counter to radicalisation.

‘Apart from the exchange of information among intelligence and security forces, which is absolutely crucial for the fight against terrorism, we must demand from European governments proper and massive investment in social programmes for social inclusion and to fight the rages of young people from our Muslim communities in countries where they were never properly integrated,’ she said. ‘This also requires specific programmes to counter radicalisation in the population in prison, that includes training our own imams and not allowing member states to import imams from countries like Pakistan and Saudi Arabia.’



“We seem to have an increasing pace and challenge set from co-called hybrid or asymmetric warfare tactics”

Kathleen H. Hicks,  
Senior Vice President, Henry A.  
Kissinger Chair, and Director of  
the International Security Program  
at the Centre for Strategic and  
International Studies (CSIS)



While several contributors recognised the importance of religious leaders in countering radicalisation, the idea of training imams or banning those from certain countries was controversial.

‘How would you define “training” imams? How would we know that Muslims in Europe would still be trusting the imams if they have undergone training conducted by the government?’ [Carrisa Tehputri](#), a Research & Analysis Intern at Hedayah. ‘When it comes to faith, a majority of people would prefer the neutrality of religious leaders to be maintained; especially in this case where “Western” ideas are often seen to be the exact opposite of Islamic values.’

[Peggy Hicks](#), Director of the Thematic Engagement, Special Procedures and Right to Development Division of the UN Human Rights Office, also had doubts. ‘Obviously, engagement with religious leaders and communities, including with imams, is critical to preventing violent extremism. At the same time, any State intervention regarding training of religious leaders must be carefully devised, non-discriminatory and must not infringe on religious freedom or on free speech,’ she said. ‘Repressive measures, such as the suggestion to stop “importing” imams from specific countries would be discriminatory and ultimately also counter-productive.’

## 7 BUILD NATIONAL, INSTITUTIONAL AND COMMUNITY RESILIENCE TO BETTER WITHSTAND HYBRID THREATS

Since Russia re-wrote the textbook on hybrid warfare with its takeover of Crimea in 2014, the West has been scrambling to keep up with Moscow's use of such tactics against a range of allies and partners; from an undeclared invasion in eastern Ukraine, to interference in European and American elections, economic muscle flexing, and cyber-attacks.

This shouldn't have come as a surprise. Russia's Chief of General Staff, Gen. Valery Gerasimov, spelled out his doctrine of war through chaos in a 2013 article, explaining how not just the military but business, media, political proxies, spies, leakers, hackers and peddlers of fake news can be deployed to spread division, confusion and fear that saps enemies' strength from the inside.

Debating Security Plus looked at how the West can resist. Building resilience in our societies is key, enabling citizens to spot hybrid efforts to undermine unity and democracy for what they are and push back against them. Participants stressed the importance of building national unity in support of democracy and core values, boosting education so citizens can see through fake news.

[Kathleen H. Hicks](#), Senior Vice President, Henry A. Kissinger Chair, and Director of the International Security Program at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), examined the nature of the problem which sought to use non-conventional means to undermine democratic societies while stopping short of action that could trigger a military response.

‘We seem to have an increasing pace and challenge set from co-called hybrid or asymmetric warfare tactics. These are provocations that are intended to fall short of conventional conflict, thus to avoid a U.S. response that would be conventional military in nature,’ she said. ‘Preventing such provocations is important in itself, but also because the risk of miscalculation is heightened when there is confusion about what trips over a conventional warfare threshold.’

Unity between democracies is of utmost importance and vital for deterrence against hybrid warfare, asserted [Gateway House](#), the Indian Council on Global Relations, a Debating Security Plus partner. It said greater efforts are needed for capacity building and developing forensic capabilities, particularly in those countries in Europe which are on the receiving end of hybrid warfare tactics. National resilience – institutional and community – should be enhanced by educational programmes – bringing in the



private sector including news and social media companies - to help society understand disinformation campaigns.

There was considerable attention paid to what the EU and NATO can do in building institutional and community resilience that can thwart hostile actors' attempts to exploit divisions. [Sven Mikser](#), Estonian Minister of Foreign Affairs, said cooperation between NATO and the EU on countering hybrid threats was moving ahead. The EU moved successfully to reduce its vulnerability on Russian energy dependency. It should build a similar unity to crack down on Russian efforts to interfere with Western democratic processes, using all legal means to unmask and block such interference, including restricting access to SWIFT. The mutual assistance clauses underpinning NATO and the EU should be better defined and expanded, where necessary, to ensure allies come each others' aid in the event of hybrid attacks that stop short of open military intervention.

'Regarding asymmetric and hybrid threats, we have managed to significantly improve our situational awareness and early warning capability. We have also taken steps to identify shortcomings in our national and collective decision-making processes,' he said. 'While the threat picture is becoming increasingly more complex and fluid, we must also acknowledge that not all the so-called new threats are necessarily new and even those that are do not replace the traditional ones but merely complement them.'

Maintaining social cohesion is vital for the overall resilience of the society, Mikser insisted. Several participants agreed that resilience is key. [Lt. Col. Joerg Barandat](#), lecturer at the German Armed Forces Command and Staff College, suggested some of the money earmarked for defence budgets should go into education that increases resilience to hybrid incursions.



“All our discussion of hybrid warfare must keep at the centre how to bolster deterrence and lower the risk of miscalculation”

Peter Singer,  
Strategist and Senior Fellow  
at the New America Foundation

‘Resilience appears to me as the deciding resource. And resilience is based on knowledge (enlightenment) and education,’ he wrote. ‘People who know about is going on, will not feed trolls or distribute fake-news any further. Vaccination also prevents the spread of virus infections. In this sense education is a security issue!’

Peter Singer, Strategist and Senior Fellow at the New America Foundation, was one of many participants who raised concerns that tensions started by hybrid tactics could lead to miscalculation that sparks open conflict. He said the West needs to bolster deterrence against hybrid attacks and force hidden soldiers like the “little green men” Russia used in Crimea to come out into the open.

‘Our goal should be to force the little green men to act either like conventional forces or insurgents, but not that tough space in between - force them to take an approach that fits our ends and designs,’ Singer said. ‘All our discussion of hybrid warfare must keep at the centre how to bolster deterrence and lower the risk of miscalculation.’

Using financial regulations to hit back against Russian front companies used in hybrid operations was an idea put forward by Christopher Kremidas-Courtney, U.S. European Command Liaison to NATO and EU.

‘A comprehensive approach would address how to prevent Russia from moving money and buying influence within the European countries. It would rely on many of the same techniques used to contain and disrupt organised crime,’ he wrote. ‘The inclusion of real estate, business law, and transparency expertise could help identify ways to thwart the Russian use of front companies and real estate holdings in major European capitals.’



## 8 WE NEED A PROACTIVE RESPONSE TO COUNTERING DISINFORMATION CAMPAIGNS

Giles Portman, Head of the East Stratcom Task Force at the European External Action Service, laid out the problem in stark terms.

‘Pro-Kremlin disinformation seeks to weaken and destabilise Europe, by exploiting existing misunderstandings and divisions, or creating artificial new ones. Messaging can be on a geo-strategic or local level. Outright lies are deployed, aimed at denigrating a particular person, group or policy,’ he told the debate. ‘The strategy can be to spread as many conflicting messages as possible, in order to confuse to such an extent that the audience is persuaded that the truth is impossible to find. Europe and its allies are criticised as Russophobic, aggressive, morally bankrupt and in a state of collapse; Russian actions, including illegal ones, are presented in a positive light or excused.’

The creation of the East Stratcom Task Force in 2015 to counter Russian propaganda was a step in the right direction, but a greater effort is needed, particularly as national governments have more power than the EU in this field.

Participants called for faster, more aggressive debunking of fake news, greater support for free media, better monitoring of fake news and more work with social-media platforms misused by Russian propagandists and their proxies.

The West should not fall into the trap of fighting fake news with more propaganda, but instead reply on facts and

“Right now, the people who work against an open and democratic society are quicker than the people who try to defend a pluralistic society. But I’m convinced people on the side of the democracy will prevail. We learn quickly”

David Schraven,  
Founder and Publisher  
of CORRECTIV



genuine reporting. Education to help society understand disinformation campaigns should be prioritised.

“Civilian awareness is the best way to defend against the threats,” said [Anna Elżbieta Fotyga](#), Chair of the European Parliament Subcommittee on Security and Defence and former Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs.

She stressed the importance of promoting quality journalism and increasing media literacy. Fotyga recognised the sensitivity of state support for the media, but pointed to the National Endowment for Democracy in the United States as an example of how backing can be provided to independent media.

“To discuss financial assurances for media is quite complicated, as it is not a role of the state to distribute revenues among media. The state’s role is to ensure equal rights of media to enter the market and operate in secure environment in terms of fair competition,” she concluded.

David Schraven, Founder and Publisher of CORRECTIV, a German nonprofit investigative journalism newsroom, warned that untreated disinformation worked on society “like a smart intelligent bomb”, but he was confident time was running out for the peddlers of fake news.

‘We need to be patient. Most people don’t want to believe in fakes. They want true information. If you deliver truth patiently and calmly, it will prevail,’ Scharavan posted.

‘We are just in the first phase of something we don’t understand yet completely.

I call it the transformation of our society into an editorial society. Right now, the people who work against an open and democratic society are quicker than the people who try to defend a pluralistic society. But I’m convinced people on the side of the democracy will prevail. We learn quickly.’

Schraven pointed out that fake news was less effective in Germany’s election in September than in earlier British votes. To help the process along, he called for more debunking centres that are decentralised and locally run to quickly counter fake news on social and traditional media; greater support for independent media; and education programmes to enable people to filter out fake news.

Portman, too, said that the West is making progress. ‘We are in a much better place than we were a year ago: our first goals were to get a handle on the nature of the threat and to start raising awareness, and we have done both. The level of conversation is simply incomparable to when we started.’

However, he said Europe had been late to respond to the problem and there was a need for governments to reach a consensus on the level of resourcing needed to tackle it. Speed is of the essence.



“Pro-Kremlin disinformation seeks to weaken and destabilise Europe, by exploiting existing misunderstandings and divisions, or creating artificial new ones”

Giles Portman,  
Head of the East Stratcom Task  
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Action Service

“The EU cannot be an outsider as to the current strategic crises in Asia. Its interests are directly at stake”

La Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique (FRS)

‘Rapid reaction is crucial. The quicker you manage to identify and debunk a disinformation attempt, the less time it has time to spread, the fewer people it reaches, the less successful it is. Killing the disinformation before it has time to spread is clearly one of the most successful strategies for preventing its damaging effects.’

Countering disinformation was not enough, Portman contended. Europe needs to improve its own ability to explain what it is doing and why. It also needs to work with international donors and others to support quality, independent journalism across the European neighbourhood. Many agreed.

‘There is a lot of erosion of truth in the media and it is hard to take any legal measures against the perpetrators because journalistic interpretations cannot be penalised due to the press freedom principle,’ posted [Mikaela d’Angelo](#), Programme Manager at Friends of Europe. ‘A possible solution is to ensure more funding to the free and high-quality media who, up until now, have stood up in the face of fake news challenges.’

[Lorenzo Nannetti](#), Senior Researcher at Italian Atlantic Committee - Atlantic Treaty Association and Senior Analyst at Il Caffè Geopolitico, warned that Russian propaganda was effective because it targeted the people, while European stratcom was more focused on elites. He suggested messages that show people what they gain from unity and risk losing with division.

‘If fear is a weapon that potential aggressors use in hybrid warfare to shift public opinion, then it’s because people don’t fear the opposite as well. Explaining what’s at stake ... is vital to understand the oft-ignored dangers of lack of unity.’

## 9 GREATER ENGAGEMENT OF REGIONAL POWERS TO DE-ESCALATE NUCLEAR TENSIONS

The rapid development of North Korea's ballistic missile and nuclear weapons programmes have shaken the global nuclear order. Despite sanctions and warnings, the rest of the world has been powerless to hamper Pyongyang's progress.

This year, the crisis has become acute as North Korean leader Kim Jong-un and U.S. President Donald Trump exchanged threats and insults, but the Pyongyang regime continues with an ever-more provocative series of tests.

Faced with the dangers of nuclear brinkmanship between the United States and North Korea, the Europe needs to get involved. 'The EU cannot be an outsider as to the current strategic crises in Asia. Its interests are directly at stake, at strategic, political and economic levels,' said the Paris-based [La Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique \(FRS\)](#).

The EU should promote a greater role for regional players to de-escalate tensions, working with China, Japan, South Korea and other Asia-Pacific players to find a solution that pulls the region back from the brink of conflict. China's role is crucial, but [Camille Grand](#), Assistant Secretary General for Defence Investment at NATO, cautioned that Beijing had no silver bullet for resolving the crisis.

'Beijing's priority is the stability of the peninsula and to avoid a collapse of the regime,' he said. 'These objectives tend to gain priority over non-proliferation. In a nutshell, they certainly have more leverage than they say, but probably less than we think.'



“A first step to resolve the crisis requires all parties to accept each other’s national security needs, as well as domestic considerations and constraints”

Lassina Zerbo,  
Executive Secretary of the  
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban  
Treaty Organisation (CTBTO)

[David A. Andelman](#), Editor Emeritus at the World Policy Journal and Columnist at CNN Opinion, said the North Korea crisis had called into question the old certainties of nuclear diplomacy, making it crucial for regional powers to play a role.

‘The concept of Mutually Assured Destruction to maintain stability in the nuclear age ... only works if both parties to this doctrine are reasonably sane. When both parties are clinically deranged, all bets are off. That’s where we find ourselves—in completely uncharted waters—when it comes to the standoff between, not North Korea and the United States, but Kim Jong-un and Donald J. Trump,’ Andelman posted. ‘The only possible hope is the sanity and stability of national leaders with even more at stake—the direct neighbours of North Korea—Japan, South Korea and of course China.’

While the EU would not be neutral over North Korea’s nuclear program it could play a role in establishing a new format for talks to defuse the crisis, argued the FRS’ [Benjamin Hautecouverture](#). ‘The missing table issue for the nuclear crisis in the Korean peninsula has become critical indeed. Since the Six Party talks collapsed nearly 10 years ago, a new format must be found,’ he said. ‘I would disagree with the idea that the EU could be a neutral actor in that crisis. The EU should not become an honest broker. It could usefully be involved as a real strategic player in order to constrain the DPRK (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea) effectively.’

Several participants lamented the lack of leadership in resolving the dispute. ‘What we need is leadership that can somehow engage all parties. The specific format doesn’t matter - what is imperative at this time of heightened tension is to find a way to diffuse the current situation. Any dialogue starts with mutual





respect,' said [Lassina Zerbo](#), Executive Secretary of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organisation (CTBTO).

He said the current tensions over the North Korea's activities showed the risk nuclear weapons pose to the whole world. Zerbo was one of many who said both sides needed to show mutual understanding of the others' position. 'I believe a first step to resolve the crisis requires all parties to accept each other's national security needs, as well as domestic considerations and constraints,' he said.



That idea was taken up by a number of contributors who said North Korea needed to be shown some respect.

‘Rational arguments such as that North Korea has been developing its nuclear programme for decades because it is concerned about its security ... as well as the concern that the U.S. could possibly try to change the regime in Pyongyang, are widely missing from the public debate and should be seriously addressed,’ said [Maya Janik](#), Research Assistant at the DOC Research Institute in Berlin.

[Ton Welter](#), Executive Director and CEO at the Coalition for Defence (CFD) in the Netherlands, also suggested some understanding for Kim Jong-un could calm tensions, even if the world has to come to terms with having a nuclear North Korea.

‘By accepting North Korea as a nuclear power, Kim Jong-un finally gets his recognition,’ Welter posted. ‘Having fulfilled his dream to be treated as a grown-up and serious leader with nuclear weapons, he has no incentive any more to blackmail or threaten with his nukes.’

Beyond Korea, Europe also needs to consider nuclear questions closer to home with new concerns over the Iran deal and Russia’s return to nuclear sabre-rattling.

# 10 CREATE AN ALL-INCLUSIVE APPROACH TO DEVELOPMENT, DEFENCE AND SECURITY ISSUES

President Trump's portrayal of European allies as freeloaders in NATO, refusing to pull their weight in defence spending – coupled with his threat to make American protection conditional on cranked up military budgets - has brought a new focus of tension within the Western Alliance.

While all allies have agreed to “move towards” NATO's target of spending at least 2% of GDP on defence, most still lag way behind. Germany for example – a focus of Trump's ire – spends 1.2% on defence and although Berlin has joined other European capitals in increasing its military budget in response to heightened




international tensions, the public opposes Trump's call for a rush to rearmament. Instead German politicians point out that modern security is about more than just military hardware.

'Germany has always made clear that diplomacy and development aid have to be deployed in addition to defence expenditures,' Chancellor Angela Merkel said in May. 'Germany stands by what we call our comprehensive approach, which is not confined to military deployments.' For many of her compatriots, Germany's spending of 0.5% of GDP on development – compared to just 0.17% in the United States – also makes a major contribution to security.

Participants in Debating Security Plus asked whether it is time to take a holistic approach to security budgets, balancing defence spending with preventative diplomacy and development – areas where some countries are making cutbacks as they seek to find more money for the military.

'We must not forget the importance of diplomacy,' said Dutch Foreign Minister [Bert Koenders](#). 'The trend toward cutbacks in embassies, ambassadors and other diplomats, that trend is not good, because when it comes to preventing conflicts rather than fighting them, there are things that diplomats and development workers are good at, they can detect signs of conflict at an early stage, early warning.'

Participants stressed the need to break stove-piped thinking and ensure that defence, foreign, interior and development ministers work more closely together to be able to respond to the diverse nature of today's security threats, where the division between external and internal dangers has been blurred by the changes in international terrorism, hybrid warfare and trans-border crime.



"I think that defence spending and humanitarian spending should not be linked, nor be part of the same umbrella"

Samantha Nutt,  
 Founder and President of War  
 Child Canada and War Child USA



Development is key for security by dealing with the causes of conflict and instability before they spin out of control. 'There is no doubt: security and development are inextricably linked. There can be no sustainable development without peace and security, while development and poverty eradication are crucial to a viable peace,' wrote the [Centre for Democracy and Development \(CDD\)](#), a Nigerian think tank. 'Security is an important priority for European citizens and will continue to climb higher up the agenda as the world becomes even more volatile, unpredictable and inter-connected. Europe, with its still-large development budget, is well-placed to combine hard and soft power to tackle an array of new and old challenges.'

The CDD underscored the need to commit to implementing the UN Sustainable Development Goals and warned against backsliding on aid spending commitments.

Given the inextricable link between security and development, some have suggested a combined budget that brings in various security strands, from military spending to homeland security and development.

'Many European countries are now pivoting in their defence spending. Due to geopolitical changes, they now try to spend more on their defence. Other ideas have emerged on making a single security budget, including spending on development into the defence spending budget, because in the long run it helps to better maintain security and stability,' posted [Antonia Erlandsson](#), Programme Assistant for Peace, Security and Defence at Friends of Europe.

MEP [Elmar Brok](#) said that was an idea to consider, along with more common security spending at a European level. 'The single security budget is generally a good idea and we have already started to put money into research for the next budget, but we need now also a defence fund for research, development and procurement,' he said.

However, others expressed caution about making too close a link between defence and development.

'I think that defence spending and humanitarian spending should not be linked, nor be part of the same umbrella,' argued [Samantha Nutt](#), Founder and President of War Child Canada and War Child USA. 'Neutrality is one of the core principles of the humanitarian movement and at the heart of NGO legitimacy and security throughout the world. The more those two goals - security and humanitarian agendas - become linked, the more that aid in itself is seen as political and therefore contentious (restricting access to the most vulnerable groups, as we saw in Syria). I am in favour of delinking the military/defence from all humanitarian aid activities.'

The all-inclusive approach also means pushing for greater diversity in security, including mainstreaming gender issues and recognising the positive role of women in peacekeeping and conflict management, counter radicalisation, mediation and development.

# OVERARCHING THEMES



Running through this fifth edition of Debating Security Plus was a call for policymakers to think beyond their field of specialisation, recognise the interrelated nature of many of the challenges facing our societies and come up with holistic approaches to resolving them. These overarching themes are explained in more depth in this chapter.

# NETWORK OF DANGER

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We live in an interconnected world, where so many of today's pressing security challenges are linked: climate change sparks regional conflict and mass migration; North Korea is widely believed to use smuggling and criminal networks to raise funds for its missile and nuclear programmes; hybrid warriors exploit divisions in Western democracies exacerbated by concerns over migration and terrorism; hostile governments and terrorists move fast to embrace the latest technological advances.

The need for security planners to recognise and respond to the interconnectivity among foreign, homeland security, environmental, defence and economic challenges was a major theme running through the debate.

'When it comes to interconnectedness, it seems that this is a process that would require the military, intelligence agencies and law enforcement, to cooperate and develop a trust-based rapport with businesses, news media, and civil society,' wrote [Virpratap Vikram Singh](#), Manager - Content, Digital and Interactive Media at Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations. 'The world has become increasingly polarised, facilitated largely due to the freedom of the internet and the advent of social media.'

Throughout the debate, participants provided examples of the global network of threats.

'Quite often proceeds from criminal activities are used by terrorists to advance their cause. Terrorists sometimes engage in criminal activities, such as kidnapping for ransom to fund their activities. Drug traffickers may





be paying terrorists for safe passage. Oil smuggling and cultural property trafficking have been identified as sources of terrorist funds,' said [Dolgor Solongo](#), of the UN Office for Drugs and Crime. 'Terrorists often use criminal groups to procure arms and weapons. The complexity and a variety of such links call for complex responses from the international community.'

[Kunio Mikuriya](#), Secretary General at the World Customs Organisation (WCO), highlighted the links between smuggling and terrorist-fund raising. 'We can act on the borders of the territories that fall into the hands of terrorist groups. We cannot prevent them from seizing assets. However, we can halt the cross-border circulation of these commodities,' he said. 'The WCO developed the Security Programme that works specifically to reinforce the role of Customs in the security domain, which includes fighting against terrorist financing, independently of the sources of this funding.'



“Terrorists often use criminal groups to procure arms and weapons. The complexity and a variety of such links call for complex responses from the international community”

Dolgor Solongo,  
Officer in Charge for Terrorism  
Prevention at the UN Office  
for Drugs and Crime

The way destabilised states can become hubs for criminal enterprise, unregulated migratory flows and terrorist activity was another recurrent theme.

‘The Horn of Africa has been an easy playground for players outside the region and outside Africa to become involved in. The mix of poor governance, mutual destabilisation and external intervention are the combustible ingredients of a region always hovering on the edges of insecurity,’ said [Maria-Cristina Stepanescu](#), Head of Mission of the European Union Mission EUCAP Somalia. ‘We cannot overlook the security perspective – a subject which, because of state collapse and the challenges of rebuilding the institutions and infrastructure of the state, includes the pressing issues of piracy, illegal fishing, and trafficking (of goods – such as weapons, narcotics, and human beings).’

Across the Middle East too, regional conflicts are increasing dangers way beyond their borders. ‘The more active participation of regional forces in Syria, Iraq, Libya, Yemen and perhaps in some other countries could strengthen the trend to asymmetric warfare in the future,’ warned the [Argentine Council for International Relations](#).

Libya is another example of the interconnectivity of risk. Instability there has allowed Daesh militants to gain a foothold, expanded the country’s role as gateway for illegal migration and has recently opened up Russian efforts to establish an influence, maybe even a military base, on Europe’s southern flank. The failure of Western powers to follow up after the military action that helped oust Muammar Gaddafi in 2011 left a power vacuum and shattered economy which fuels frustration among a population where 65% is under 34. [Mary Fitzgerald](#), Libya Analyst, Researcher and European Young Leader, quoted a recent tweet from Libyan photographer Nadar Elgadi: “No jobs, no education = no sustainable peace”.

‘In Libya, there are many young people who took part in the 2011 uprising only to have their hopes and expectations dashed,’ Fitzgerald wrote. ‘Some cling to militia life but others are engaged in new thinking about how to turn their country around. This includes encouraging entrepreneurship in a bid to diversify Libya’s oil-dependent economy. How can such Libyans be empowered further in order to have a lasting impact?’

Governments were urged to focus on growing economies for sustainable development through investments in youthful populations in places where they are vulnerable to criminal/terrorist activities due to lack of opportunities. Cross-border trade was promoted as central to managing the interconnectedness of security and development.

[Paul Carroll](#), Senior Advisor at N Square: The Crossroads for Nuclear Security Innovation, promoted technology based transparency as a way of monitoring and controlling illicit activity by governments or other groups.

‘What I am talking about is a quantum leap beyond news reports or intelligence agencies “knowing more”. I am talking about what some call “radical transparency” where the technology will exist so that no one can be anonymous or hidden on the planet,’ Carroll posted. ‘It means the prospect that no state or non-state actor can move materials, build nuclear infrastructure, communicate about plans or activities, or conduct tests, etc. without being detected, and detected by essentially everyone. It means early and complete warning thus giving far more time to respond.’

Dangerous non-state actors could also be targeted through their illicit funding sources, said [Solene Jomier](#), Director of Security and Defence at Young Professionals in Foreign Policy (YFPF). ‘When we talk about non-state actors, we examine groups that have grown their power

“Let's not confuse security and migration. Too often, I hear people talking about migration as an issue which is creating security problems and terrorism. This is not true”

[Stefano Manservigi](#),  
European Commission Director  
General for International  
Cooperation and Development  
(DEVCO)

using coercive force (mostly via armaments), illicit trade (drugs most of the time) and/or corruption (money). By addressing those three core issues, we could, from my perspective, already weaken many groups,' she wrote. 'This implies more work on anti-corruption, arms bans (including small arms) and embargos, and new drug policies.'

Although the interconnections between security challenges were highlighted, contributors also stressed the need to avoid facile, erroneous amalgams between migration and security threats.

'Let's not confuse security and migration. Too often, I hear people talking about migration as an issue which is creating security problems and terrorism. This is not true,' insisted [Stefano Manservigi](#), European Commission Director General for International Cooperation and Development (DEVCO).

[Francesco Marone](#), of the Italian Institute for International Political Studies – ISPI, agreed. 'Terrorism and mass migration are two distinct and very different challenges that Europe faces,' he said. 'In our work, we have found little evidence of a direct link between these two phenomena.'



# UNITY MAKES STRENGTH

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Faced with such a multitude of challenges, democracies must be united among themselves and within themselves. There is clearly a need for greater cooperation, even among close allies in areas such as intelligence sharing, coordination in defence procurement, building defences against terrorism, cyber and other hybrid threats.

‘Capacity building in the fight against terrorism, on cyber defence are also very important elements of the efforts that the European Union is pursuing, and it is pursuing this in cooperation with international partners: that includes the United Nations, it includes NATO, the African Union, the OSCE and other partners, also individual partners amongst whom we can include the United States,’ said [Pedro Serrano](#), Deputy Secretary General for Common Security and Defence Policy and Crisis Response at the European External Action Service (EEAS).

After Brexit, the rise of populist leaders, and deep divisions among European Union nations over the economic and migration crises, participants said a new sense of unity is needed, and some were hopeful that it has been emerging in recent months.

‘The EU has so much more leverage when it shows a unified stance,’ wrote [Marcin Bużański](#), Director of The Peace and Stabilisation Programme at the Casimir Pulaski Foundation, a Warsaw-based think tank. ‘There is a feeling of the EU catching a new breath, with Macron’s election, the dust of Brexit settling and Merkel re-elected – the EU has a window of opportunity to align the interests of member states better, and be stronger to respond to challenges facing it.’



Within governments and international organisations, silo busting is essential to promote cooperation among ministries, institutions and command structures. [Nicolas Reynolds](#) CTO at Civocracy, said Western powers need to be more linked up than the bad guys. ‘As the problem takes a more global turn, our response needs to shift accordingly. In other words: we need to be less siloed than they are,’ he said.

Governments should look to the private sector to see how it could be done. ‘There is a lot to learn on this topic from the business world,’ Reynolds said. ‘Definition of common goals, coordinated planning and frequent communication between actors to have a unified response.’

Several participants said that governments also had to look beyond internal cooperation, to collaborate more closely with the private sector and civil society to build unity and resilience.

“The EU has so much more leverage when it shows a unified stance”

Marcin Bużański,  
Director of The Peace and  
Stabilisation Programme at the  
Casimir Pulaski Foundation

“We have to work together with civil society and partners in order to identify the appropriate balanced solution. In our experience, “development is for the long term” and “security is for the short term” is not affordable anymore,” said [Stefano Manservigi](#), the European Commission Director General for International Cooperation and Development.

Western powers need to build up their partnerships with friendly nations and organisations around the world to promote democratic values and boost international stability.

‘The EU ... supports Africans in their search for solutions to African problems,’ said Manservigi. ‘The EU never substitutes itself for countries and communities in mitigating conflict. In this search, very often, we are supporting civil-society organisations, local communities.’

Greater efforts are needed to resist attempts to exploit divisions among allies and within our societies whether by terrorist groups or states promoting fake news and other hybrid warfare tactics. An essential element of maintaining societal cohesion is respect for the men and women serving in our armed forces, said [EUROMIL](#), the European Organisation of Military Associations.

‘Governments and societies owe a duty of care towards their military personnel,’ it posted. ‘Soldiers are called upon to make sacrifices, risking their health and life in the service of their nation and the international community. Servicemen and -women deserve in return fair treatment, respect and being valued as fellow citizens. The fact that some men and women have chosen to serve their country by wearing a uniform does not negate their fundamental rights.’



Education, information and inclusion should all be promoted in defence of democratic societies. [Robert M. Lee](#), Founder and CEO at Dragos, Inc., said international cooperation in the fight against cyber threats, and a closer understanding of the roles of government, business and civil society are paying dividends.

‘Smart application of security and changing the security culture, while benefiting from the native resilience of our infrastructure, puts us in a place where we can succeed. There is optimism that should exist here,’ Lee posted. ‘Our threats are getting more bold. International cooperation in response to those threats, especially at the political level and setting international norms and messaging, is appropriate. Governments tend not to own the infrastructure nor do they “protect” it, but through our collective efforts the community, including the government, can encourage and promote better activities.’

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# GENDER DRIVES SECURITY

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Throughout Debating Security Plus, examples emerged of the vital role women play in security, from rebuilding shattered post-conflict societies, to confronting radicalisation in local communities and increasingly as planners and frontline fighters in the world's military forces. The need to recognise and expand female involvement was a recurrent theme.

[Rosa Balfour](#), Senior Fellow at Women in International Security (WIIS) in Brussels, said the time was ripe for a feminist foreign policy. 'For too long, we have not been explicit enough about gender issues and feminism. I think the time has come to "come out" and state that it's OK to be a feminist and to push for a feminist foreign policy,' she said. 'Women's rights are under attack even in places where women have advanced. There is a need to end complacency about gender and mobilise.'

The importance of women in United Nations operations was highlighted by Netherlands Foreign Minister [Bert Koenders](#). 'A better gender balance can, among other things, improve the contacts between the UN mission and the local population,' he said. [Nina Suomalainen](#), Head of the OSCE Mission to Skopje, stressed women's key mediation role: 'Mediation capacities of organisations and local communities should be supported, including very importantly the role of women as mediators.'

The call for a feminist foreign policy was backed by [Pauline Massart](#), Head of Media and Communication at the European Defence Agency. 'We're seeing lots of firsts in terms of women in the military: the U.S. Marines have just promoted their first female officer, the UK armed

“The time has come to “come out” and state that it's OK to be a feminist and to push for a feminist foreign policy”

Rosa Balfour,  
Senior Fellow for the Europe  
Programme at the German  
Marshall Fund of the United States

forces have lifted all restrictions on women serving in any combat or other position, and more and more countries are welcoming women into frontline combat positions,’ Massart wrote. ‘These women are the ones implementing their countries’ foreign policy, so surely the latter should reflect their involvement.’

In Libya, women entrepreneurs are at the forefront of efforts to rebuild the economy. ‘One interesting by-product of Libya’s economic crisis since 2014 is that women, whose households are under much budgetary pressure due to the crisis, have started their own businesses from home. Local networks and organisations have sprung up as a result, to encourage women’s entrepreneurship and engage in lessons sharing,’ explained Libya Analyst and European Young Leader (EYL40) [Mary Fitzgerald](#). ‘Women whose catering businesses have expanded across several cities and towns have become role-models. The growth of women’s entrepreneurship in Libya is worth watching and encouraging.’

The key role women play in countering radicalisation was raised by several speakers, but MEP [Beatriz Becerra Basterrechea](#), also recalled how jihadi terrorist groups have been successful in attracting female recruits even though “women can only expect slavery and exploitation from the terrorists”. She said counter-radicalisation efforts should pay particular attention to preventing women being drawn into the terrorist net, notably through online recruiting.

‘In the caliphate Daesh is trying to build, women are the centrepiece and it’s necessary to attract them. Women are often a moral and ideological reference for their children and the future men of their society,’ Becerra Basterrechea said. ‘In many cases, they participate in the process of indoctrination without being easily detected. However, there is a growing involvement of women in roles very different from the submissive woman, especially in recruitment and direct action. This is because they do so inside the family and communal networks which are difficult to detect.’

At a time when populist politicians rail against changes in society and hark back to mythical golden ages, [Peggy Hicks](#), of the UN Human Rights Office, said women should remember how much their lives have changed for the better.

‘With regard to changes in culture or “undermining identity”, we need to look more carefully at what are the sharp edges in that discussion. Those of my generation have seen so many changes in our lifetimes, that it is natural to harken back to a different time,’ Hicks wrote. ‘Those rosy-coloured rear-view mirrors have to be challenged a bit, a point that rings very true to me as a woman who has seen our societies’ approaches to women’s roles change significantly in my lifetime. Our identities have, and continue to, evolve. The challenge is managing that change in a way that is respectful and honours our traditions and cultures.’



# PREVENTION IS BETTER THAN CURE

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In his first formal briefing to the Security Council, UN Secretary General António Guterres was clear. ‘Prevention is not merely a priority, but the priority,’ he said in January. ‘If we live up to our responsibilities, we will save lives, reduce suffering and give hope to millions.’

Too often, he said, governments and international institutions pay a heavy price responding to crises because insufficient attention is paid to early reaction that could snuff out trouble before it’s too late.

The call for a greater focus on prevention was a major refrain cutting across the debates over the three days of Debating Security Plus.

‘We need to shift from response to prevention. All member states have a role to play,’ stated [Sigrid Kaag](#), the UN Special Coordinator for Lebanon. ‘Conflict prevention is not just about peace and security but also related to issues of good governance, human rights, inclusive development and social cohesion. All forms of violence need to be addressed, including gender-based violence. Addressing inequalities, strengthened institutions and ensuring that development strategies are risk-informed are central to preventing the unravelling of a social fabric.’

While situations differ, Kaag said, there are commonalities in effective prevention by building alliances with governments, civil society, the private sector and regional and international partners. ‘Above all, it is always about people,’ she concluded.



Several debaters recalled how small-scale, local and regional tensions can rapidly develop into international conflicts if left to fester. The need for greater foresight and prevention efforts will grow as climate change increases the risk of confrontation over land and resources.

‘It is key to identify factors of fragility and vulnerability much ahead of the beginning of crises - sound analysis and prevention, which we help with, to design appropriate responses. This is at the very core of our resilience strategy and within this of the strict relations between humanitarian and development,’ said [Stefano Manservigi](#), the European Commission’s Director General for International Cooperation and Development.

“Prevention is better, cheaper and ultimately more efficient than trying to solve a situation already out of hand, for that we need diplomacy,” added Dutch Foreign Minister [Bert Koenders](#).

“We need to shift from response to prevention. All member states have a role to play”

Sigrid Kaag  
UN Special Coordinator  
for Lebanon

Yet, governments are cutting funding for development and diplomacy in favour of boosting defence budgets. President Trump has proposed cuts of around 30% to the State Department and Agency for International Development, to fund a hike in military spending. That runs against the words of his Defence Secretary James Mattis, who in 2013 warned: “If you don’t fund the State Department fully, then I need to buy more ammunition.”

Debate participants pointed to specific cases where failure to intervene early has led to a heavy cost in terms of lives, destruction and a weakening of international security.

‘More than ever, there is a need for European leadership to address the root causes of the developing terrorist threat posed by ISIS and the continuing refugee crisis,’ wrote the advisory group [Independent Diplomat](#). ‘Six years on from the Syria crisis, has the EU yet to define its role in the ongoing international efforts to address the war in Syria? The evidence points out that the EU is far from a consensus position on Syria. But if ‘do nothing’ is not an option, then what is the way forward?’

[Jorge Amézquita](#), of COMEXI, the Mexican Council on Foreign Relations, pointed to how prevention policies should be applied to tackle the drug gangs of Latin America. ‘The starting point of the overall countering strategy should be to attack the supply of young people recruited into drug cartels. By implementing communication campaigns against it and reforming the public-school system to include a higher quality education mandatory for all students, the appeal of the narco life and success can be curbed,’ he wrote. ‘This, coupled with an employment initiative, would strengthen the economy. Providing tax incentives for small business and foreign direct investment would encourage employment.’



# MODERATORS' CONCLUSIONS



Senior experts from leading think tanks around the world, who moderated the 6 principal themes, have provided their contribution. This section presents their evaluation of the discussions.

## THEME 1

# COUNTERING RADICALISATION AND GLOBAL TERRORISM

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Moderated by **Sara Zeiger**, Senior Research Analyst and **Talal Faris**, Senior Program Associate

at **Hedayah**

One key theme that emerged during Debating Security Plus was the importance of educating families of at-risk teenagers to help them spot the early signs of radicalisation, and of supporting the parents and siblings of those that have become radicalised.

Prevention and counter-radicalisation should involve a wide range of players, including young people; educational, social, cultural and religious institutions; civil-society groups and non-governmental organisations working within local communities. Together, they can forge an all-inclusive approach that builds credible social resilience. Medical, psychological and social sectors should also be more actively involved in prevention efforts.

Extremists seek to provide identity, purpose and a sense of belonging. Therefore, Prevention and Countering of Violent Extremism (P-CVE) projects should prioritise alternatives around these key factors by offering innovative options for youth development.

Governments should better understand the drivers of radicalisation that ultimately lead to violent extremism and develop national strategies based on an evidence-based approach to the existing push and pull factors. There was a debate over which was the leading impulse: “the radicalisation of Islam” or “the Islamisation of radicalism”. Countries have a duty to find a balance between freedom of expression and hate speech. The relationship between religious based violent extremism and politically based violent extremism is a relevant one in the European context, with one phenomenon strengthening the other.

There is a need to better coordinate cooperation between agencies working to counter violent extremism at an international and local level. The establishment of a “European Intelligence Agency” was discussed to allow for the sharing of information.

Bottom-up responses should also be deployed in post-conflict or terror-affected zones, engaging with pre-existing communities and those returning from displacement. When it comes to reintegration efforts, it is crucial to work with communities to show that social reintegration complements rule-of-law measures as a last phase, after proper “categorisation and risk assessment”.

Among the chief recommendation ideas to emerge: young people should be empowered to lead the way in the fight against radicalisation online and offline; there is a need to more actively include medical, psychological and social practices within prevention efforts; family members might be able to identify early signs of radicalisation and constructively intervene, if properly trained; the international community should develop a comprehensive response on rehabilitation and reintegration of former radicals, including children exposed to radicalisation.

## THEME 2

# FROM HYBRID TO ASYMMETRIC WARFARE

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Moderated by **Sameer Patil**,  
Director for the Centre for  
International Security

at **Gateway House: Indian  
Council on Global Relations**

Since Russia's 2014 actions in Crimea, the term "hybrid warfare" has become a new buzzword in security discussions. Hybrid warfare can essentially be defined as representing amplified use of irregular, non-conventional and subversive elements. Key features include deploying non-state actors as proxies, economic coercion, cyber operations, aggressive use of information tactics, disruptive technologies, and denial of attribution. Many of these elements are not new. They have been used in conflicts in Vietnam, Chechnya, Afghanistan, Iraq, Kashmir, Lebanon and elsewhere.

Discussions in Debating Security Plus focused on how nations are using elements of hybrid warfare to create grey zones in conflicts and blurring distinctions between war and peace. The debate was understandably Euro-centric, with a focus on Russia. Some argued the term "hybrid warfare" has been applied too broadly, confusing the issue, but even as discussants grappled with the concept, others focused on how to respond to and deter the hybrid threat. In this, three broad themes emerged.

The first concerned Russia's hybrid warfare against the West. Some participants argued that the threat worked on the assumption that Western nations can be divided in times of need because some will refuse to react to certain types of aggression.

The inability of the Western allies to construct and deliver a coherent response against Russia only exacerbated the threat. Unity among Western allies is therefore key to foiling hybrid war designs.

An important tool to deter the hybrid threat lies within existing international norms. Peter Singer from New America Foundation argued that many actions considered to be part of hybrid warfare violate international regulations and should be called out as such. That could deter states from engaging in such tactics. The ability to pin attribution for hybrid attacks on states could also play an important deterrent role.

A second set of discussions focused on resilience to hybrid threats. The focus was on how the EU and NATO can build institutional and community resilience to drain support that hostile state actors hope to exploit for their hybrid tactics. The critical factor in this resilience is the ability to endure sustained disinformation campaigns.

Cyber operations constitute an important hybrid warfare element. Estonian Foreign Minister Sven Mikser highlighted the importance of keeping high legal and technical security standards to raise the costs and time needed in attacks.

Among the ideas that emerged: unity between Western allies is of the utmost importance for deterrence against hybrid warfare; clear identification of non-state actors acting as proxies for states will help define rules of engagement for hybrid warfare; efforts should be made for capacity building and developing forensic capabilities; resilience should be built to counter disinformation campaigns.

## THEME 3

# NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AND OTHER NUCLEAR THREATS

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Moderated by **Benjamin Hautecouverture**,  
Head of Research

at the **Fondation pour la  
Recherche Stratégique**

The rapid progress of North Korea's ballistic missile and nuclear programmes has opened a breach in the nuclear order worldwide. Despite sanctions imposed against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) since 2006, the international community has not been able to halt the regime's programmes and the crisis has become one of the world's most pressing and most complex.

It affects the regional security of North East Asia, involving three nuclear armed powers. It is a cause for concern for the European Union, threatening political, strategic and economic interests.

Our discussions looked at crisis avoidance scenarios; the effectiveness of sanctions; the role of China; U.S. strategic interests in the Asia-Pacific region; a new role for the EU; offensive and defensive strategic systems; strategic stability in the region; the authority of the nuclear non-proliferation norm; and the credibility of extended U.S. deterrence.

The Nuclear Ban Treaty adopted last summer at the General Assembly of the United Nations was opened to signature in October. The initiative is supported by many western NGOs, but more than 70 countries have not adopted it, including all recognized nuclear weapon states, plus India, Pakistan, Israel and those countries benefiting from extended deterrence.

It appears not to be an answer to the proliferation of nuclear weapons in Asia.

Are we facing a double reality here? On the one hand, wishful thinking by some states in New York managed to pass a ban on the most strategic weapons ever seen; on the other, there are large parts of the world where nuclear weapons are perceived as instruments of security, deterrence, non-proliferation, or even instruments of aggression. Many asked how this treaty can be useful in our world of strategic realities.

Another question that came out in the debate is whether Europe is witnessing a re-nuclearisation of security policies. What can be done to reset the political dialogue and confidence-building measures between the main stakeholders on the continent? How can EU countries be part of a strategic dialogue between the U.S. and Russia?

Among the recommendations that emerged: the EU cannot be an outsider in the current strategic crisis in Asia, because its interests are directly at stake; the nuclear disarmament debate within multilateral fora in New York and Geneva should not be decoupled from strategic realities; and security architecture in Europe needs to be revived, including renewed dialogue with Russia.

## THEME 4

# CYBER DEFENCE AND DETERRENCE

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Moderated by **Philip Reitingner**,  
President and CEO

at the **Global Cyber Alliance**

Threats in cyberspace are not just a technical problem. Although many of the solutions are technical, the human factor cannot be dismissed.

Human skills are crucial in areas such as policy-making, interaction with systems, drawing up budgets and user behaviour. With that in mind, government officials, business leaders and the general public must become more cyber savvy, to better understand security roles and responsibilities.

We cannot think of cyberspace as a separate world. Just as we have advanced awareness on issues like healthy eating, hygiene or safe driving, we need a cultural shift in awareness of cybersecurity. We must develop shared values for the real and virtual worlds.

Cyber professionals with the right technical skills are in high demand, but there is more to cybersecurity than having the right technical background. Well-rounded cybersecurity workforces need policy experts, lawyers, law enforcement, military specialists, communicators, managers, software developers and more.

We need to develop a culture of security that includes general awareness programmes to cultivate good behaviour, skills and knowledge.

Cybersecurity should be an integrated part of school computer teaching programmes. Education programmes should be built to encourage young people to seek cybersecurity careers. They could include apprenticeships and internships offering real-world experience.



Cybersecurity should be integrated into teaching at the university level and during in-work learning. Professional pipelines should be set up to allow the private and public sectors to share experience and build cooperation.

The vast majority of the cyber infrastructure is owned and operated by the private sector. Internet service providers and other communication companies have tremendous intelligence that can give them a greater awareness of the threat landscape than government agencies. Cooperation between the private sector and government is, therefore, vital for action against cyber threats.

Public-private partnerships and inter-government partnerships should be strengthened and nurtured to improve information sharing. Targeted action to promote collaboration could include drawing up common definitions of cybersecurity terms universally understood across the public and private sectors.

Better international cooperation at government level is critical. International cyber rules should establish norms on what constitutes an attack. Supranational regulation could set standards on transparency and accountability, including rules for prosecuting offences, and legal responses. This would enable security bodies and the industry to better prepare and coordinate defences.

NATO should establish a NATO Cyber Planning Group, modelled on its Nuclear Planning Group, to discuss and coordinate possible responses.

Privacy issues were raised by several participants who stressed the need for “privacy-by-design” mechanisms that remove the need for tradeoffs between security and privacy requirements.

## THEME 5

# REALIGNING SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT

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Moderated by **Philip Olayoku**,  
Research Consultant

at **Information Aid Network  
(IFAnet)**

The central focus of this theme was on preventative diplomacy as a strategic element in development. Discussions on this theme centred on the need to emphasize soft approaches to security challenges, especially through the application of preventative diplomacy that precludes the escalation of conflicts into crises.

Central to the adoption of preventative diplomacy is the need to redirect investments from warfare to development and the sustenance of human capital. The EU should focus on development that makes countries in the Global South less dependent on aid, by promoting sustainable self-reliant economies. It should also manage rivalries between its member states to allow for successful UN-mediated intervention in war-torn countries.

Diplomatic networks are important for conflict prevention by incorporating understanding of local contexts into conflict-management processes. Education, gender-mainstreaming, environmental conservation and information technology should also be prioritised as important elements of the global security apparatus.

Despite the intersection between security and development, it is important they are kept separate in budgeting and accountability, to prevent one overshadowing the other.

The second theme concerned domesticating development and border security. EU member states were urged to manage the refugee challenge through greater understanding of interconnections between foreign, security and economic policies.

Security and development need to be reconsidered as long-term goals toward ensuring sustainability. It is important to tackle root causes of refugee flows, including climate change impacts in countries of origin. Schengen border-control policies should be re-evaluated.

Promoting sustainable development by investment in young people would be a step in the right direction, reducing their exposure to criminal or terrorist activities.

Cross-border trade is central to security and development. Customs officers are major players in facilitating security at borders and regulating trade channels which drive growth. Coordinated humanitarian and community-based efforts would help build resilience in vulnerable communities. Military and security units could help redevelopment projects. Gender responsiveness should be incorporated to all interventions given the key role of women in peacebuilding and development.

Indeed, the need for greater diversity and inclusiveness formed our third theme, characterised by calls for a holistic approach to security and development.

There was specific focus on civil society and media as key players, for example in countering terrorist recruitment strategies. It is important to focus on developing human capital, with special attention on women and young people.

Gender responsiveness is particularly important in de-radicalisation strategies. A balance must be found between censoring extremist preaching and protecting freedom of worship.

Funds should be channelled directly to local entrepreneurial initiatives in developing nations, alongside increased support for infrastructure development and renewable energy.

Top recommendations included: more EU investment in soft approaches to conflict management through human-capital development; a bottom-up approach to human security and development by working with local actors and the private sector; the EU should embrace an all-inclusive approach to development and security recognising the key role of women.



## THEME 6

# CLIMATE CHANGE, CONFLICT AND MASS MIGRATION

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Military organisations around the globe have embraced the notion that climate change presents national security challenges. The United States, for example, directly addresses climate change in quadrennial defence reviews, and senior officers have stated that climate change is a significant national security threat.

Moderated by **Hal Bidlack**,  
Senior Fellow

at the **American Security Project  
(ASP)**

Participants in the online discussion were asked to consider three broad topics: the depth of connections between climate change and national security; likely impacts of climate change on military operations; and US leadership, or lack thereof, on climate change.

Several interesting thoughts were put forward.

The diverse nature of national security threats was highlighted by a discussion of food security. It was noted that most governments are slow to respond to threats to food supply, with only acute crises seeming to prompt the necessary action. Intervention prior to reaching crisis stage would be helpful, but is hard to achieve.

Leaders around the world were urged to pay more attention to non-state actors, and in particular private business concerns, for best practices and technologies that could be utilised on a larger scale.

There were comments on climate refugees and on the Arctic as a growing concern, as climate change opens sea passages and opportunities for natural-resource exploitation. The role of climate change as a threat multiplier for traditional national security concerns was also discussed.

The second part, focused on migration concerns and food security. This was of particular interest to European participants given the recent history of refugee flows. Much of the discussion in this area centred on video presentations by VIP contributors Vincent Cochetel and Monique Pariat, and addressed concerns about human trafficking and migration.

There was a general discussion on the impact of climate change on areas such as intense hurricane activity, rising sea levels and civil protection. All the contributors noted the breadth of the challenges that climate change creates. There was a consensus around the notion of thinking more strategically in terms of prevention rather than only response.

Among the recommendations that emerged from our debate: governments and NGOs should do more to address the migration side of climate change, including by identifying migrants who move due to environmental factors; nations, particularly in Europe, should institute robust migration policies and laws, and should not wait until crises erupt before tackling food security issues; EU member states should share best practice on climate change and development – particularly the experience of the Netherlands and Nordic nations – to focus more on prevention and preparation.

# RAPID FIRE CHAT SUMMARIES



Twelve live chats – 60 minute “break out” sessions – were hosted by partners from around the world. These in-depth discussions allowed participants to deep-dive into specific sub-topics, developing recommendations. The following summaries reflect their analysis of the discussions.

# THE FUTURE OF ASYMMETRIC WARFARE IN THE MIDDLE EAST

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Moderated by **General Julio Hang**  
at the **Consejo Argentino para  
las Relaciones Internacionales  
(CARI)**

The Middle East is a centre of long-term conflict. Despite efforts by the international community to reduce tensions, and counter the gains of terrorists and radical groups, war remains a possible outcome for the region's future.

This live chat aimed to address some fundamental questions over the impact of terror on conflict in the region; the possible use of weapons of mass destruction; the influence of asymmetric warfare; and the possible emergence of new violent anti-government factions in certain countries.

The discussion made specific reference to “asymmetric conflicts” involving local and terrorist groups instead of states. These groups have a significant influence at local and regional level, making situations harder to manage because states do not hold a monopoly on violence within their own boundaries.

Most Middle East wars are fought against a background of poor and corrupt governance combined with ethnic, sectarian and tribal cleavages which evolve in a wider context, characterised by economic, social, political and religious confrontations.

Two different scenarios were regarded as likely in the future of the region. On the one hand, we can expect increasing employment of conventional means, including



use of regular armies, air power and other government forces. On the other hand, the use of tactical terrorism may increase alongside the emergence of divided irregular factions, making the interests of the different sides difficult to identify.

Within this framework, it is difficult to think of a final and lasting solution. However, some measures can be implemented to reduce the consequences of war. One could be increasing the presence of local and international forces and the use of intelligence to identify dangers, anticipate attacks, respond fast and mitigate the consequences.

Professional armies should implement some of the tactics of asymmetric warfare, which have been developed in western countries. However, many claimed that these “western experiences” cannot be employed in the Middle East, where legal and political power may be lacking. Thus, local armies with a better knowledge of their environment, should develop their own strategies instead of trying to copy imported models.

Another possible measure could be the establishment of agreements between local troops and tribal forces to create operational units. This idea is an unconventional way to fight against the use of tactical terrorism, fostering the division of terrorist groups under the control of local and irregular warriors.

Finally, it should not be forgotten that long-term measures – such as anti-corruption policies and provision of public services - are fundamental to finding a permanent solution to conflict and restoring state legitimacy.

# EU RESPONSES TO CRISES IN ITS BROAD NEIGHBOURHOOD

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Moderated by **Marcin Buzanski**,  
Director Peace and Stabilisation  
Programme

at the **Casimir Pulaski  
Foundation**

Participants were asked whether the EU is currently capable of securing and stabilizing its neighbourhood and, if not, how it should adapt its policies to that end.

There was broad agreement that the EU response to challenges in the neighbourhood have been chequered at best. A new balance between short-term security goals and long-term stabilisation and development effects is urgently needed.

Contributors clearly showed that lowered prospects for membership; new challenges from Russia and others; ongoing conflicts and constantly erupting crises require bolder action.

Although the EU has the joint capacities to act, internal disagreements among member states are a big challenge. Participants agreed the EU has much more leverage when it shows a unified stance, yet that has been hard to achieve in key areas such as refugee policy or relations with Russia - despite the sustained common position on sanctions.

Russia's assertive policies and actions were identified as one of the main challenges causing disruption in the EU's broad neighbourhood. The refugee crises and political divisions in the EU play to Russia's benefit and Moscow continues to seek ways to fuel disputes. Following its intervention in Syria, Russia is gaining a foothold in Libya, which will give it more influence over migration routes.

Russia is also active in the Western Balkans and is actively engaged in cyber and information attacks. The EU has yet to come up with sufficiently strong responses.

Participants noted that the EU's most powerful foreign policy tool has been the accession and association processes, especially the prospect of EU membership. Yet, the EU is unlikely to accept any new members in the short- to mid-term future. Keeping the option of a "membership perspective" alive, can still be a stabilizing factor - even if there is no current political will for further enlargement.

Not surprisingly, the question of a comprehensive EU response to migration was raised. Participants denounced the current focus on short-term policies aimed at highly visible responses to illegal migration – including through partnerships with autocratic strongmen. Instead, greater efforts should be devoted to stabilising conflicts that are often the root cause of migratory pressures.

Participants raised concerns about a crisis of leadership within the EU, yet there was a feeling that Europe is catching a new breath, with President Macron's election, the dust of Brexit settling and Angela Merkel re-elected. The EU has a window of opportunity to better align the interests of its member states and to be stronger in responding to the challenges facing it.

Turning to country-specific challenges in the neighbourhood, participants pointed to the EU's inability agree effective policy-responses to crises in Ukraine and Libya. The EU was urged to keep Ukraine high on its agenda and avoid the country slipping into a long-term "frozen" conflict. Europe should maintain a long-term diplomatic and financial commitment to Libya. More efforts are also needed to engage with the Western Balkans.

# FRONTIERS OF EUROPEAN BORDER MANAGEMENT

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Moderated by **Niccolò Beduschi**,  
Researcher for the Europe  
Programme

at the **Centre for Geopolitics  
& Security in Realism Studies**

A year since the European Union launched the European Border and Coast Guard Agency, our discussion focused on the limits and possibilities of European border management.

The general consensus was that Europe is falling short of expectations, notably on irregular crossing and return operations.

The new agency can point to record-low numbers of irregular arrivals in the Eastern Mediterranean after the EU-Turkey agreement and along the Central Mediterranean route. However, many irregular immigrants are already inside or at the gates of Europe. Only 36% of irregular migrants undertook return operations. In 2016, 1 million third-country nationals were present in the EU, only half were ordered to leave the EU, of which, 226.000 were effectively returned.

The central question of the debate was whether more or less Europe would help resolve these issues. Although the new agency has improved on Frontex's track record, participants felt it was difficult to persuade EU member states and their citizens that a European effort was making an effective difference on the ground.

Most thought that management and systemic issues need to be resolved to ensure a genuine European dimension of border management. That will entail striking a difficult balance between security and human rights.

A number of radical ideas were put forward. One was the creation or expansion of centres to process asylum application in safe neighbouring countries, modelled on the EU-Turkey agreement. However, many participants identified difficulties in identifying such safe-partner nations in North Africa and in conducting proper oversight that would guarantee respect for fundamental rights.

Another bold idea raised in the forum was a call to regularize the influx of migrants. Undocumented entries, which represent a security challenge in Europe, would decline if alternative legal routes were set up. However, participants were divided between those who cautioned against massive inward population movements, and those who stressed the long-term economic and demographic benefits of migration.

Ultimately, the new European Border and Coast Guard Agency is plagued by the same divisions that emerged during the debate: tensions among member states, who are often perceived as being better able to defend the security of their citizens, and a European approach that can deliver on the promise of open internal borders and possibly ensure a fair burden sharing.

The external borders of the EU are a shared responsibility of both member states and the EU, but there is an opportunity for the Union to do more. Common return and asylum policies are examples of where the scope of European border management could be expanded.

# THE FUTURE OF EU DEFENCE

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Moderated by **Anne Bakker**,  
Research Fellow at the Security  
cluster of Clingendael Research

at the **Clingendael Institute**

European defence has gained momentum after a long period of stagnation. President Trump's comments on NATO, Brexit and a renewed Franco-German push for further integration have resulted in progress at an unprecedented pace. However, despite the wide range of initiatives currently on the table, many key issues must be addressed before a credible European defence can take shape.

This lively chat session saw the participation of analysts, scholars and policymakers from around the world to address various issues relating to European defence integration. Overall, participants suggested the outlook for further integration is positive, but they pointed to some major roadblocks that must be overcome before ambitions can be translated into reality. Many cautioned against setting unrealistic goals. Most shared the opinion that a common European army was unlikely, due to political sensitivities, and some warned that even raising that prospect can be harmful to the integration process.

Much debate focussed on the question of leadership. There was wide agreement that a Franco-German coalition was likely to pull things forward, especially after the encouraging recent speech by President Macron. However, the ongoing talks in Germany on the formation of a new government coalition raised doubts. There was speculation that the likely "Jamaica" coalition among the CDU/CSU, FDP and Greens could lead to resistance

to the interventionist approach suggested by Macron. The question of whether Germany should change its strategic culture and accept a greater leadership role in European defence was also raised.

Relations between the EU and NATO were discussed extensively, with the debate centred on ways to prevent competition and promote complementarity. Most agreed that the EU can put instruments on the table that NATO cannot, such as border management. Still, it faces enormous challenges providing security independent of U.S. assets.

Looking to the future, contributors welcomed PESCO (Permanent Structured Cooperation) and CARD (the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence) as promising initiatives for further EU integration. The European Defence Fund provides an opportunity to synchronize procurement and improve capabilities throughout Europe. The need for more cross-border intelligence-sharing was highlighted. These issues were linked to the question of finding the right narratives on European defence: joint procurement and improved intelligence-sharing are ways to explain the benefits of defence integration to the public.

Overall, the positive direction seems clear, but it remains to be seen how - and at what pace - we move ahead.

# ORGANISED CRIME: CHALLENGES FOR STATES' SECURITY

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Moderated by **Jorge Tello**,  
President and Director General of  
Madison Intelligence on behalf of  
COMEXI

at the **Consejo Mexicano  
(COMEXI)**

The level of organised-crime activity in certain regions of Mexico and other parts of Latin America has seen some communities normalise criminal practices, and led local populations to support illegal activities and protect criminals.

The negative consequences of this cut across national frontiers. The operations of criminal organisations have become a regional issue, in which arms, drugs, money, and the violence inherent in the trade, flow both ways across borders. The size and economic importance of the criminal activities, paired with widespread corruption and impunity, serve to worsen the problem.

In the debate, one of the most controversial topics was the possible legalisation of illicit drugs. Regardless of the different sides of the discussion, there was broad agreement that the response should be regional, addressing public health consequences and the homogenisation of capabilities. Solutions have to confront the reality of impunity, negligence and dysfunctional judicial systems, as well as the false notion that security, order and respect for human rights are incompatible.

There is no one-size-fits-all strategy. Plan Colombia has been taken as an example to replicate in Mexico, but progress in Colombia was achieved by pushing organised crime to other countries, including Mexico and parts of Central America. If copied, the result would be a similar displacement of the problem. That is why a regional strategy is needed.



Accountability is required on all sides: wealthier states where demand is concentrated and developing countries whose criminals have capitalised on this demand.

An efficient strategy should promote development opportunities to help populations who could be attracted by criminal activities. Inequality and the lack of opportunities in the legal job market represent the biggest risk for vulnerable communities. Latin America's failure to address inequality means violence is often perceived as a means of advancement and source of revenue, especially among low-income societies.

Short-sighted social programmes, tailored for political purposes, are inefficient and lack continuity. Longer-term social programmes and national strategies are needed, featuring effective evaluation mechanisms.

In conclusion, the solution to the violent crime crisis has to be holistic. To assure sustainable democratic solutions and avoid the temptation of autocratic behaviour, a responsible alignment of security strategies is needed, promoting closer and broader cooperation, respect for human rights, social consensus and political will.

More regional cooperation is required, overcoming the nationalist rhetoric and divisive policies that represent a step back from joint strategies could be effective against criminal organisations.

# THE ROLE OF NEW TECHNOLOGIES IN DEVELOPMENT AND GLOBAL SECURITY

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Moderated by **Nikita  
Konopaltsev**,  
Senior Researcher

at the **Dialogue of Civilisations  
Research Institute**

The discussion showed the importance of new technologies for peaceful and sustainable world development. Nevertheless, it is important to balance the risks and benefits of new technologies through real-world projects that help make societies more stable and secure.

One important challenge drew special attention - the power of today's giant technology and social-media companies and their ties to government. The implications of their influence raise questions of personal freedom and of both corporate and government accountability.

There is a dangerous line where the control of elective technologies risks creating a critical infrastructure for our personal lives.

Another point raised was the need to match rapid technological developments with well-designed and well-researched regulations that provide guidelines for individuals and institutions in the hyper-connected world. Solid foundations, open access to information and strong moral values are crucial to preserving identities during times of transformation.

New technologies are produced and presented for people's benefit, but it is the responsibility of people to take sound and considered actions in the evolving technical environment.

The discussion also argued that artificial intelligence, robotics and bio-technologies could provide the most benefits and the most risks for societies. The impact of these technologies may be dramatic. In particular, it is important to ensure that jobs are not lost as a result of these emerging risks and opportunities.



# THE SOCIAL DIMENSION OF THE ARMED FORCES

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Moderated by **Caroline Henrion**,  
Policy Manager and **Rebekka  
Haffner**, Project Officer

at the **European Organisation of  
Military Associations (EUROMIL)**

Military trade unions are well established and respected as social partners in some European countries. In Denmark, for example, they are part of the joint council system which has existed since 1949. Over 90% of military employees there are union members. From a Danish perspective, political leadership is needed to ensure soldiers enjoy fundamental democratic rights and freedoms – especially as their task is to protect democracy.

Unfortunately, the situation of military personnel is more problematic in countries such as Italy and Spain. Participants reported that associations there have difficulties gaining representative status which could allow them to join negotiations on pressing issues like military health and safety, or ex-soldiers' reintegration in the civilian labour market.

The controversial issue of soldiers' right to was also discussed. In some European countries, such as Sweden, the military have the right to strike – although they have never used it.

EUROMIL does not call for the right to strike. The organisation is aware this might cause national security problems. Experience shows, moreover, that issues can be solved during negotiations in a well-regulated social dialogue, without the need to invoke the right to strike.

Going to court should only be the last step to resolve breaches of soldiers' fundamental rights, even where there is the legal possibility to submit issues to the European courts. A better compromise can often be reached when all parties sit together and negotiate. Most countries also have national complaint mechanisms and Ombuds institutions (outside of the military chain of command) to which problems can be reported.

It is essential to promote the "Citizen in Uniform" concept on an international level. The European Parliament added this dimension to its resolution on the European Defence Union in 2016. As long as security and defence issues are decided on a national level, the role of the European institutions is to encourage member states to work towards the harmonisation and standardisation of the living and working conditions of the military personnel. The future framework of European defence should include a strong social dimension.

When military professionals from different national backgrounds are working together, questions of identity and military culture arise that can influence cohesion in military units. If a few fundamental common principles - such as the "Citizen in Uniform" concept - are respected, military diversity does not stand in the way of more European defence cooperation and integration.

Participants also looked to the future and discussed the challenges of new technologies and the emergence of cyber as an operational domain. These trends will force military authorities, associations and politicians to rethink the social dimension of security and of the military profession. Soldiers need training on new technological equipment and should remain "cognitively fit" in addition to physically fit.

# ADDRESSING THE ROOT CAUSES OF MIGRATION AND TERRORISM: THE CASE OF SYRIA

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Moderated by **Abdy Yeganeh**,  
Director

at the **Independent Diplomat  
Brussels**

In recent years, Europe has suffered at firsthand the consequences of an increasingly unstable world, particularly in the form of a refugee crisis and the threat of terrorism. Both phenomena can be attributed to war and chaos in the Middle East, especially in Syria. With more than 5 million refugees in Syria alone, and the recent spate of terror attacks in a number of European capitals, European leadership is looking for a solution. Addressing the root causes of the Syrian crisis to bring about a sustainable solution must be part of Europe's comprehensive plan to deal with the refugee crisis and threat of terrorism. But the EU and individual member states have yet to define their role in ongoing international efforts to address the war in Syria. What is the way forward?

There was a broad agreement that the EU response to challenges that have arisen out of Syria, namely the refugee crisis and terrorism have been less than effective. And that new solutions are needed to have any genuine impact for the long term stabilisation of the country and its surrounding areas by at large.

Participants were well aware of the complex geo political forces at play, with Saudi, Iranian and Russian involvement identified as the main challenges causing disruption and conflict in the region. And that it was fundamental to engage with these sides should there

be any lasting, long term solution. The discussion went further, agreeing that Syria was a proxy war, played out against Iran and Syria, and broad agreement that the EU should use its diplomatic clout and perceived relative diplomatic advantage to open doors in Riyadh and Tehran – something that perhaps other individual member states can't do due to wider political reasons.

When asked whether the EU should go further than diplomatic and political means to address the challenges in the region which have been ongoing for the past seven years, the overriding position was that the EU must remain an impartial entity, much like the UN. With the group unanimously agreeing that the use of punitive measures, such as economic sanctions or military action, must not be considered at any cost. That is despite the war crimes highlighted committed by the aforementioned countries and prolonged crisis in the region.

In conclusion, despite the disagreement between our experts and the group about the extended role the EU beyond using political and diplomatic instruments, it was clear that there is a need for closer and broader cooperation and political will to tackle the ongoing crisis in Syria. And that a clear strategy must be set out for the region which includes Iran, Saudi Arabia and Russia as part of the process.

# JIHADIST TERRORISM IN EUROPE SINCE THE PROCLAMATION OF THE CALIPHATE: EVOLUTIONS AND TRENDS

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Moderated by **Francesco Marone**, Research Fellow for Programme on Radicalization and International Terrorism

at the **Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI)**

The discussion took as a basis *Fear Thy Neighbor: Radicalization and Jihadist Attacks*, a database of all attacks in Europe and North American from the declaration of the Islamic State (IS) "Caliphate" up to mid-September 2017. The original database was produced by ISPI in collaboration with GWU to analyse the socio-demographic characteristics of each perpetrator, their pre-event behaviour and some event-specific information - including connections to terrorist groups such as IS.

Several participants asked about possible links between international migration and terrorism. Given that migrants – and especially Muslim migrants - are often victims of prejudice and negative stereotyping, it is not surprising that migration is associated with terrorism. However, there is relatively little evidence supporting such links. Several studies, including a detailed recent ISPI report, show the jihadist threat in Europe is largely home-grown.

The discussion also dealt with the relationship between terrorism in Europe and the fate of the "Caliphate" in the Middle East. Militarily, IS appears to be in crisis in the Middle East and its collapse looks close. It seems likely,



however, that the cause of global jihadism will survive and continue to represent a threat to the West in the years to come. IS, with its "state", has been a formidable catalyst for jihadist mobilisation in Europe and around the world.

Another important topic was the role of mosques and imams. Today in Europe, mosques are less important for jihadist radicalisation than in the past. However, the role of imams is still crucial – for example in the Barcelona attacks in August 2017. The problem of training is important and complex. Sunni Islam does not have a clear hierarchy and Muslims in Europe refer to many countries, cultures and traditions. However, it is crucial to develop a constructive dialogue and agree on common rules

One participant raised the complex question of developing "counter-narratives" in counter-terrorism. Although there was a recognition that "publicity is the oxygen of terrorism", it was also noted that controlling the publication of extremist materials is very complicated in a democratic society, especially on the Internet.

Many contributions concerned the crucial role of social networks - often based on pre-existing personal bonds among friends and family members - at the "meso" level, that is between the individual "micro" level and society at the "macro" level. In fact, there is no common profile of European jihadists and levels of radicalisation are not automatically associated with socio-economic integration.

The discussion referred to the need to combine "hard" repressive measures with "soft" preventive measures of counter-radicalisation and de-radicalisation.

# ADDRESSING CLIMATE FRAGILITY RISKS - WHAT WORKS?

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Moderated by **Florian Krampe**,  
Researcher in Climate and Risk

at the **Stockholm International  
Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)**

There is a strong overlap between countries vulnerable to climate change and those that are fragile and conflict-affected.

Over 600,000 people were displaced in summer 2017 floods in Sri Lanka; drought threatens 11 mln people in Kenya, Ethiopia and Somalia; around Lake Chad, depleted resources, poverty and conflict interact with climate change to leave 10.7 mln needing humanitarian assistance. These are just a few pieces of the mounting evidence that climate change exacerbates insecurity and suffering in already fragile states.

A recent report by the UN Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), showed over 60% of people facing hunger and malnutrition live in conflict-affected countries.

Climate-related security risks contribute to migration and insurgent recruitment of young people. 'The world faces increasingly complex security challenges, but lacks the institutions needed to deal with them,' SIPRI Director Dan Smith says in a new film on the issue.

The rapid-fire chat, hosted by SIPRI aimed to brainstorm on solutions. During the hour-long chat, 21 participants joined to share experiences on climate-fragility.

Participants emphasised climate change's role as a threat multiplier, making people more vulnerable to environmental conditions and the environment vulnerable

to changing climatic patterns. The overlap of such conditions hampers recovery opportunities.

Conversation steered towards ways international organisations could gain the “right” to address climate-fragility impacts while avoiding being drawn into local conflicts. The experience of well-intended international interventions triggering severe, unanticipated consequences should serve as a lesson of what to avoid.

Participants recommended starting at the local level, liaising with regional authorities – where possible - and ensuring that the reasons for international intervention are clearly established and understood by local communities.

Some debaters looked at the potential for tension between the sovereignty of local authorities to address domestic conflicts and the potential of climate-driven crises to produce transnational impacts requiring multi-party resolution.

Participants pondered reforms to make international governance regimes, such as the UN, more “fit for purpose” in addressing current and anticipated climate-fragility risks.

A recent SIPRI policy brief by Camilla Born argues that the UN Security Council (UNSC) has failed to consistently or systematically address climate-related security risks. The UNSC should strengthen climate risk-informed

decision making and facilitate coordination on climate security across the UN.

SIPRI's recent work leaves no doubt that climate change has far-reaching implications for human livelihoods and activities, including security ramifications. A recent study entitled *Climate-Related Security Risks: Towards an Integrated Approach*, shows how multifaceted security risks require an array of integrated policy responses. A SIPRI policy brief by Malin Mobjörk details three ways to strengthen such responses: identify common concepts to facilitate collaboration across policy communities; develop organizational structures to reinforce coordination; and cultivate deeper understanding of climate-related security risks.

A truly integrated approach cannot be achieved without strategic guidance based on long-term thinking. Sustained and coherent leadership is vital.

# TOWARDS A EUROPEAN FEMINIST FOREIGN POLICY

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Swedish Foreign Minister Margot Wallström's 2015 announcement of a feminist foreign policy marked a turning point for gender equality in international affairs. Yet, although gender is mentioned in EU's 2016 Global Strategy on foreign and security policy, it does not constitute a fundamental principle.

WIIIS Brussels hosted this rapid live chat which showed great commitment to the feminist foreign policy concept, but also examined how difficult it is to implement in practice.

The need is clear. Women's rights are under attack even in places where women have advanced. We must fight complacency over gender. So long as women and girls are made a specific target of war, we need a foreign policy that has a special focus on women.

That is in the interest of all. There are mountains of evidence that women are crucial for economic, social and cultural development. In conflict prevention and resolution, in fact across the whole conflict cycle, women play a crucial role in ensuring peace

There should be two aspects to a European feminist foreign policy: bringing greater diversity into policymaking, including through more women peacekeepers, trainers, soldiers or crafters of peace deals; and ensuring all foreign and security policies contain a strong gender focus.

UN Security Council resolution 1325, about women's specific needs in conflict and peace building is a good outline of what a feminist foreign policy should look like. It

Moderated by **Rosa Balfour**, Senior Fellow, Europe programme at the German Marshall Fund of the United States and **Pauline Massart**, Head of Communication at the European Defence Agency

at **Women in International Security (WIIIS) Brussels**

takes into account women's specific needs, and includes women as military and civilian personnel, as well as in negotiation processes and external projects.

The U.S. Marines have just promoted their first female officer, Britain's armed forces have lifted restrictions on women in combat or other positions, and more countries are accepting women in frontline combat roles. These women are implementing their countries' foreign policy, so surely it should reflect their involvement.

The Sustainable Development Goals also have gender high among their priorities. Canada is introducing a feminist International Assistance Policy. The EU should look at the lessons learnt.

Feminism is still charged with negative connotations. Changing institutional mind-sets takes time. Too often, women have to distance themselves from gender-based approaches to avoid being seen as "the crazy feminist". It is crucial to engage in feminist discussions that have the potential and power to drive major change.

The feminist perspective is often neglected because of the "non-urgency" of the problem. This is why it is so important to keep pushing in the media and civil society. The higher the demand for a feminist perspective on foreign policy, the greater the urgency for policy makers.

Work on non-feminist issues too! Women's expertise across the spectrum of foreign and security policy will strengthen the realisation that their knowledge will inform a smarter debate. If we don't mainstream the feminist perspective into everything we do, we risk remaining stuck in a gender corner.

Be outspoken: for too long we have not been sufficiently explicit. The time is right to "come out" and state that it's OK to be a feminist and to push for a feminist foreign policy.

# THE ROLE OF YOUTH IN TRANSFORMING WARFARE

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Academics, NGOs, policymakers and young professionals joined this live chat on the role and prospects of young people in 21st-century warfare, moderated by Young Professionals in Foreign Policy. It aimed to identify the footprint of a new generation amid the staggering recent changes in the security realm.

Moderated by **Solène Jomier**,  
Director of Security and Defence

at the **Young Professionals  
in Foreign Policy Brussels**

Young people form the biggest demographic, with under-30s representing up to 50% of the global population, but they remain under-represented and unconsidered in decision-making processes, including in the security sphere.

Difficulties identifying this complex, constantly evolving group represent a limitation to efforts to promote youth inclusion in decision-making, but participants agreed more efforts are badly needed.

In the 21st century, the emergence of new information and communication technologies in a globalised, interconnected world has allowed youth to better engage, giving them a far more influential role. It has also improved their capacity to exchange, structure and voice concerns. Their increased access to education has also been a key factor.

Young people are no longer a mere subgroup, impacted by security changes - as an opportunity or a threat. They are now willing and able to impact those changes.

The link between youth and technology was a particularly interesting subject explored in the chat. Participants highlighted how the new generation's tech savvy was giving young people an unprecedented advantage in areas such as hybrid warfare, drones, cybersecurity and artificial intelligence.

In this perspective, participants expressed concern over the ambiguous potential of these "digital-natives", arguing their ability to adapt fast to the new tools of warfare could be both a blessing and a curse.

Some argued that the well-framed and properly encouraged participation of this new, highly educated generation could trigger the emergence of innovative solutions for peace and stability that help make the world a better, safer place.

However, others wondered whether such a generation could turn its back on peace, if its feelings of exclusion and under-representation remain unanswered.

Despite gaining more outlets to voice their concerns, young people still seem excluded from decision-making at the highest levels and are only represented through grassroots efforts. If those efforts are ignored - or worse - repressed, this large demographic could turn to subversion, turning into a major driver of insecurity.

Besides featuring among the victims of warfare, young people could develop more into violent players – as has already been the case, for example, with Islamic State.

The live chat concluded by discussing actions to prevent this scenario becoming reality. Suggestions included a better generational mix within the traditional decision-making framework; tackling exclusion and unemployment; and increased awareness among world leaders.




## BEHIND THE SCENES: PEOPLE & NUMBERS




This section highlights the most interesting data from this year's global online brainstorm including the diverse scope of participation from various affiliations and countries.


### 1. MOST POPULAR TOPICS




### 2. MOST POPULAR TOPICS BY REGION




### 3. TOP PARTICIPATING COUNTRIES OUT OF 122




### 4. TOP 5 COUNTRIES WITH THE HIGHEST WOMEN'S PARTICIPATION




### 5. MOST POPULAR TOPICS BY GENDER




### 6. GENDER AND PARTICIPATION



### 7. AFFILIATION



### 8. AGE CATEGORIES



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Editor Emeritus at the World Policy Journal & Columnist at CNN Opinion



## GILLES DE KERCHOVE

Counter-Terrorism Coordinator at the Council of the European Union



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Member of the European Parliament Subcommittee on Human Rights



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Founder and CEO of Cymmetria



## ELMAR BROK

Member of the European Parliament Committee on Foreign Affairs



## ANNA ELŻBIETA FOTYGA

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


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# COALITION PARTNERS

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The coalition partners gave Debating Security Plus its truly global nature, reaching out to their network of experts around the world.

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- Il Caffè Geopolitico
- Institute for the Danube Region and Central Europe (IDM)
- Istituto Affari Internazionali
- Law and Internet Foundation
- MacKenzie Institute
- Partnership for Peace Consortium
- Research Institute for European and American Studies
- Security Europe
- The Delma Institute
- The Wana Institute
- Trans European Policy Studies Association
- Women Political Leaders
- Young Australians in International Affairs

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The junior moderators monitored the discussions during Debating Security Plus and provided key support to moderating partners by identifying key ideas and emerging themes as Debating Security Plus unfolded, helping to guide participants towards final recommendations. The Debating Security Plus team is extremely grateful to:

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